Implications of measures of reliability for theories of priming: Activity in semantic memory is inherently noisy and uncoordinated

In experiments on semantic priming, participants vary substantially in the absolute magnitude of priming they produce. Are these individual differences systematic or do they arise from random processes, and does the answer carry theoretical implications? To find out, we examined split‐half and test–retest reliability of semantic priming in a series of two‐session experiments that crossed relatedness proportion (RP, at .25, .50, and .75) with stimulus–onset asynchrony (SOA, at 200, 350, and 800 ms). Low reliability would indicate little coherence of activity within semantic memory, so that the degree to which any given association influences performance is uncorrelated from one association and time of testing to the next. High reliability would indicate that each person tends to harness his or her semantic knowledge consistently, applying semantic relations among words in much the same way from one word to the next and one time of testing to the next to help task performance, resulting in systematic individual differences. What we observed was low reliability—often zero. When conditions highlighted “automatic activation” (low RP, short SOA), priming was completely uncorrelated from item to item and session to session. Both split‐half and test–retest reliability increased to significant levels under conditions that raised the probability that an activated or retrieved episode of prime experience would help with target recognition, and the probability of intentionally generating the target from the prime. Thus, task‐relevant" utility imposes a modicum of order on semantic associations that are otherwise noisy and uncoordinated. Harnessing semantic memory is like herding cats—without considerable constraint, associations tend to come and go their own ways in independent fashion.     

Is the truth table task mistaken?

There is ample evidence that in classical truth table task experiments false antecedents are judged as “irrelevant”. Instead of interpreting this in support of a suppositional representation of conditionals, Schroyens (2010a Schroyens, W. 2010a. Mistaking the instance for the rule: A critical analysis of the truth-table evaluation paradigm. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 63: 246–259. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2010b Schroyens, W. 2010b. A meta-analytic review of thinking about what is true, possible, and irrelevant in reasoning from or reasoning about conditional propositions. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 22: 897–921. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) attributes it to the induction problem: the impossibility of establishing the truth of a universal claim on the basis of a single case. In the first experiment a truth table task with four options is administered and the correlation with intelligence is inspected. It is observed that “undetermined” is chosen in one third of the judgements and “irrelevant” in another third. A positive correlation is revealed between intelligence and the number of “irrelevant” and “undetermined” judgements. The data do not exclude that a part of the “irrelevant” judgements in classical truth table task experiments might be caused by the induction problem. In the second experiment participants are presented with a simplified four-option truth table task and asked for a justification of their judgements. These justifications show the induction problem is not the reason for choosing the “irrelevant” or “undetermined” option, which is supportive for a suppositional representation of conditionals.     

Pronounced inferences: A study on inferential conditionals

An experimental study is reported which investigates the differences in interpretation between content conditionals (of various pragmatic types) and inferential conditionals. In a content conditional, the antecedent represents a requirement for the consequent to become true. In an inferential conditional, the antecedent functions as a premise and the consequent as the inferred conclusion from that premise. The linguistic difference between content and inferential conditionals is often neglected in reasoning experiments. This turns out to be unjustified, since we adduced evidence on the basis of a quantitative and a qualitative analysis that this difference has a manifest psychological relevance. For the inferential conditionals, participants appear to retrieve the order of events of the original content conditional on which it was based, before they start reasoning with it. The implications of this finding for reasoning research and linguistics will be discussed.     

Age-Related Changes in Executive Function: An Event-Related Potential (ERP) Investigation of Task-Switching

ABSTRACT

Older adults have difficulty when executive control must be brought on line to coordinate ongoing behavior. To assess age-related alterations in executive processing, task-switching performance and event-related potential (ERP) activity were compared in young and older adults on switch, post-switch, pre-switch, and no-switch trials, ordered in demand for executive processes from greatest to least. In stimulus-locked averages for young adults, only switch trials elicited fronto-central P3 components, indicative of task-set attentional reallocation, whereas in older adults, three of the four trial types evinced frontal potentials. In response-locked averages, the amplitude of a medial frontal negativity (MFN), a component reflecting conflict monitoring and detection, increased as a function of executive demands in the ERPs of the young but not those of the older adults. These data suggest altered executive processing in older adults resulting in persistent recruitment of prefrontal processes for conditions that do not require them in the young.     

