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ABSTRACT

An important issue within the field of global ethics is the extent or scope of moral obligation or duties. Cosmopolitanism argues that we have duties to all human beings by virtue of some common property. Communitarian ethics argue that one's scope of obligation is circumscribed by one's community or some other defining property. Public virtues, understood to be either a property that communities possess to function well or a moral excellence constitutive of that community, offer an interesting challenge to this binary by positing moral goods or excellences that are constitutive of a community yet global in application. Virtues such as tolerance, charity, moderation, or benevolence might be examples of such goods or excellences endorsed by a community but applied to individuals who are not members of the community, or, as in the case of environmental ethics, even to entities that are not moral agents. Unlike cosmopolitan ethics, the scope of the obligation does not depend on identifying universal properties, such as rationality, human dignity, or utility, but could be defined entirely by and within a community.  相似文献   
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D H Warren  T E Scott  C Medley 《Perception》1992,21(5):671-689
When an observer (O) uses a map (M) whose orientation does not correspond to the orientation of the environment (E) in which performance occurs, substantial errors occur: these are called map alignment effects. Much of the prior research on map/environment (M/E) alignment has involved maps of simple paths, although alignment effects have also been demonstrated for you-are-here (YAH) maps. A study is reported in which simple YAH maps were used to test the hypothesis that errors with misaligned maps would fall into categories predictable from the application of inappropriate cognitive operations to the misaligned maps, as demonstrated earlier by Rossano and Warren. Further, performance under conditions of M/E misalignment was compared with performance under map/observer (M/O) misalignment, the situation in which the map is sideways or upside-down with respect to the observer. The major hypothesis was supported: predictable errors occurred under conditions of M/E misalignment. Errors under conditions of M/O misalignment were significantly smaller. Furthermore, when given the choice of using M/E or M/O alignment, each at the expense of the other, the overwhelming choice was to retain M/E rather than M/O alignment. This pattern of results occurred even when environmental features were represented by words rather than by lines and shapes on the map. The results underscore the robustness of map alignment effects.  相似文献   
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