Understanding of Genetic Inheritance among Xhosa-Speaking Caretakers of Children with Hemophilia

Hemophilia A and B are X-linked recessive inherited bleeding disorders that have a profound impact on the family of affected individuals. Education is vital to enable women to appreciate the implications of being a carrier and the implications for a prospective child. Prior research has shown that cultural, socio-economic and linguistic issues in South Africa are major barriers to communication for first-language Xhosa-speakers. This exploratory study aimed to investigate the basic knowledge of genetic inheritance among this cultural group in order to promote culturally-sensitive, effective genetic counseling. Ten in-depth interviews were conducted with Xhosa-speaking mothers or caregivers of boys with hemophilia. Results suggest that the participants had a very limited understanding of the clinical management, genetic consequences and cause of hemophilia. While treatment and care by health care service providers was fully accepted, several participants believed that traditional methods would provide them with more satisfactory explanations. These findings suggest that there is a critical need for socio-culturally tailored, language-specific education for families with hemophilia.     

I like you but I don't know why: Objective facial resemblance to significant others influences snap judgments

Does a new person's objective facial resemblance to a significant other influence snap judgments of liking, and if so, does this effect occur even when individuals are not consciously aware of the resemblance? Participants (romantic couples) made trait judgments about 24 novel faces, each shown for 500 ms. Objective facial resemblance was manipulated using morphing techniques such that half of the novel faces resembled participants' partner and half did not. We found that women's evaluations of novel men who resembled their partner (vs. those who did not) were more positive, but men's evaluations of novel women were not appreciably affected by facial resemblance. These results held even when individuals were not consciously aware of the resemblance. Moreover, the effect of facial resemblance on judgments of liking was more pronounced for individuals who were more satisfied in their relationship, suggesting that these results were due to activating the specific partner representation (rather than familiarity). This research shows that objective facial resemblance to a significant other influences snap judgments of liking automatically, effortlessly, and without conscious awareness.     

Idealizations and scientific understanding

In this paper, I propose that the debate in epistemology concerning the nature and value of understanding can shed light on the role of scientific idealizations in producing scientific understanding. In philosophy of science, the received view seems to be that understanding is a species of knowledge. On this view, understanding is factive just as knowledge is, i.e., if S knows that p, then p is true. Epistemologists, however, distinguish between different kinds of understanding. Among epistemologists, there are those who think that a certain kind of understanding??objectual understanding??is not factive, and those who think that objectual understanding is quasi-factive. Those who think that understanding is not factive argue that scientific idealizations constitute cognitive success, which we then consider as instances of understanding, and yet they are not true. This paper is an attempt to draw lessons from this debate as they pertain to the role of idealizations in producing scientific understanding. I argue that scientific understanding is quasi-factive.     

Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Can’ from an Epistemic Point of View?

In this paper, I argue that the ??Ought Implies Can?? (OIC) principle, as it is employed in epistemology, particularly in the literature on epistemic norms, is open to counterexamples. I present a counterexample to OIC and discuss several objections to it. If this counterexample works, then it shows that it is possible that S ought to believe that p, even though S cannot believe that p. If this is correct, then OIC, considered from an epistemic point of view, is false, since it is supposed to hold for any S and any p.     

Mothers' voices: Coping with their children's initial disability diagnosis

For parents of infants and toddlers receiving a diagnosis of disability, a variety of responses may result. Yet, little is known about the specific ways families cope with the initial diagnosis. This qualitative study investigated 6 mothers' memories of their children's diagnoses. Mothers described their use of both palliative strategies (denying, questioning, and wishful thinking) and problem‐solving strategies (searching for information, seeking social support, reframing, and seeking spiritual support) to cope with their children's initial diagnoses. The results of this study may improve professionals' understanding of parents' need for information and support at the time of initial diagnosis.     

