An exploration of spiritual superiority: The paradox of self‐enhancement

Spiritual training is assumed to reduce self‐enhancement, but may have the paradoxical effect of boosting superiority feelings. It can thus operate like other self‐enhancement tools and contribute to a contingent self‐worth that depends on one's spiritual accomplishments. In three studies (N = 533, N = 2,223, N = 965), a brief measure of spiritual superiority showed good internal consistency and discriminant validity. As predicted, it was distinctly related to spiritual contingency of self‐worth, illustrating that the self‐enhancement function of spirituality is similar to other contingency domains. It was correlated with self‐esteem and, more strongly, with communal narcissism, corroborating the notion of spiritual narcissism. Spiritual Superiority scores were consistently higher among energetically trained participants than mindfulness trainees and were associated with supernatural overconfidence and self‐ascribed spiritual guidance. Our results illustrate that the self‐enhancement motive is powerful and deeply ingrained so that it can hijack methods intended to transcend the ego and, instead, adopt them to its own service.     

Self-Compassion Versus Global Self-Esteem: Two Different Ways of Relating to Oneself

ABSTRACT This research examined self-compassion and self-esteem as they relate to various aspects of psychological functioning. Self-compassion entails treating oneself with kindness, recognizing one's shared humanity, and being mindful when considering negative aspects of oneself. Study 1 ( N =2,187) compared self-compassion and global self-esteem as they relate to ego-focused reactivity. It was found that self-compassion predicted more stable feelings of self-worth than self-esteem and was less contingent on particular outcomes. Self-compassion also had a stronger negative association with social comparison, public self-consciousness, self-rumination, anger, and need for cognitive closure. Self-esteem (but not self-compassion) was positively associated with narcissism. Study 2 ( N =165) compared global self-esteem and self-compassion with regard to positive mood states. It was found that the two constructs were statistically equivalent predictors of happiness, optimism, and positive affect. Results from these two studies suggest that self-compassion may be a useful alternative to global self-esteem when considering what constitutes a healthy self-stance.     

Effects of mimicking: acting prosocially by being emotionally moved

Mimicry is functional for empathy and bonding purposes. Studies on the consequences of mimicry at a behavioral level demonstrated that mimicry increases prosocial behavior. However, these previous studies focused on the mimickee. In the present paper, we investigated whether mimickers also become more helpful due to mimicry. In two studies, we have demonstrated that participants, who mimicked expressions of a person shown on a video, donated more money to a charity than participants who did not mimic. Moreover, the processes by which mimicry and prosocial behavior are related largely remain empirically unexamined in existing literature. The results of Study 2 confirmed our hypothesis that affective empathy mediates the relationship between mimicry and prosocial behavior. This suggests that mimicry created an affective empathic mindset, which activated prosocial behaviors directed toward others. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mimicry in social interaction: Benefits for mimickers,mimickees, and their interaction

Mimicry has benefits for people in social interactions. However, evidence regarding the consequences of mimicry is incomplete. First, research on mimicry has particularly focused on effects of being mimicked. Secondly, on the side of the mimicker evidence is correlational or lacks real interaction data. The present study investigated effects for mimickers and mimickees in face‐to‐face interaction. Feelings towards the immediate interaction partner and the interaction in which mimicry takes place were measured after an interaction between two participants in which mimicry did or did not occur. Results revealed that mimickers and mimickees became more affectively attuned to each other due to bidirectional influences of mimicry. Additionally, both mimickers and mimickees reported more feelings of having bonded with each other and rated the interaction as smoother.     

