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11.
Berle D Starcevic V Hannan A Milicevic D Lamplugh C Fenech P 《Behaviour research and therapy》2008,46(2):282-291
There remains a lack of consensus regarding the possibility that especially high levels of panic-related cognitions characterise panic disorder with agoraphobia. We administered the Anxiety Sensitivity Index, the Agoraphobic Cognitions Questionnaire and the Anxious Thoughts and Tendencies Scale as well as measures of agoraphobic avoidance to patients diagnosed with panic disorder with agoraphobia (n=75) and without agoraphobia (n=26). Patients with panic disorder with agoraphobia did not score significantly higher on any of the cognitive variables than did panic disorder patients without agoraphobia. However, most of the cognitive variables showed small to moderate-strength correlations with self-report measures of agoraphobic avoidance. Our findings suggest that anxiety sensitivity, catastrophising of the consequences of panic and a general anxiety-prone cognitive style, although to some extent associated with agoraphobic avoidance, do not discriminate panic disorder with agoraphobia from panic disorder without agoraphobia. 相似文献
12.
Confusion,Irrationality and the Ends of Philosophy: Horwich's Wittgenstein Inspired Metaphilosophy
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Charles M.K. Djordjevic 《Philosophical Investigations》2018,41(3):329-365
This paper focuses on Horwich's metaphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein. Specifically, it focuses on Horwich's charge that all philosophy is irrational. First, I coordinate the various aspects of Horwich's metaphilosophical program to make sense of his charge of irrationality against philosophy. Second, I argue that this metaphilosophical program misfires in two distinct ways. However, third, I close by calling attention to what I posit to be a critical insight of Horwich's account. 相似文献
13.
Charles M. Djordjevic 《Metaphilosophy》2019,50(1-2):16-35
In certain philosophical quarters, a new metaphilosophical position is being discussed—antiphilosophy. Such a position seems to maintain that there is no distinction between philosophy and sophistry, reason and rhetoric, arguing and emoting. This paper examines antiphilosophy. Specifically, it aims to address three interrelated questions: Is antiphilosophy a possible metaphilosophical position? If it is, what characterizes it? And what ramifications would it have? The paper argues that antiphilosophy is possible and is best construed as an attempt to reconstruct philosophical discourse on noncognitive lines. Explicitly, “to assert” and the belief propositional attitude is replaced by “to convince” and a pro‐attitude desire to rhetorically talk someone into something. The paper examines one possible form such a position could take as well as various ramifications of it. 相似文献