Shetland ponies (Equus caballus) show quantity discrimination in a matching-to-sample design

Numerical competence is one of the aspects of animal cognition with a long history of research interest, but few results are available for the horse. In the present study, we investigated the ability of three Shetland ponies to discriminate between different quantities of geometric symbols presented on a computer screen in a matching-to-sample arrangement. In Experiment 1, the ponies had to relate two similar quantities to another, paired in contrasts (1 vs. 2, 3 vs. 4 and 4 vs. 5) of the same stimulus (dot). Specific pairs of quantities (all differing by one) of up to five different geometrical symbols were displayed in Experiment 2. In each session, both quantities (more and less) were used as sample in such a way that each of the two quantities presented in one test served as positive and as negative stimulus, respectively. The three Shetland ponies were able to discriminate between the given quantities of dots by showing more than 80 % correct responses in two consecutive sessions. Only one of the ponies distinguished different shapes of geometric symbols at a level of 4 versus 5 items. The results show that all ponies were capable of visual quantity discrimination in the present matching-to-sample design, but task solving seemed more difficult when quantities were composed of heterogeneous stimuli. The present results confirm our hypothesis that the ponies based their decision on the matching concept of sameness and were not biased by a spontaneous preference for higher quantities.     

Attention to Emotion and Non-Western Faces: Revisiting the Facial Feedback Hypothesis

In a modified replication of Strack, Martin, and Stepper's demonstration of the Facial Feedback Hypothesis (1988), we investigated the effect of attention to emotion on the facial feedback process in a non-western cultural setting. Participants, recruited from two universities in Ghana, West Africa, gave self-reports of their perceived levels of attention to emotion, and then completed cartoon-rating tasks while randomly assigned to smiling, frowning, or neutral conditions. While participants with low Attention to Emotion scores displayed the usual facial feedback effect (rating cartoons as funnier when in the smiling compared to the frowning condition), the effect was not present in individuals with high Attention to Emotion. The findings indicate that (1) the facial feedback process can occur in contexts beyond those in which the phenomenon has previously been studied, and (2) aspects of emotion regulation, such as Attention to Emotion can interfere with the facial feedback process.     

Specificity of relations between adolescents’ cognitive emotion regulation strategies and symptoms of depression and anxiety

ABSTRACT

The aim of this study was to examine the extent to which cognitive emotion regulation strategies were “common or transdiagnostic correlates” of symptoms of depression and anxiety and/or “specific correlates” distinguishing one problem category from the other. The sample comprised 582 13- to 16-year-old secondary school students. Symptoms of depression and anxiety were measured by the SCL-90, and cognitive emotion regulation strategies were measured by the CERQ, in a cross-sectional design. Multivariate regression analyses were performed. Before controlling for comorbidity, the same cognitive emotion regulation strategies that were related to symptoms of depression were also related to symptoms of anxiety. However, after controlling for comorbid anxiety symptoms, rumination, self-blame (only girls), positive reappraisal, and positive refocusing (the latter two inversely) were uniquely (and significantly) associated with depression symptoms; and after controlling for comorbid depression symptoms, catastrophising and other-blame were uniquely related to anxiety symptoms. The results supported the cognitive content-specificity model, in which anxiety is supposed to be uniquely characterised by thoughts concerning the overestimation of threats and harm, and depression is supposed to be uniquely characterised by negative evaluations of self, and of past and future events.     

Does Conceivability Entail Metaphysical Possibility?

In this paper, we argue that ‘Weak Modal Rationalism’, which is the view that ideal primary positive conceivability entails primary metaphysical possibility, is self‐defeating. To this end, we outline two reductio arguments against ‘Weak Modal Rationalism’. The first reductio shows that, from supposing that ‘Weak Modal Rationalism’ is true, it follows that conceivability both is and is not conclusive evidence for possibility. The second reductio shows that, from supposing that ‘Weak Modal Rationalism’ is true, it follows that it is possible that ‘Weak Modal Rationalism’ is necessarily false, and hence that ‘Weak Modal Rationalism’ is false. We then argue that adopting a weaker position according to which conceivability is merely prima facie evidence for possibility provides limited protection from our criticism of conceivability arguments. 1     

Three Arguments Against the Expertise Defense

Experimental philosophers have challenged friends of the expertise defense to show that (a) the intuitive judgments of professional philosophers are different from the intuitive judgments of nonphilosophers, and (b) the intuitive judgments of professional philosophers are better than the intuitive judgments of nonphilosophers, in ways that are relevant to the truth or falsity of such judgments. Friends of the expertise defense have responded by arguing that the burden of proof lies with experimental philosophers. This article sketches three arguments which show that both (a) and (b) are probably false. If its arguments are cogent, then shifting the burden of proof is a futile move, since philosophical training makes no difference so far as making intuitive judgments in response to hypothetical cases is concerned.