Effects of other‐profitability and self‐profitability on evaluative judgements of behaviours

Behaviours are judged by their causes (i.e. the actor's intentions) as well as by their consequences. The present study focuses on the effects of the latter. Subjects judged behaviours that were either socially good, socially bad, competent, or incompetent. The consequences of the behaviours were either (a) personal consequences for the actor, (b) interpersonal consequences for others, or (c) not mentioned. Behaviours with interpersonal consequences were judged more extremely than with personal consequences. When no consequences were mentioned, the behaviours were rated similarly as in the condition with interpersonal consequences. These effects emerged regardless of behaviour valence (positive versus negative) and dimension (social versus competence‐related). The results suggest that others' behaviours are judged primarily by their interpersonal implications, and that observers take the perspective of those whose outcomes may be affected by the actor. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dilemmas of academic practice: perceptions of superiority among social psychologists

The current research examines social psychologists' beliefs regarding the probability of self and others to engage in desirable and undesirable actions relevant to solving dilemmas of academic practice (e.g. openly discussing versus concealing complex effects in a paper). Consistent with hypotheses, results revealed that social psychologists believed that others are more likely than they themselves to engage in undesirable actions and less likely to engage in academically desirable actions. Moreover, the probability of undesirable actions by both self and others was perceived to be greater under conditions of low rather than high perceived traceability (i.e. when others within the field are believed not to verify the appropriateness of the actions). Interestingly, but unexpectedly, this latter result was observed among faculty members but not among individuals with less research experience (i.e. graduate students). The discussion considers possible explanations for this latter finding and closes with an implication relevant to the peer review system. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Natural concepts in a juvenile gorilla (gorilla gorilla gorilla) at three levels of abstraction

The extent to which nonhumans are able to form conceptual versus perceptual discriminations remains a matter of debate. Among the great apes, only chimpanzees have been tested for conceptual understanding, defined as the ability to form discriminations not based solely on simple perceptual features of stimuli, and to transfer this learning to novel stimuli. In the present investigation, a young captive female gorilla was trained at three levels of abstraction (concrete, intermediate, and abstract) involving sets of photographs representing natural categories (e.g., orangutans vs. humans, primates vs. nonprimate animals, animals vs. foods). Within each level of abstraction, when the gorilla had learned to discriminate positive from negative exemplars in one set of photographs, a novel set was introduced. Transfer was defined in terms of high accuracy during the first two sessions with the new stimuli. The gorilla acquired discriminations at all three levels of abstraction but showed unambiguous transfer only with the concrete and abstract stimulus sets. Detailed analyses of response patterns revealed little evidence of control by simple stimulus features. Acquisition and transfer involving abstract stimulus sets suggest a conceptual basis for gorilla categorization. The gorilla's relatively poor performance with intermediate-level discriminations parallels findings with pigeons, and suggests a need to reconsider the role of perceptual information in discriminations thought to indicate conceptual behavior in nonhumans.     

The automatic and co-occurring activation of multiple social inferences

People make a variety of automatic inferences when observing others' actions. These include inferences about stable dispositions as well as transitory goal states and social situations. However, models of social inference have rarely considered whether different types of automatic inferences can co-occur. We present three experiments in which participants were incidentally exposed to texts depicting behaviors that afforded inferences about actors' traits and the social situations these actors were experiencing. Results from lexical decision and probe-recognition tasks revealed heightened activation of both trait and situational inferences; furthermore, this co-occurring activation was spontaneous, unconscious, and independent of processing resources or specific impression-formation goals. A fourth experiment extended these findings by showing that when participants were asked to make deliberate attributional judgments of the same set of behaviors, typical goal-directed biases reflecting the selection of either trait or situational interpretations emerged. Implications for social inference processes are discussed.     

Optimal Self‐esteem is Contingent: Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic and Upward Versus Downward Contingencies

We argue that noncontingent, unconditional self‐esteem is not optimal but defensive. We introduce the concept of intrinsic contingency, where self‐esteem is affected by whether one's actions are self‐congruent and conducive to personal growth. Whereas external contingencies, especially social and appearance, were negatively correlated with authenticity, self‐compassion, and personal well‐being, intrinsic contingencies were positively correlated with these measures, and uncorrelated with aggression and self‐esteem instability. Participants with high intrinsic contingency rated higher on measures of psychological adaptiveness than noncontingent participants. In addition, we distinguish upward from downward contingencies, the latter being more harmful in case of external contingencies but not for intrinsic contingencies. We conclude that intrinsic contingency, rather than noncontingency, may reflect true self‐esteem as implied in self‐determination theory. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.