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The purpose of this study was to investigate the association among dysfunctional relationship beliefs, problem-solving responses, and satisfaction in close relationships. A survey was completed by 322 college students, each of whom was currently involved in a close heterosexual relationship. As hypothesized, dysfunctional relationship beliefs exhibited positive correlations with the destructive problem-solving responses of exit and neglect and negative correlations with the constructive problem-solving response of voice. Canonical correlation analysis suggested that individuals possessing the beliefs that disagreement is destructive and partners cannot change were likely to respond to relational problems with exit and neglect and to eschew responding with voice. Both dysfunctional beliefs and problem-solving responses were associated with relational satisfaction. However, dysfunctional beliefs failed to predict satisfaction when controlling for problem-solving responses. Support was therefore obtained for the prediction that problem-solving responses mediate the association between dysfunctional beliefs and relational satisfaction. 相似文献
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WILLIAM ROCHE 《The Southern journal of philosophy》2012,50(1):151-169
Some recent work in formal epistemology shows that “witness agreement” by itself implies neither an increase in the probability of truth nor a high probability of truth—the witnesses need to have some “individual credibility.” It can seem that, from this formal epistemological result, it follows that coherentist justification (i.e., doxastic coherence) is not truth‐conducive. I argue that this does not follow. Central to my argument is the thesis that, though coherentists deny that there can be noninferential justification, coherentists do not deny that there can be individual credibility. 相似文献