MMPI-A in the inpatient assessment of adolescents with eating disorders.

The MMPI-A (Butcher et al., 1992), like the older MMPI (Hathaway & McKinley, 1983), distinguishes between anorexia and bulimia. In this study, 245 adolescent girls diagnosed with anorexia, bulimia, or eating disorder not otherwise specified completed the MMPI-A. Multivariate analyses revealed significant differences between anorexia and bulimia on the MMPI-A's validity, clinical, content, and supplementary scales, particularly suggesting multiple impulse control problems among bulimic patients. However, profiles were also more homogeneous across eating disorder groups than in studies using the older MMPI, with high points involving some combination of Scales 1, 2, 3, and 0 for two thirds of the patients in this study. Implications are considered for understanding the common and differential psychopathology of eating disorders.     

Youth with Oppositional Defiant Disorder at Entry into Home-Based Treatment,Foster Care,and Residential Treatment

We explored and compared rates of youth diagnosed with oppositional defiant disorder (ODD) at entry into three broad program types, home-based care, foster care, and residential care. We also explored factors other than an ODD diagnosis that could be associated with program placement, and compared the presence of these factors in youth with and without an ODD diagnosis. Analyses were conducted using data from an ongoing, private-agency led, outcome measurement project. Programs were grouped into low (home-based), moderate (foster), or high (residential) categories, based upon levels of supervision and structure provided. A sample of 9,564 youth admitted into care between years 2005 and 2007 was used. Results suggested the following rates of ODD: 14.2 % overall; 7.9 % for low level programs; 5.3 % for moderate level programs; 21.1 % for high level programs. Rates were significantly different by program level (p ≤ 0.001). Sixty of 65 additional risk factors were also significantly associated with placement by level of program. No risk factors were unique to youth with ODD. Of the significant factors for youth with ODD, 4 were particularly strong: Classification as a child in need of services (CHINS), history of neglect, verbal aggression, and truancy. Youth classified as CHINS and with substantiated or suspected neglect were more likely placed into a moderate level program. Youth with verbal aggression or truancy were more likely placed into a high level program. Results suggested many factors are considered at program entry. Given the potential for poor prognosis and social costs of ODD, results support an individualized approach to placement determinations, with increased attention to symptoms of ODD and associated features at program entry.     

Causation,randomness, and pseudo-randomness in John Venn's logic of chance

In 1866, the young John Venn published The Logic of Chance, motivated largely by the desire to correct what he saw as deep fallacies in the reasoning of historical determinists such as Henry Buckle and in the optimistic heralding of a true social science by Adolphe Quetelet. Venn accepted the inevitable determinism implied by the physical sciences, but denied that the stable social statistics cited by Buckle and Quetelet implied a similar determinism in human actions. Venn maintained that probability statements were intelligible solely as projections of the ultimate frequency of an outcome in an unlimited series of trials and therefore led to no inferences about free will. An issue here was Venn's claim that although the aggregate probability may be stable, the individual events were completely irregular and, in fact, displayed randomness. Venn's concept of randomness was really apparent, or pseudo-, randomness, which could be totally determined. Ironically, Venn's frequentist position was very useful to the growing field of statistics, which could develop correlations and predictive models empirically without having to address implications for personal freedom or fatalism.     

A Moorean paradox of desire

A prevalent assumption among philosophers who believe that people can intentionally deceive themselves (intentionalists) is that they accomplish this by controlling what evidence they attend to. This article is concerned primarily with the evaluation of this claim, which we may call ‘attentionalism’. According to attentionalism, when one justifiably believes/suspects that not-p but wishes to make oneself believe that p, one may do this by shifting attention away from the considerations supportive of the belief that not-p and onto considerations supportive of the belief that p. The details of this theory are elaborated, its theoretical importance is pointed out, and it is argued that the strategy is supposed to work by leading to the repression of one's knowledge of the unwelcome considerations. However, I then show that the assumption that this is possible is opposed by the balance of a relevant body of empirical research, namely, the thought-suppression literature, and so intentionalism about self-deception cannot find vindication in the attentional theory.     

Depressed Clients' Attributions of Responsibility for the Causes of and Solutions to Their Problems

This study examined the attributions made by depressed clients about responsibility for the causes of and solutions to their problems. A total of 160 university counseling center clients completed the Beck Depression Inventory (A. T. Beck & R. A. Steer, 1987) and instruments measuring attributions of responsibility, internality, stability, and controllability for their problems. Support was obtained for the hypothesis that depressed clients blame themselves more for causing their problems than do nondepressed clients. However, client attributions of responsibility for solving problems were not affected by level of depressive symptoms. Finally, P. Brickman et al.'s (1982) theory of responsibility attributions was found to be modestly related with B. Weiner's (1985) attribution theory.     

Drivers’ propensity to have different types of intelligent speed adaptation installed in their cars

The aim of the present study was to examine if there are differences in drivers’ propensity to have different types of intelligent speed adaptation installed in their cars depending on the sample of drivers (i.e. Swedish or Turkish), their aberrant driving behaviours (i.e. violations and errors), and/or the technical solution used (i.e. speed limit information, advisory, supportive and intervening systems). A sample of 224 Swedish and 316 Turkish drivers completed a questionnaire including questions based on the driver behaviour questionnaire (DBQ) as well as questions about the drivers’ propensity to have different types of intelligent speed adaptation installed in their cars. The results showed that the Swedish sample of drivers was less positive than the Turkish sample of drivers towards having the advisory, supportive and intervening systems installed. Furthermore, drivers who frequently commit violations were less positive towards having any of these systems installed than were drivers who commit violations less frequently, while drivers who frequently make errors were more positive towards having the systems installed than were drivers who make errors less frequently. Both the Swedish and the Turkish sample of drivers were most positive towards having the speed limit information system installed, followed by the advisory system on second place, the supportive system on third place and lastly the intervening system on fourth place.