Executive disorders and perceived socio‐emotional changes after traumatic brain injury

Although socio‐emotional changes are very frequently encountered after traumatic brain injury (TBI), the psychological mechanisms underlying these disorders are still poorly understood. This study aimed to explore the relationships between dysexecutive syndrome (assessed with the Behavioural Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome [BADS]) and socio‐emotional changes assessed by the Iowa scales of personality change (ISPC) in patients with TBI. The BADS was thus administered to 25 patients with TBI and to 25 healthy controls. Simultaneously, a close relative of each patient was given the ISPC in order to assess socio‐emotional changes. Results indicated that patients displayed significantly lower executive performances than controls and experimented significant socio‐emotional changes. The Modified Six Elements Test was the only subtask of the BADS to be significantly related to behavioural changes, and more specifically to externalizing disorders. It is concluded that executive functions, and especially multitasking, encompass processes whereby one can consciously control one's emotional reactions and behaviours.     

What Are the Brain Mechanisms on Which Psychological Processes Are Based?

ABSTRACT— That the human brain is the organ of the mind is not in dispute, but we know remarkably little about the brain mechanisms underlying the mind. What are the functional structures and computational processes of the human brain that subserve cognition, emotion, and behavior? Given the complexity of the human brain, progress in understanding the functional organization and structure of the human brain depends on sophisticated theoretical specifications of the psychological representations and processes that differentiate two or more comparison conditions. Psychological scientists, therefore, are well positioned to lead the search for brain mechanisms underlying psychological processes. Doing so constitutes an expansion of the purview of psychological science beyond a science of behavior, and beyond a science of the mind, to include a science of the brain. Such an expansion of the mission of psychological science has implications for the infrastructure and training needs of the discipline.     

Evaluating a dual‐process model of risk: affect and cognition as determinants of risky choice

In three studies we addressed the impact of perceived risk and negative affect on risky choice. In Study 1, we tested a model that included both perceived risk and negative affect as predictors of risky choice. Study 2 and Study 3 replicated these findings and examined the impact of affective versus cognitive processing modes. In all the three studies, both perceived risk and negative affect were shown to be significant predictors of risky choice. Furthermore, Study 2 and Study 3 showed that an affective processing mode strengthened the relation between negative affect and risky choice and that a cognitive processing mode strengthened the relation between perceived risk and risky choice. Together, these findings show support for the idea of a dual‐process model of risky choice. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Phonetic recalibration only occurs in speech mode

Upon hearing an ambiguous speech sound dubbed onto lipread speech, listeners adjust their phonetic categories in accordance with the lipread information (recalibration) that tells what the phoneme should be. Here we used sine wave speech (SWS) to show that this tuning effect occurs if the SWS sounds are perceived as speech, but not if the sounds are perceived as non-speech. In contrast, selective speech adaptation occurred irrespective of whether listeners were in speech or non-speech mode. These results provide new evidence for the distinction between a speech and non-speech processing mode, and they demonstrate that different mechanisms underlie recalibration and selective speech adaptation.     

Self-constructing

In our societies, where jobs are unstable and employment uncertain, and where the traditional social bearings tend to lose their hold, individuals must deal with a major issue: designing their lives. To help them do this, counselors need to develop certain appropriate procedures. This development supposes that knowledge is available about the main factors and processes of self-construction. This article puts forth a general theoretical model that describes self-construction as a system of (past, present and anticipated) subjective identity forms the dynamic of which originates in the tension between two kinds of reflexivity. Furthermore a counseling interview that builds on this self-construction model is outlined. It aims to help clients develop some expectations regarding their future, to consider their system of subjective identity forms from a future perspective and to commit themselves to the advancement of this design and its redesigning.     

Mirror neurons and embodied simulation in the development of archetypes and self-agency

Abstract :  In this paper I explore the role of mirror neurons and motor intentionality in the development of self-agency. I suggest that this will also give us a firmer basis for an emergent view of archetypes, as key components in the development trajectory of self-agency, from its foundation in bodily action to its mature expression in mentalization and a conscious awareness of intentionality. I offer some ideas about the implications of these issues of self-agency for our clinical work with patients whose developmental trajectory of self-agency has been partially inhibited, so that their communications have a coercive effect. I discuss the possibility that this kind of clinical phenomenon may relate to Gallese and Lakoff's hypothesis that abstract thought and imagination are forms of simulated action, and that the same sensory-motor circuits that control action also control imagination, concept formation and understanding, but with a crucial development, that of an inhibition of the connections between secondary pre-motor cortical areas and the primary motor cortex. I shall speculate that in the earlier developmental stages of self-agency, the separation of secondary from primary motor areas is not complete, so that imagination and thought are not entirely independent of physical action.     

Relations between mental verb and false belief understanding in Cantonese-speaking children

Previous research has shown that linguistic forms that codify mental contents bear a specific relation with children’s false belief understanding. These forms include mental verbs and their following complements, yet the two have not been considered separately. The current study examined the roles of mental verb semantics and the complement syntax in children’s false belief understanding. Independent tasks were used to measure verb meaning, complements, and false belief understanding such that the verbs in question were present only in the verb meaning test, and no linguistic devices biased toward false belief were used in the false belief test. We focused on (a) some mental verbs that obligatorily affirm or negate what follows and (b) sentential complements, the content of which is to be evaluated against the mind of another person, not reality. Results showed that only (a) predicted false belief understanding in a group of Cantonese-speaking 4-year-olds, controlling for nonverbal intelligence and general language ability. In particular, children’s understanding of the strong nonfactive semantics of the Cantonese verbs /ji5-wai4/ (“falsely think”) predicted false belief understanding most strongly. The current findings suggest that false belief understanding is specifically related to the comprehension of mental verbs that entail false thought in their semantics.     

Introduction to Multi-Level Community Based Culturally Situated Interventions

This introduction to a special issue of the American Journal of Community Psychiatry is the result of a symposium at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Applied Anthropology, 2006, that brought together anthropologists and psychologists involved in community based collaborative intervention studies to examine critically the assumptions, processes and results of their multilevel interventions in local communities with local partners. The papers were an effort to examine context by offering a theoretical framework for the concept of “level” in intervention science, and advocating for “multi‐level” approaches to social/behavioral change. They presented examples of ways in which interventions targeted social “levels” either simultaneously or sequentially by working together with communities across levels, and drawing on and co‐constructing elements of local culture as components of the intervention. The papers raised a number of important issues, for example: (1) How are levels defined and how should collaborators be chosen; (2) does it matter at which level multilevel interventions begin; (3) do multilevel interventions have a greater effect on desired outcomes than level‐specific interventions; (4) are multilevel interventions more sustainable; (5) are multilevel interventions cost effective to run, and evaluate; (6) how can theories of intervention be generated and adapted to each level of a multilevel intervention; (7) how should intervention activities at each level coordinate to facilitate community resident or target population empowerment? Many of these questions were only partially addressed in the papers presented at that time, and are more fully addressed in the theoretical papers, case studies and approach to evaluation included in this collection.