Age-related differences in memory after attending to distinctiveness or similarity during learning

Episodic memory is vulnerable to age-related change, with older adults demonstrating both impairments in retrieving contextual details and susceptibility to interference among similar events. Such impairments may be due in part to an age-related decline in the ability to encode distinct memory representations. Recent research has examined how manipulating stimulus properties to emphasize distinctiveness can reduce age-related deficits in memory. However, few studies have addressed whether learning strategies that differentially encourage distinctiveness processing attenuate age-related differences in episodic memory. In the present study, participants engaged in two incidental encoding tasks emphasizing either distinctiveness or similarity processing. Results demonstrated higher rates of recollection for stimuli studied under the distinctiveness task than the similarity task in younger but not older adults. These findings suggest a declining capacity for distinctiveness processing to benefit memory in older adults, and raise the possibility that strategies that enhance gist-based encoding may attenuate age-related memory deficits.     

Personality and Memory in Old Age

We examined the impact of personality on episodic memory performance in a sample of 287 healthy adults aged 68-95 years. Extraversion and neuroticism were assessed with a standardized personality inventory. Episodic memory was assessed with an everyday task. Results from regression analyses controlling for the effects of age, gender, and education show that higher extraversion and lower neuroticism are associated with higher episodic memory performance. In addition, the strength of the correlations between neuroticism and episodic memory declined with increasing age in a male sub-sample, revealing an interaction between age and neuroticism.     

Development of a Children's Version of the SCORE Index of Family Function and Change

The Systemic Clinical Outcome and Routine Evaluation (SCORE) Index of Family Function and Change is a recently developed outcome measure. It was designed to be acceptable to adults and children aged 12 and over. Thus far no research has been conducted using the SCORE in children under the age of 12. The aim of this study was to pilot a children's version of the SCORE. An existing 29‐item version of the SCORE was completed by a sample of seven children aged 8–10. Time was allowed for group discussion with the children. Feedback from this stage of the study was used to develop a draft version of the SCORE for children. An expert panel of clinicians and researchers were also consulted. A pilot version of the Child SCORE was administered to 80 children aged 7–10 in an inner London primary school. Thirty‐five children also completed the measure for a second time, 1 week later. Findings suggested that the Child SCORE was acceptable to children in the 8–11 age range. Values for internal reliability and test–retest reliability were good. The Child SCORE appears to be a promising instrument. Further research is required to confirm its acceptability to clinical populations, and to demonstrate sensitivity to change.     

Editorial

Austrian economics ‐ the school of thought associated with Carl Menger, Frederick von Weiser, Eugen von Bohm‐Bawerk, and in this century, Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, Murray N. Rothbard, and Israel Kirzner ‐ is based on a framework of methodological principles and assumptions much at variance with those of traditional or ‘orthodox’ economists. Robert Nozick, in his ‘On Austrian Methodology’, focuses attention on the most fundamental features of this framework, and subjects them to a thoroughgoing and scathing analysis. Singled out for detailed and critical review are: (1) the praxeological concepts of methodological individualism; (2) the claim that economics is an a priori science of human action; (3) the nature of preference and its relation to choice and action; and (4) the assumptions of time‐preference theory. Although Nozick does not consider Austrian views on business cycles, market process analysis, the coordinative and informational effects of the price system, competition, and several other fundamental aspects of praxeology, his criticism strikes at the very root of the praxeological school. This paper attempts to refute each criticism made of the praxeological school by Nozick on a point‐by‐point basis. It thus follows the same pattern as the original paper, and scrutinizes in detail the arguments made by its author.     

Report to the World Federation for Mental Health Editor's Note

The effects of written, cognitive pretraining on self-reported self-disclosure and cohesion in group psychotherapy were studied. Subjects were members of time-limited psychotherapy groups that focused on incest-related issues. The experimental groups were given written cognitive pretraining designed to increase self-reported self-disclosure and cohesion. The control groups received general group information. Subjects in the pretrained groups reported higher levels of self-perceived self-disclosure than the control groups after sessions 4 (p = .003) and 8 (p = .003). Self-reported self-disclosure did not increase over time for pretrained or nonpretrained subjects. Cohesion did not differ across groups, but increased over time for experimental subjects (p = .008), and not for control subjects.