Capacity to vary writing hand/posture in relation to the Levy and Reid model for control of writing

Inherent in Levy and Reid's (1978) neurological model for the control of writing hand/posture were implications pertaining to the capacity of people to vary their hand/posture when writing. These implications were formulated into the writing variation hypothesis. The skill with which right-normal, left-inverted, and left-normal writers were able to write using hand/postures other than their preferred one was examined. The resulting performance was incompatible with Levy and Reid's neurological model. Whether or not subjects wrote with their preferred hand seemed more important than which posture they used.     

Journal of experimental psychology: human perception and performance

We examined the nonveridicality of visual direction produced by monocular viewing. In Experiment 1, 19 subjects pointed to a small light and moved a small light to their subjective median plane. The extent of constant error under monocular and binocular viewing conditions differed in both tasks (p less than .001). The monocular-binocular difference was larger when the viewing distance was 25 cm than when it was 50 cm (p less than .01). Also, correlations between phoria and monocular-binocular differences ranged from .58 to .77, depending on viewing distances and tasks. The effects of phoria within the context of Hering's .001). The monocular-binocular difference was larger when the viewing distance was 25 cm than when it was 50 cm (p less than .01). Also, correlations between phoria and monocular-binocular differences ranged from .58 to .77, depending on viewing distances and tasks. The effects of phoria within the context of Hering's .001). The monocular-binocular difference was larger when the viewing distance was 25 cm than when it was 50 cm (p less than .01). Also, correlations between phoria and monocular-binocular differences ranged from .58 to .77, depending on viewing distances and tasks. The effects of phoria within the context of Hering's principle of visual direction can account for these results. In Experiment 2, the same subjects adapted to phoria-induced error by placing a finger over a monocularly viewed target. The difference in their pointing responses before and after the task were reliable (p less than .005), and the correlations between phoria and the pre- to posttest differences were .45 and .77, depending on the number of adaptation trials. We argue that all monocular experiments dealing with visual direction should control for these effects.     

Detection in a four-observation two-channel task

Two models are proposed for a four-observation two-channel forced-choice paradigm of signal detection. The first model, an extension of signal detection theory, fails, while the second model, an extension of the classical decision threshold model, succeeds.     

Attention bands in absolute identification

If both the number of one-dimensional signals and their range are sufficiently large (about 7 and 20 dB for loudness), the information transmitted in absolute identification is not much increased by increasing either variable (Miller, 1956; Braida & Durlach, 1972). The data can be represented in terms of Thurstonian discriminal dispersions in which the variance is proportional to the square of the signal range in decibels (Durlach & Braida, 1969; Gravetter & Lockhead, 1973), but it is by no means obvious what sorts of mechanisms would lead to this model. An alternative is proposed, namely, that there is a roving attention band, about 10 to 15 dB wide, such that signals falling within the band are represented by a sensory sample size about an order ot magnitude larger than when the same signal falls outside the band. With reasonable choices for parameters, including the subjective continuum growing as a power function of intensity with an exponent about 3, this nicely accounts for the data. In an attempt to examine the change of performance with range, we replicated the BraidaoDurlach experiment with many additional points. These data are not, however, adequate to decide between the two models.     

What Right to Die?

This letter first discusses two meanings of a "right to die." In the popular sense, the term refers to a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. In the strict sense, the term signifies an affirmative right to obtain death--a right to suicide. The letter then explores the legal implications of a suicide right. This right would extend to competent adults, mature minors, and probably also incompetent persons. Counselors would have to inform clients of the suicide option. Intervention to prevent suicide could trigger civil liability. Suicidal intentions would not justify involuntary commitment. Consent would become a defense to homicide.     

Decision biases in intertemporal choice and choice under uncertainty: Testing a common account

Two experiments were performed to test a psychophysical account of parallels between biases in risky choice and intertemporal choice. Experiment 1 demonstrated the common difference effect in intertemporal choice and the common ratio effect in risky choice. As was predicted, these two biases were uncorrelated with each other, although each was correlated across monetary/health domains. This result is consistent with the supposition that these two biases result from psychophysical properties of two different dimensions (time and probability, respectively). Experiment 2 examined the magnitude effect in intertemporal choice and the peanuts effect in risky choice. These two biases were correlated with each other but were uncorrelated across monetary/health domains. This result is consistent with the supposition that these two biases result from psychophysical properties of the same dimension (utility of money or health).