AGENCY,AUTONOMY, AND SOCIAL INTELLIGIBILITY

Popular Frankfurt‐style theories of autonomy hold that (i) autonomy is motivation in action by psychological attitudes that have ‘authority’ to constitute the agent's perspective, and (ii) attitudes have this authority in virtue of their formal role in the individual's psychological system, rather than their substantive content. I pose a challenge to such ‘psychologistic’ views, taking Frankfurt's and Bratman's theories as my targets. I argue that motivation by attitudes that play the roles picked out by psychologistic theories is compatible with radically unintelligible behavior. Because of this, psychologistic views are committed to classifying certain agents as ‘autonomous’ whom we intuitively find to be dysfunctional. I then argue that a necessary condition for autonomy is that an agent's behavior is intelligible in a particular way: autonomy necessarily involves acting from a subjective practical perspective that is, in principle, minimally comprehensible to others – not simply in a causal sense, but in a substantive, socio‐cultural sense.     

COMMUNICATION APPREHENSION AND ACHIEVEMENT IN A PERFORMANCE-ORIENTED BASIC COMMUNICATION COURSE

The study of communication apprehension (CA) impact in the instructional environment is extended through examination of all three CA levels relative to various performance situations in a basic communication course. Results indicate significant differences in achievement indices between all three CA groups on final course grade and the first two of four performance assignments. Moderate and high CA groups were not significantly different from each other on the third and fourth performance tasks. Low and high CA groups were significantly different in all performance areas. No differences were indicated between CA groups on the final examination. Results are discussed relative to the naturalistic nature of the study.