Applying Meta-theory to Achieve Generalisability and Precision in Personality Science

In contrast to traditional theories of personality, the CAPS perspective is a meta-theory that is deliberately "content-free". The generalisability of the theory depends on how widely its basic, common principles and methods can be applied to identify the constructs (e.g. situation-specific encodings, beliefs, values, etc.) relevant to a given domain of behavior and situations. In this commentary we will discuss how the target article illustrates the use of the CAPS meta-theory for developing domain-specific content-full models for smoking cessation, psychopathology, and organisational behavior.     

The Role of Threat in Attitudes Toward Affirmative Action and Its Beneficiaries1

This set of two studies employed the integrated threat theory to examine attitudes toward affirmative action (AA). The first study found that opposition to the policy of AA was predicted by realistic threats, symbolic threats, and personal relevance; while attitudes toward the beneficiaries of AA were predicted by three of the four threat variables (symbolic threats, intergroup anxiety, and negative stereotypes), and in‐group identity. The second study replicated and expanded on the first study and found that the effects of several individual‐difference variables (racism, anti‐Black affect, and political conservatism) on opposition to AA were mediated by three of the threats in the integrated threat theory (realistic threats, symbolic threats, and negative stereotypes). The implications of the results are discussed.     

Taking realization seriously: no cure for epiphobia

The realization relation that allegedly holds between mental and physical properties plays a crucial role for so-called non-reductive physicalism because it is supposed to secure both the ontological autonomy of mental properties and, despite their irreducibility, their ability to make a causal difference to the course of the causally closed physical world. For a long time however, the nature of realization has largely been ignored in the philosophy of mind until a couple of years ago authors like Carl Gillett, Derk Pereboom, or Sydney Shoemaker proposed accounts according to which realization is understood against the background of the so-called ‘causal theory of properties’. At least partially, the hope was to solve the problem of mental causation, in particular the kind of causal exclusion reasoning made famous by Jaegwon Kim, in a way acceptable to non-reductive physicalists. The paper asks whether a proper explication of the realization relation can indeed help explain how physically realized mental properties can be causally efficacious in the causally closed physical world and argues for a negative answer: it is important for the non-reductive physicalist to understand what exactly the realization relation amounts to, but it does not solve the problem of mental causation.