The Place of Semantic Theory

Abstract: Some twenty years since its publication Putnam's model‐theoretic argument is still much discussed. The present paper aims to defend a reconstruction of the argument but begins by attempting to clarify the form of the argument. Usually, and with good textual grounds, the argument is treated as a reductio argument against metaphysical realism. I argue instead that it should be treated as developing a paradox. I go on to claim that the most promising response to this paradox is to be able to provide a theory of (Fregean) sense, in the style recommended by Dummett. So, according to this reasoning, the argument is not an argument against metaphysical realism but an argument against positions which reject the notion of sense.     

EFFECTS OF STANDARD EXTREMITY ON MIXED STANDARD SCALE PERFORMANCE RATINGS1

It was suggested that the extremity of the scale values associated with standards used to represent effective and ineffective performance in Mixed Standard Scales may affect the nature of performance ratings derived from MSS responses and decisions based on MSS ratings. When the extremity of standards was experimentally manipulated, it was found that standard extremity affects both the level of performance ratings and the proportion of logically inconsistent response patterns observed. In addition, standard extremity appears to affect the rankings on performance of ratees. The implications of these observations for the development of Mixed Standard Scales were discussed.