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91.
Combining cues while avoiding perceptual conflicts   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
Hogervorst MA  Brenner E 《Perception》2004,33(10):1155-1172
A common assumption in cue combination models is that small discrepancies between cues are due to the limited resolution of the individual cues. Whenever this assumption holds, information from the separate cues can best be combined to give a single, more accurate estimate of the property of interest. We examined whether information about the discrepancy itself is lost when this is done. In our experiments, subjects were required to combine cues to match certain properties while avoiding perceptual conflicts. In part 1, they combined expansion and change in disparity to estimate motion in depth; and in part 2, they combined perspective and binocular disparities to estimate slant. We compared the pattern in the way that subjects set the two cues with the patterns predicted by models of cue combination with and without a loss of information about the discrepancy. From this comparison we conclude that little information about the discrepancies between cues is lost when the cues are combined.  相似文献   
92.
Rotman G  Brenner E  Smeets JB 《Perception》2002,31(10):1195-1203
Human subjects misjudge the position of a target that is flashed during a pursuit eye movement. Their judgments are biased in the direction in which the eyes are moving. We investigated whether this bias can be reduced by making the appearance of the flash more predictable. In the normal condition, subjects pursued a moving target that flashed somewhere along its trajectory. After the presentation, they indicated where they had seen the flash. The mislocalisations in this condition were compared to mislocalisations in conditions in which the subjects were given information about when or where the flash would come. This information consisted of giving two warning flashes spaced at equal intervals before the target flash, of giving two warning beeps spaced at equal intervals before the target flash, or of showing the same stimulus twice. Showing the same stimulus twice significantly reduced the mislocalisation. The other conditions did not. We interpret this as indicating that it is not predictability as such that influences the performance, but the fact that the target appears at a spatially cued position. This was supported by a second experiment, in which we examined whether subjects make smaller misjudgments when they have to determine the distance between a target flashed during pursuit and a reference seen previously, than when they have to determine the distance between the flashed target and a reference seen afterwards. This was indeed the case, presumably because the reference provided a spatial cue for the flash when it was presented first. We conclude that a spatial cue reduces the mislocalisation of targets that are flashed during pursuit eye movements. The cue does not have to be exactly at the same position as the flash.  相似文献   
93.
I. Erev, T. S. Wallsten, and D. V. Budescu (1994) showed that the same probability judgment data can reveal both apparent overconfidence and underconfidence, depending on how the data are analyzed. To explain this seeming paradox, I. Erev et al. proposed a general model of judgment in which overt responses are related to underlying "true judgments" that are perturbed by error. A central conclusion of their work is that observed over- and underconfidence can be split into two components: (a) "true" over- and underconfidence and (b) "artifactual" over- and underconfidence due to error in judgment. It is argued in the present article that decomposing over- and underconfidence into true and artifactual components is inappropriate. The mistake stems from giving primacy to ambiguously defined model constructions (true judgments) over observed data.  相似文献   
94.
Patients with schizophrenia show deficits in visual perception and working memory, but the relationship between these deficits has not been characterized with psychometrically matched tasks. The authors administered 2 visual discrimination and 6 recognition tasks to 43 schizophrenia spectrum patients and 22 nonpsychiatric subjects. When performing difficulty-matched tasks, spectrum subjects showed more severe impairments for motion compared with form processing. When tasks were matched on true score variance, spectrum subjects exhibited worse performance on both form and motion discrimination, and a differential deficit in motion recognition with a short display duration and long interstimulus interval. These results provide evidence of differential deficits in visual processing in schizophrenia that appear to be dependent on the temporal characteristics of the tasks.  相似文献   
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In this paper I piece together a Wittegnsteinian view of the topics indicated in my title, contrasting it with the views of Bertrand Russell and Donald Davidson - two philosophers who, in words from the Blue Book , seem "constantly to see the method of science before their eyes." I conclude that Wittegnstein helps us understand something those philosphers tend to overlook: that "freedom of the will" gets its meaning not in a belief to be assessed by evidence but, on the contrary, in the expression of a way of living and assessing life that limits the role of "assessing beliefs by evidence."  相似文献   
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The aim of this study is to investigate whether sluggish cognitive tempo (SCT) symptoms are associated with neurocognitive task performance and ratings of real-world executive functioning (EF) in preschoolers at risk for attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). The associations between parent- and teacher-rated SCT symptoms and neuropsychological task performance and ratings of EF in 61 4-year-old preschool children (51 boys, 10 girls) with self-regulation difficulties were examined, with regression analyses controlling for the effects of ADHD inattention symptoms. In the study sample, higher teacher-rated SCT symptoms are significantly associated with poorer performance on tasks of visual-perceptual abilities, auditory and visual attention, sustained and selective attention, inhibitory control, pre-numerical/numerical concepts, and slower processing speed, but SCT symptoms are not significantly associated with working memory, attention shifting or cognitive flexibility when controlling for ADHD inattention. Higher parent-rated SCT symptoms are significantly associated with visual-perceptual abilities. ADHD inattention symptoms are more strongly associated than SCT with daily life EF ratings; neither parent- nor teacher-rated SCT symptoms are significantly associated with daily life ratings of inhibition, working memory, or planning/organization after controlling for ADHD inattention. This study suggests that SCT symptoms contribute to EF deficits at least on neurocognitive tasks assessing visual-perceptual/spatial abilities, attention to detail and processing speed, as observed in this sample of young children at risk for ADHD, and may be an important intervention target.  相似文献   
100.
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