Stress, externality, and depression

Previous research has found mixed support for the possibility that locus of control moderates the effects of life stress on depression. Two methodological choices may have influenced previous findings: the use of a unidimensional rather than a multidimensional locus of control scale, and reliance on linear statistical methods using median splits. We attempted to correct these choices by using the Levenson IPC scale (1974) and multiple regression analyses in a female undergraduate population (N = 158). The results supported use of a multidimensional scale, since Stress, Internality, and Powerful Others were found to have main effects on depression whereas Chance interacted with life stress. The question of whether locus of control refers to responsibility for causing an event, i.e., self-blame, or belief in control over future events, i.e., coping behavior, was discussed.     

Development of Children's perceptions of internal locus of control: A cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis

Elementary school children between the ages of eight and thirteen were administered the Children's Nowicki/Strickland Locus of Control Scale annually for three years. As predicted, children's mean locus of control scores were found to be significantly different from one age group to the next (cross-sectional analysis) as well as from one year to the next (longitudinal analysis). Older children had significantly more internal scores than did younger children, and the same 97 children demonstrated significant increases in internal perceptions over each succeeding year. No significant sex differences were observed in this generally linear developmental trend. The study supports the hypothesis that increases in internal perceptions are associated with growing older. The data are explained using a confluent theoretical perspective drawing upon cognitive as well as behavioral theory.     

A comparison of three methods for scoring figure drawings

Figure drawings obtained from 758 white male medical students were scored using three different methods. Method I involved 16 different physical size measurements; Method II involved six separate sophistication of body concept ratings; and Method III involved 42 separate aspects of the drawings weighted in direct proportion to their relative frequency of occurrence in the sample studied (conventionality scoring). Separate factor analyses of the scores derived from each method revealed that Methods I and II each reflect only a single underlying factor, and that these factors are uncorrelated in the population studied. Method III yielded eight meaningful factors, each of which may be construed as an independent area of conventionality/deviancy. An overall conventionality/deviancy score was also derived. It is believed that these three methods of scoring capture most of the variance inherent in existing figure drawing scoring systems, but that use of all three is necessary for a comprehensive analysis.     

Sweet sorrow: the color-shading response in an adult cystic fibrosis population

Research on the color-shading response on the Rorschach has been limited previously to its use as a predictor of suicide. The theoretical understanding of this response was addressed by some of the major Rorschach authors. Adult cystic fibrosis patients were administered a battery of psychological tests, including the Rorschach. While these patients face a premature death, none of these patients were suicidal. A higher than usual incidence of color-shading responses occurred. Rapaport's hypothesis that the color-shading response is an expression of a simultaneously conflicting emotion, or similar to "sweet sorrow," was suggested as a possible hypothesis.     

Application of the consensus Rorschach to couples

The consensus method of administering the Rorschach is described and the literature reviewed. The consensus method is viewed as an adaptation of the Rorschach as a form of behavioral assessment, especially as regards couple interaction. Materials on two couples are presented as illustrations.     

Attitude accessibility following a self-perception process

Self-perception processes have been postulated to occur only to the extent that initial attitudes are weak. The present research asked whether the outcome of such a process is a strengthening of the attitude in question. Two experiments investigated the accessibility of attitudes from memory following self-inference from behavior. Experiment 1 examined the consequence for attitude accessibility of reviewing and considering previously performed religious behaviors that were recent and primarily unmanded versus distant in time and "manded" in nature. Experiment 2 involved the performance of a new behavior that was either required or freely chosen. In each case, control subjects either did not review prior behaviors or did not perform a new behavior. In both experiments, attitude accessibility, as measured by the latency of response to attitudinal inquiries, was enhanced by the consideration or performance of unmanded behavior, but not by manded behavior. The relevance of this finding to issues regarding attitude-behavior consistency and attitudinal persistence is discussed.     

Paradox,truth and logic part I: Paradox and truth

Conclusion The discussion of the semantics of inconsistent truth theories now comes to a pause. The preceding is of course but a sketch; many interesting questions remain to be answered. The second part of this essay, however, will not seek to answer them. Rather, I will turn to the discussion of the proof theory of truth theory: the local and global logic of truth.Under the first heading, I show how to replace the inductive construction of models with an appropriate infinitary proof theory, and relate this on the one hand to the so-called dependence approach to inductive truth theories (Davis, 1979; Yablo, 1982) and on the other to van Fraassen's fact semantics for relevance logic.Under the second heading, I offer formals systems which capture the inferences valid in all approximate models. Not surprisingly, these turn out to be relevant logics.With formalism in hand, I discuss finally the extent to which the gap and/or glut approach can in fact be said to solve the paradoxes; that is, to allow us to say that the very language we are speaking is of the sort described in our theory.     

Accepting inconsistencies from the paradoxes

It has been proposed that the law of non-contradiction be revised to permit the simultaneous truth and falsity of the key sentences of the logical paradoxes, e.g., This sentence is false. In an attempt to show to what extent this bizarre suggestion of inconsistent models or truth-value gluts is a coherent suggestion it is proved that a first-order language for number theory can be semantically closed by having its own global truth predicate under some non-standard interpretation and thus that it actually can contain the Liar sentence. It is proved that in this interpretation the Liar sentence is both true and false, although not every sentence is.