Time course of visual information utilization during fixations in reading

College students read short texts from a cathode-ray tube as their eye movements were being monitored. During selected fixations, the text was briefly masked and then it reappeared with one word changed. Subjects often were unaware that the word had changed. Sometimes they reported seeing the first presented word, sometimes the second presented word, and sometimes both. When only one word was reported, two factors were found to determine which one it was: the length of time a word was present during the fixation and the predictability of a word in its context. The results suggested that visual information is utilized for reading at a crucial period during the fixation and that this crucial period can occur at different times on different fixations. The pattern of responses suggested that the first letter of a word is not utilized before other letters and that letters are not scanned from left to right during a fixation.     

Two stages in postcategorical filtering and selection

Memory &; Cognition - In a modified Stroop paradigm, Kahneman and Henik (1981) varied the spatial location of incompatible color words in relation to the position of the ink color to be named. A...     

Comments on Hughes and Sussman''s time-sharing study of cerebral laterality in language-disordered and normal children

M. Hughes and H. M. Sussman (1983, Brain and Language, 19, 48-64) suggest that the time-sharing paradigm "does not serve as an adequate behavioral index for language lateralization in children." The merits of this conclusion are considered and general interpretative issues regarding manual interference in dual-task/time-sharing studies are discussed.     

Possible effects of forced report order on tachistoscopic recognition of bilaterally presented stimuli: A response to Young and Ellis

Comparing visual field asymmetries for bilaterally presented words and corresponding line drawings, we found an RVF advantage for words and no visual field asymmetry for line drawings. We suggested that the RVF advantage previously obtained by Young, Bion, and Ellis (Brain and Language, 11, 54–65, 1980) for bilaterally presented line drawings may have resulted from a forced order of report procedure, noting that the RVF advantage was greater on trials on which subjects were forced to report in the nonpreferred right-to-left order. Young and Ellis (Brain and Language, 20, 166–171, 1983) attempt to discredit this claim and maintain their hypothesis that the RVF advantage for line drawings is attributable to better temporary storage of these stimuli by the left than the right hemisphere. In the present article, we present in greater detail our arguments for the effects of forced order of report on the perception of bilaterally presented stimuli and refute Young and Ellis's ibid. criticisms of this proposal.     

Auditory perception of breaking and bouncing events: a case study in ecological acoustics

The mechanical events of bouncing and breaking are acoustically specified by single versus multiple damped quasi-periodic pulse patterns, with an initial noise burst in the case of breaking. Subjects show high accuracy in categorizing natural tokens of bouncing and breaking glass as well as tokens constructed by adjusting only the temporal patterns of components, leaving their spectral properties constant. Differences in average spectral frequency are, therefore, not necessary for perceiving this contrast, though differences in spectral consistency over successive pulses may be important. Initial noise corresponding to glass rupture appears unnecessary to categorize breaking and bouncing. The data indicate that higher order temporal properties of the acoustic signal provide information for the auditory perception of these events.     

Integrating pictorial information across eye movements

Six experiments are reported dealing with the types of information integrated across eye movements in picture perception. A line drawing of an object was presented in peripheral vision, and subjects made an eye movement to it. During the saccade, the initially presented picture was replaced by another picture that the subject was instructed to name as quickly as possible. The relation between the stimulus on the first fixation and the stimulus on the second fixation was varied. Across the six experiments, there was about 100-130 ms facilitation when the pictures were identical compared with a control condition in which only the target location was specified on the first fixation. This finding clearly implies that information about the first picture facilitated naming the second picture. Changing the size of the picture from one fixation to the next had little effect on naming time. This result is consistent with work on reading and low-level visual processes in indicating that pictorial information is not integrated in a point-by-point manner in an integrated visual buffer. Moreover, only about 50 ms of the facilitation for identical pictures could be attributed to the pictures having the same name. When the pictures represented the same concept (e.g., two different pictures of a horse), there was a 90-ms facilitation effect that could have been the result of either the visual or conceptual similarity of the pictures. However, when the pictures had different names, only visual similarity produced facilitation. Moreover, when the pictures had different names, there appeared to be inhibition from the competing names. The results of all six experiments are consistent with a model in which the activation of both the visual features and the name of the picture seen on the first fixation survive the saccade and combine with the information extracted on the second fixation to produce identification and naming of the second picture.     

The experience of self-awareness and its relation to level of self-consciousness: An experiential sampling study

The present research studied self-awareness by utilizing experiential sampling methodology, which allows for the random sampling of individuals' thoughts and feelings as they go about their normal daily activities. Neither Study 1 nor 2 found a relation between private or public self-awareness and negative affect. However, attention to private self-aspects was generally more positive and less ruminative for low as opposed to high private self-conscious subjects, and awareness of oneself as a social object was generally more positive but less important for low as opposed to high public self-conscious subjects. What may have accounted for the negative relation between private self-consciousness and average affect was that low private self-conscious subjects were more likely to attend to their private self-aspects if they were pleasant than if they were unpleasant, while high private self-conscious subjects' degree of private self-awareness was unrelated to whether the content of this state was pleasant or not. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that low private self-conscious individuals engage in a more selective type of self-attention when in the private self-aware state than do high private self-conscious individuals. Regarding the relation between self-awareness and social context, both studies found that the presence of others results in a heightened public self-awareness. However, even though subjects were more attentive to public self-aspects when with others than when alone, in general, they were more attentive to their “private self” than to their “public self”. Results are discussed in terms of current self-awareness theory.