From Perceptual Categories to Concepts: What Develops?

People are remarkably smart: they use language, possess complex motor skills, make non-trivial inferences, develop and use scientific theories, make laws, and adapt to complex dynamic environments. Much of this knowledge requires concepts and this paper focuses on how people acquire concepts. It is argued that conceptual development progresses from simple perceptual grouping to highly abstract scientific concepts. This proposal of conceptual development has four parts. First, it is argued that categories in the world have different structure. Second, there might be different learning systems (sub-served by different brain mechanisms) that evolved to learn categories of differing structures. Third, these systems exhibit differential maturational course, which affects how categories of different structures are learned in the course of development. And finally, an interaction of these components may result in the developmental transition from perceptual groupings to more abstract concepts. This paper reviews a large body of empirical evidence supporting this proposal.     

Tryptophan Hydroxylase 1 Variant rs1800532 is Associated with Suicide Attempt in Serbian Psychiatric Patients but does not Moderate the Effect of Recent Stressful Life Events

Tryptophan hydroxylase 1 (TPH1) gene, coding for serotonin synthesizing enzyme, and recent stressful life events (SLEs) have been commonly associated with suicidal behavior. TPH1 has been also hypothesized to be involved in stress–response mechanisms. The aim of this study was to assess TPH1 variant rs1800532 and its possible interaction with recent SLEs as risk factors for suicide attempt (SA) in Serbian psychiatric patients, including 165 suicide attempters and 188 suicide nonattempters. rs1800532 and recent SLEs were independently associated with SA, while rs1800532 did not moderate the effect of recent SLEs on SA vulnerability among Serbian psychiatric patients.     

Can You Lie Without Intending to Deceive?

This article defends the view that liars need not intend to deceive. I present common objections to this view in detail and then propose a case of a liar who can lie but who cannot deceive in any relevant sense. I then modify this case to get a situation in which this person lies intending to tell his hearer the truth and he does this by way of getting the hearer to recognize his intention to tell the truth by lying. This case, and further cases that I develop from it, demonstrate that lying without the intention to deceive is possible.