Philosophy of Education in a Poor Historical Moment: A Personal Account

Under the post-metaphysical sky “old” humanistic-oriented education is possible solely at the cost of its transformation into its negative, into a power that is determined to diminish human potentials for self-exaltation. Nothing less than total metamorphosis is needed to rescue the core of humanistic genesis: the quest for edifying Life and resistance to the call for “home-returning” into the total harmony that is promised to us within nothingness.     

自然数码奇象记忆法记忆复杂数字的神经机制

本研究采用学习-再认范式和复杂数字记忆材料,考察自然数码奇象记忆法相对于机械记忆法在记忆提取上的优势及神经机制。行为结果表明,自然数码奇象记忆法比机械记忆法的再认准确率更高。事件相关电位分析结果显示,再认提取阶段奇象记忆条件下诱发的N400和N700波幅显著更低,这说明奇象记忆提取更容易。在自然数码奇象记忆条件下,正确再认旧数字诱发的前额区、左顶枕叶区及中顶枕叶区N700成分与使用自然数码奇象记忆有关。本研究表明,采用自然数码奇象记忆可以减少或跨越语义加工,从而提高个体对材料的记忆效率。     

The Knowledge Argument and Objectivity

In this paper I argue that Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument is better considered not as an argument against physicalism, but as an argument that objective theories must be incomplete. I argue that despite the apparent diversity of responses to the knowledge argument, they all boil down to a response according to which genuine epistemic gains are made when an individual has an experience. I call this the acquaintance response. I then argue that this response violates an intuitive stricture on the objectivity of theories. Therefore, the knowledge argument does show that objective theories cannot provide a complete understanding of the world. The result, however, is that both objective dualism and objective physicalism are refuted by the argument. In the end it is suggested that the notion of “subjective physicalism” is one that should be pursued.     

How Wittgenstein Defeated Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment

In 1913 Wittgenstein raised an objection to Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment that eventually led Russell to abandon his theory. As he put it in the Tractatus, the objection was that “the correct explanation of the form of the proposition, ‘A makes the judgement p’, must show that it is impossible for a judgement to be a piece of nonsense. (Russell’s theory does not satisfy this requirement,” (5.5422). This objection has been widely interpreted to concern type restrictions on the constituents of judgment. I argue that this interpretation is mistaken and that Wittgenstein’s objection is in fact a form of the problem of the unity of the proposition.