Impact of attachment style on reactions to accommodative dilemmas in close relationships

Four studies examined reactions to accommodative dilemmas in ongoing close relationships, exploring the association between adult attachment style—secure, avoidant, and anxious-ambivalent—and four possible modes of reaction—exit, voice, loyalty, and neglect. Consistent with predictions, it was shown that which close partners enact potentially destructive behaviors, insecurely attached individuals tend to react in a more defensive and destructive manner. Specifically, in comparison to secure individuals, insecure individuals were more likely to react to accommodative dilemmas with exit and neglect, and were less likely to react with voice. Contrary to predictions, individuals with avoidant and anxious-ambivalent styles did not differ in their reactions to accommodative dilemmas. The implications of these findings for understanding reactions to emotionally threatening interpersonal situations are discussed.     

EMPIRICAL REALISM AND OTHER MINDS

In apparent vogue, perhaps as a reaction against excesses on the part of certain Wittgensteinians, is the idea that the existence and nature of other people's mental lives are things known to us on broadly empirical grounds. A particularly unabashed version of this idea is to be found in Hilary Putnam's "Other Minds"¹. Therein Putnam defines empirical realism as the "position that the existence of the external world is supported by experience in much the way that any scientific theory is supported by observational data,"² His concern in this article is to defend, after entering some criticism of detail, Paul Ziff's attempt to show that the same general sort of position is the proper one to adopt with regard to the traditional problem of other minds. I wish to argue here that the empirical realist's solution to the problem of other minds offered by Ziff and defended by Putnam is wrong.     

The Handicapped: Special Needs and Strategies for Counseling

This article examines the psychosocial needs of disabled persons and the counseling approaches for dealing with their special needs. The authors discuss problems of self-concept, body image, frustration and anger, and dependency and motivation. Strategies are drawn from a broad spectrum of counseling theories, with examples from neo-Freudian, Gestalt, rational-emotive, and behavioral frameworks, with a stress on counselor versatility and involvement with clients' individual responses to disability.     

EFFECTS OF AMOUNT, FORMAT, AND LOCATION OF DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON QUESTIONNAIRE RETURN RATE AND RESPONSE BIAS OF SENSITIVE AND NONSENSITIVE ITEMS

Three characteristics of demographic questionnaire items were manipulated on a job satisfaction survey administered to 888 faculty members in order to assess effects on survey return rate and response bias. Demographic factors analyzed were Amount (number of demographic items), Format (questionnaires with all categorical answers versus those with a combination of categorical and continuous answers), and Location (demographic items placed before versus being placed after attitudinal items). Analysis of the 461 questionnaires which were returned revealed significant results for the Format rnanipulation, in that responses indicating higher satisfaction were obtained when the survey instrument contained questions which required both categorical and continuous answers rather than only questions requiring categorical responses. Also, this format-induced response bias occurred more frequently among sensitive than nonsensitive job satisfaction items. Implications of the results for questionnaire design are discussed.     

CHARACTERISTICS OF EFFECTIVE EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE REVIEW AND DEVELOPMENT INTERVIEWS: REPLICATION AND EXTENSION1

Eight performance review interview characteristics were related to 7 interview outcomes. Several of these individual variables had been examined in previous research. Two hundred seventy nursing personnel described their last review interview. Five of the interview characteristics were related to most of the outcomes, replicating earlier research as well as adding new findings. Implications for improving the conduct of appraisal interviews in organizations are offered.     

Perception and Representation

I oppose the popular view that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience consists in the subject's representing the (putative) perceived object as being so-and-so. The account of perceptual experience I favor instead is a version of the "Theory of Appearing" that takes it to be a matter of the perceived object's appearing to one as so-and-so, where this does not mean that the subject takes or believes it to be so-and-so. This plays no part in my criticisms of Representationalism. I mention it only to be up front as to where I stand. My criticism of the Representationalist position is in sections. (1) There is no sufficient reason for positing a representative function for perceptual experience. It doesn't seem on the face of it to be that, and nothing serves in place of such seeming. (2) Even if it did have such a function, it doesn't have the conceptual resources to represent a state of affairs. (3) Even if it did, it is not suited to represent, e.g., a physical property of color. (4) Finally, even if I am wrong about the first three points, it is still impossible for the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience to consist in it's representing what it does. My central argument for this central claim of the paper is that it is metaphysically, de re possible that one have a certain perceptual experience without it's presenting any state of affairs. And since all identities hold necessarily, this identity claim fails.     

Thoughts Without Distinctive Non-Imagistic Phenomenology

Silent thinking is often accompanied by subvocal sayings to ourselves, imagery, emotional feelings, and non-sensory experiences such as familiarity, rightness, and confidence that we can go on in certain ways. Phenomenological materials of these kinds, along with our dispositions to give explanations or draw inferences, provide resources that are sufficient to account for our knowledge of what we think, desire, and so on. We do not need to suppose that there is a distinctive, non-imagistic 'what it is like' to think that p , and a different non-imagistic 'what it is like' to think that q. Nor need we suppose that there is a proprietary 'what it is like' to have one propositional attitude type rather than another.