The Impact of Absolute Importance and Processing Overlaps on Prospective Memory Performance

Prospective memory is the ability to remember an intention at an appropriate moment in the future. Prospective memory tasks can be more or less important. Previously, importance was manipulated by emphasizing the importance of the prospective memory task relative to the ongoing task it was embedded in. This resulted in better prospective memory performance but also ongoing task costs. In the present study, we simply instructed one group of participants that the prospective memory task was important (i.e., absolute importance instruction) and compared them with a group with relative importance instructions and a control group. The results showed that absolute importance leads to an increase in prospective memory performance without enhancing ongoing task costs, whereas relative importance resulted in both increased prospective memory performance and ongoing task costs. Thus, prospective memory can be enhanced without ongoing task costs, which is particularly crucial for safety‐work contexts. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Considering too few alternatives: The mental model theory of extensional reasoning

When solving a simple probabilistic problem, people tend to build an incomplete mental representation. We observe this pattern in responses to probabilistic problems over a set of premises using the conjunction, disjunction, and conditional propositional connectives. The mental model theory of extensional reasoning explains this bias towards underestimating the number of possibilities: In reckoning with different interpretations of the premises (logical rules, mental model theoretical, and, specific to conditional premises, conjunction and biconditional interpretation) the mental model theory accounts for the majority of observations. Different interpretations of a premise result in a build-up of mental models that are often incomplete. These mental models are processed using either an extensional strategy relying on proportions amongst models, or a conflict monitoring strategy. The consequence of considering too few possibilities is an erroneous probability estimate akin to that faced by decision makers who fail to generate and consider all alternatives, a characteristic of bounded rationality. We compare our results to the results published by Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, Legrenzi, and Caverni [Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 62 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]–88 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]. doi:10 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar].1037 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]/0033 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]-295X Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar].106 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar].1 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar].62 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]], and we observe lower performance levels than those in the original article.     

Delayed reinforcement and runway performance

The Psychological Record -     

相遇与疏远——评海德格尔-雅斯贝尔斯书信往来

由维多里奥.克劳斯特曼出版社和R.皮珀尔出版社出版的《海德格尔-雅斯贝尔斯书信往来》[1](P299)属于一份重要文献,它洞察了这个世纪两位思想家的哲学关系史,并且通过这一历史透视了这个时代的某些问题。最初我曾按照汉斯.萨尼尔(系雅斯贝尔斯-书信编者)的意见在前面标上了《相     

Necessity and sufficiency in abstract conditional reasoning

The necessity and sufficiency of the cause relates to the conclusions people draw on everyday conditional inference problems. The current research explores the effects of necessity and sufficiency in an abstract causal context. Three experiments showed that the subjective ratings of necessity and sufficiency diverge from the objective levels: A sufficient and necessary cause is more often labelled as sufficient than a sufficient and not-necessary cause. Likewise, a necessary and sufficient cause is more often labelled necessary than a necessary and not-sufficient cause. In Experiments 1 and 2 we observed that the robust effects of sufficiency on MP and MT, and of necessity on AC and DA found on everyday reasoning generalise to abstract conditionals. There were also partial effects of sufficiency on AC and DA, and of necessity on MP and MT. When the problem presentation is simplified, as in Experiment 3, these partial effects on reasoning disappear. The reasoning results then relate to the objective levels and less to the subjective levels of necessity and sufficiency. This divergence sheds doubt on the idea that reasoners base their inferences on an active assessment of the necessity and/or sufficiency of the causal relation.