The layman's use of trait and behavioral information to predict behavior

This study investigated conditions that determine subjects' preferences for information about another person's traits versus his specific past behavior in order to predict his future behavior. The similarity-dissimilarity between the situation for which past behavior was available and the one to which predictions had to be made strongly influenced the choice of specific behavioral information versus more general trait information. As expected, behavioral information was preferred most when the situation to which behavior had to be predicted was highly similar to the one for which the past behavioral data were available. On the other hand, more general trait information was preferred in predicting to situations that were not directly similar to those for which past behavioral information was available. The effect of the temporal span covered by available information was also explored.     

The effect of perceived distance on perceived movement

Equations were developed to predict the apparent motion of a physically stationary object resulting from head movement as a function of errors in the perceived distances of the object or of its parts. These equations, which specify the apparent motion in terms of relative and common components, were applied to the results of two experiments. In the experiments, the perceived slant of an object was varied with respect to its physical slant by means of perspective cues. In Experiment I, O reported the apparent motion and apparent distance of each end of the object independently. The results are consistent with the equations in terms of apparent relative motion, but not in terms of apparent common motion. The latter results are attributed to the tendency for apparent relative motion to dominate apparent common motion when both are present simultaneously. In Experiment II, a direct report of apparent relative motion (in this case, apparent rotation) was obtained for illusory slants of a physically frontoparallel object. It was found that apparent rotations in the predicted direction occurred as a result of head motion, even though under these conditions no rotary motion was present on the retina.     

Changes in factor structure of a complex psychomotor test as a function of practice

Scores obtained at eight different stages of practice on the Complex Coordination Test together with scores on 18 reference tests were subjected to a Thurstone Centroid Factor Analysis. Nine meaningful factors were identified in the experimental battery. The results indicated considerable, but systematic, changes in the factor structure of the Complex Coordination Test as practice on the task was continued. The test became less complex (factorially) as practice was continued. Moreover, there was a change in thenature of the factors contributing variance at early and later stages of practice. Implications of the findings are related to certain problems of learning theory, psychomotor test development, and criterion analysis. Skill Components Research Laboratory. The opinions or conclusions contained in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or indorsement of the Department of the Air Force. The writers are indebted to Dr. Jack A. Adams for the basic data on which this analysis is based.     

Sampling theory in item analysis

Since item values obtained by item analysis procedures are not always stable from one situation to another, it follows that selection of items for validity or difficulty is sometimes useless. An application of Chi Square to testing homogeneity of item values is made, in the case of theUL method, and illustrative data are presented. A method of applying sampling theory to Horst's maximizing function is outlined, as illustrative of author's observation that the results of item analysis by any of various methods may be similarly tested.     

The Impact of Absolute Importance and Processing Overlaps on Prospective Memory Performance

Prospective memory is the ability to remember an intention at an appropriate moment in the future. Prospective memory tasks can be more or less important. Previously, importance was manipulated by emphasizing the importance of the prospective memory task relative to the ongoing task it was embedded in. This resulted in better prospective memory performance but also ongoing task costs. In the present study, we simply instructed one group of participants that the prospective memory task was important (i.e., absolute importance instruction) and compared them with a group with relative importance instructions and a control group. The results showed that absolute importance leads to an increase in prospective memory performance without enhancing ongoing task costs, whereas relative importance resulted in both increased prospective memory performance and ongoing task costs. Thus, prospective memory can be enhanced without ongoing task costs, which is particularly crucial for safety‐work contexts. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Considering too few alternatives: The mental model theory of extensional reasoning

When solving a simple probabilistic problem, people tend to build an incomplete mental representation. We observe this pattern in responses to probabilistic problems over a set of premises using the conjunction, disjunction, and conditional propositional connectives. The mental model theory of extensional reasoning explains this bias towards underestimating the number of possibilities: In reckoning with different interpretations of the premises (logical rules, mental model theoretical, and, specific to conditional premises, conjunction and biconditional interpretation) the mental model theory accounts for the majority of observations. Different interpretations of a premise result in a build-up of mental models that are often incomplete. These mental models are processed using either an extensional strategy relying on proportions amongst models, or a conflict monitoring strategy. The consequence of considering too few possibilities is an erroneous probability estimate akin to that faced by decision makers who fail to generate and consider all alternatives, a characteristic of bounded rationality. We compare our results to the results published by Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, Legrenzi, and Caverni [Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 62 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]–88 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]. doi:10 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar].1037 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]/0033 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]-295X Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar].106 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar].1 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar].62 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]], and we observe lower performance levels than those in the original article.