Reliabilism and the extra value of knowledge

Goldman and Olsson (2009) have responded to the common charge that reliabilist theories of knowledge are incapable of accounting for the value knowledge has beyond mere true belief. We examine their “conditional probability solution” in detail, and show that it does not succeed. The conditional probability relation is too weak to support instrumental value, and the specific relation they describe is inessential to the value of knowledge. At best, they have described conditions in which knowledge indicates that additional epistemic value is likely to be forthcoming in the future. We also argue that their motive analogy breaks down. The problem, we conclude, is that being produced by a reliable process is not sufficient for a belief to be justified.     

Statistical learning is related to reading ability in children and adults

There is little empirical evidence showing a direct link between a capacity for statistical learning (SL) and proficiency with natural language. Moreover, discussion of the role of SL in language acquisition has seldom focused on literacy development. Our study addressed these issues by investigating the relationship between SL and reading ability in typically developing children and healthy adults. We tested SL using visually presented stimuli within a triplet learning paradigm and examined reading ability by administering the Wide Range Achievement Test (WRAT-4; Wilkinson & Robertson, 2006). A total of 38 typically developing children (mean age of 9;5 years, range 6;4-12;5) and 37 healthy adults (mean age of 21 years, range 18-34) were assessed. In children, SL was significantly related to reading ability. Importantly, this relationship was independent of grade and also age. The adult data, too, revealed that SL was significantly related to reading ability. A regression analysis of the combined child and adult data revealed that SL accounted for a unique amount of variance in reading ability, after age and attention had been taken into consideration. For the first time, this study provides empirical evidence that a capacity for more effective SL is related to higher reading ability in the general population.     

Patient and partner correlates of couple relationship functioning in bipolar disorder

Extensive research in unipolar depressed and population-based samples has shown cross-partner associations between depressive symptoms and relationship adjustment. Yet despite evidence that bipolar disorder (BPD) is a more chronic and severe illness than unipolar depression, that individuals with BPD are at risk for interpersonal dysfunction, and that critical, unsupportive relationships are predictive of the course of depressive symptoms in BPD, there have been limited efforts to understand the correlates of relationship functioning within BPD. The current study addresses this gap in the literature by examining the associations between the depressive and manic symptoms of individuals with BPD, their partner's depressive symptoms, and relationship functioning, using a multimethod, multi-informant approach. Results revealed that the depressive symptoms of the individual with BPD were associated with poorer relationship functioning, particularly when the partner without BPD also had elevated depressive symptoms. In addition, an interaction between the individual with BPD's depressive and manic symptoms was observed, such that manic symptoms were associated with increased observed hostility and poorer partner relationship adjustment, but only when depressive symptoms were also elevated. These effects persisted even after overall mental health of both partners was controlled.     

More “C” Please: Commentary on Arch and Craske's (2011) “Addressing Relapse in Cognitive Behavioral Therapy for Panic Disorder”

Comments are offered to clarify the learning model proposed by Arch and Craske (2011) based on extensive clinical experience with the CBT model for treating panic disorder developed by Barlow and Craske (1990). Suggestions are made regarding treatment targets and several cases are offered as examples of how choice of treatment target can make a significant difference when panic appears refractory.     

Refining the understanding of inhibitory processes: how response prepotency is created and overcome

Understanding (a) how responses become prepotent provides insights into when inhibition is needed in everyday life. Understanding (b) how response prepotency is overcome provides insights for helping children develop strategies for overcoming such tendencies. Concerning (a), on tasks such as the day‐night Stroop‐like task, is the difficulty with inhibiting saying the name of the stimulus due to the name being semantically related to the correct response or to its being a valid response on the task (i.e. a member of the response set) though incorrect for this stimulus? Experiment 1 (with 40 4‐year‐olds) suggests that prepotency is caused by membership in the response set and not semantic relation. Concerning (b), Diamond, Kirkham and Amso (2002) found that 4‐year‐olds could succeed on the day‐night task if the experimenter sang a ditty after showing the stimulus card, before the child was to respond. They concluded that it was because delaying children’s responses gave them time to compute the correct answer. However, Experiment 2 (with 90 3‐year‐olds) suggests that such a delay helps because it gives the incorrect, prepotent response time to passively dissipate, not because of active computation during the delay.     

Neural circuits underlying the pathophysiology of mood disorders

Although mood disorders constitute leading causes of disability, until recently little was known about their pathogenesis. The delineation of anatomical networks that support emotional behavior (mainly derived from animal studies) and the development of neuroimaging technologies that allow in vivo characterization of anatomy, physiology, and neurochemistry in human subjects with mood disorders have enabled significant advances towards elucidating the pathophysiology of major depressive disorder (MDD) and bipolar disorder (BD). In this review, we integrate insights from human and animal studies, which collectively suggest that MDD and BD involve dysfunction within an extended network including the medial prefrontal cortex and anatomically-related limbic, striatal, thalamic and basal forebrain structures.     

By whose standard? The affective implications of ethnic minorities' comparisons to ethnic minority and majority referents

In a 'diary' study, we examined the frequency and affective implications of 34 ethnic minority students' comparisons to other ethnic minorities or to members of a high-status ethnic majority (i.e., European-Americans). Participants made more frequent comparisons to ethnic majority than ethnic minority referents, although neither type of comparison tended to be perceived in terms of group membership (see also Smith & Leach, 2004). Comparisons to ethnic majority referents did not alter participants' positive affect even where they suggested poor future prospects in status-relevant domains. In contrast, comparisons to fellow ethnic minorities led to increased positive affect when they suggested a future prospect of improvement. We discuss the conceptual and practical implications of social comparison in the context of group status.     

Technical flaws in the coherence theory

Conclusion We have argued that Lehrer's definitions of coherence and justification have serious technical defects. As a result, the definition of justification is both too weak and too strong. We have suggested solutions for some of the problems, but others seem irremediable. We would also argue more generally that if coherence is anything like what Lehrer's theory says it is, then coherence is neither necessary nor sufficient for justification. While our current objections are directed at the letter of Lehrer's theory, other criticisms can be aimed at its very spirit. We would argue that coherence is unnecessary for justification because of the existence of basic beliefs, those about self-presenting states (I have a tingling sensation in my leg) or self-evident truths (All men are men). Such beliefs may be justified even though there are no other propositions in the subject's acceptance system that makes them more probable than competitors. Coherence is, moreover, insufficient for justification, because it ignores the inferential structure of the subject's acceptance system, and requires no justification of any kind for the subject's acceptance system itself. But we must develop these more fundamental objections on another occasion.