Relevance reviewed: The case of argumentum ad hominem

This article aims tt providing some conceptual tools for dealing adequately with relevance in argumentative discourse. For this purpose, argumentative relevance is defined as a functional interactional relation between certain elements in the discourse. In addition to the distinction between interpretive and evaluative relevance that can be traced in the literature, analytic relevance is introduced as an intermediary concept. In order to classify the various problems of relevance arising in interpreting, analyzing and evaluating argumentative discourse, a taxonomy is proposed in which the concept of relevance is differentiated along three co-ordinate dimensions: object, domain and aspect. With the help of this taxonomy, it can be shown that the problems of evaluative relevance with which the standard approach to fallacies cannot satisfactory deal can be more systematically approached within a pragma-dialectical framework. This is demonstrated for the argumentum and hominem, which is erroneously treated as a homogenous type of relevance fallacy in logico-centric analyses, so that cases where this is not justified must be treated as ad hoc exceptions.     

Premissary relevance

Premissary relevance is a property of arguments understood as speech act complexes. It is explicable in terms of the idea of a premise's lending support to a conclusion. Premissary relevance is a function of premises belonging to a set which authoritatively warrants an inference to a conclusion. An authoritative inference warrant will have associated with it a conditional proposition which is true— that is to say, which can be justified. The study of the Aristotelian doctrine of topoi or argument schemes may contribute to the task of identifying authoritative warrants.     

WHEN PREDICTIONS CREATE REALITY:

Abstract —Nelson and Dunlosky (Psychological Science, July 1991) reported that subjects making judgments of learning (JOLs) can be extremely ac curate at predicting subsequent recall performance on a paired-associate task when the JOL task is delayed for a short while after study They argued that this result Is surprising given the results of earlier research, as well as their own current experiment, indicating that JOLs are quite inaccurate when made immediately after study We note that the delayed-JOL procedure used by Nelson and Dunlosky invited covert recall practice (which was reported by their subjects) Retrieval practice is a welt-known determinant of subsequent recall Accordingly, Nelson and Dunlosky s findings can be explained by the simple assumption that people base delayed JOLs on an assessment of retrieval success which in turn influences their retrieval success on the subsequent recall test