What Is an Inconsistent Truth Table?

Do truth tables—the ordinary sort that we use in teaching and explaining basic propositional logic—require an assumption of consistency for their construction? In this essay we show that truth tables can be built in a consistency-independent paraconsistent setting, without any appeal to classical logic. This is evidence for a more general claim—that when we write down the orthodox semantic clauses for a logic, whatever logic we presuppose in the background will be the logic that appears in the foreground. Rather than any one logic being privileged, then, on this count partisans across the logical spectrum are in relatively similar dialectical positions.     

Epistemic justification and the ignorance excuse

One of the most common excuses is ignorance. Ignorance does not always excuse, however, for sometimes ignorance is culpable. One of the most natural ways to think of the difference between exculpating and culpable ignorance is in terms of justification; that is, one’s ignorance is exculpating only if it is justified and one’s ignorance is culpable only if it not justified (call this the justification thesis). Rosen (J Phil 105(10):591–610, 2008) explores this idea by first offering a brief account of justification, and then two cases that he claims are counter examples to the justification thesis. The aim of this paper is to defend the justification thesis against Rosen’s two cases. The argument will proceed in the following way. First, I clarify a few things about the nature of culpable ignorance generally and why the justification thesis is so intuitive. I then present Rosen’s purported counterexamples. Once this is done, I argue that Rosen misses an important view of justification in the epistemology literature that I call the pragmatic view. I present a general picture of the pragmatic view, and explain how it fits naturally with our practices of criticizing people’s beliefs, including claims of culpable ignorance. Finally, I address Rosen’s cases arguing that, if the pragmatic view is right, then Rosen’s cases are not counterexamples to the justification thesis.     

Overparenting and Narcissism in Young Adults: The Mediating Role of Psychological Control

Overparenting, or “helicopter parenting,” can be generally characterized as parenting that is well-intentioned, but over-involved and intrusive. This style of parenting has been especially highlighted in the lives of young adults, who may be inhibited by this form of parenting in the appropriate development of autonomy and independence. Overparenting shares conceptual similarities with parents’ psychological control practices, which involve emotional and psychological manipulation of children (e.g., inducing guilt, withholding love as a form of control). Although these constructs contain key differences, both have been linked to narcissism in young adults, by way of parental over-involvement in children’s lives. Thus, we sought to explore parental psychological control as a mediator between overparenting and narcissism, including in regard to both grandiose and vulnerable narcissistic phenotypes. Participants included 380 young adult college students (age range: 18–26 years) who completed the Pathological Narcissism Inventory, as well as reports of their parents’ behaviors related to overparenting and psychological control. Mediation analyses through Process in SPSS supported the hypothesized role of parental psychological control as a mediator between overparenting and narcissistic traits, including traits related to both grandiose and vulnerable narcissism. Effect sizes for each analysis were modest. This study further clarifies the nature of overparenting, and speaks to the need for further research in establishing the mechanisms by which overparenting may lead to narcissistic traits among young adults.