False memory,attentional bias and future thinking among people living with HIV with posttraumatic stress disorder

People living with HIV can experience posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Complex relationships exist between HIV, PTSD and cognitive impairments. This cross-sectional study compared three cognitive impairments (false memory, attentional bias, deficits in future thinking) among people living with HIV with and without PTSD in Iran. People living with HIV with PTSD (n = 20) and without PTSD (n = 20) completed measures of psychological symptomatology, dot-probe task, Deese Roediger McDermott paradigm and future thinking task at Razavi Khorasan Health Center. The PTSD group, when compared to the non-PTSD group, recognised a significantly greater number of false memories (p < .001; η² = .58), had an attentional bias toward threat-related words (p < .001; η² = .35) and imagined fewer specific future events (p < .001; η² = .31). People living with HIV with PTSD may have difficulties with false memory, attentional biases, and generating future events. Since psychological treatments are limited in Iran, this research highlighted some potential cognitive targets for people living with HIV.     

THE BLOOD CRISIS: <Emphasis Type="Italic">A CHOICE BETWEEN DYING AND REARRANGING?</Emphasis>

I began my Ferenczi studies in the fall of 1987, a year before the English translation of his Clinical Diary was published. Since then, I have demonstrated in writing, teaching, working, and living that there is scarcely a passage in this “laboratory notebook of psychoanalysis” that fails to illuminate the clinical and the personal. And above all is Ferenczi’s late awareness that his personality had been constructed upon false assumptions. This is a reckoning of thirty years’ conscious and unconscious usage of Ferenczi’s experience to illustrate, to interpret, and to expose the clinical and personal dimensions of my own life lived as “the will of another person.” What constitutes, what allows, a choice between dying and rearranging? Now that I am long past Ferenczi’s fifty-nine years, I take the risk every day, and I know it.     

How does dominance rank status affect individual and social learning performance in the dog (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Canis familiaris</Emphasis>)?

Dogs can learn effectively to detour around a V-shaped fence after observing a demonstration from either an unfamiliar human or dog demonstrator. We found earlier that there is substantial individual variation between the dogs’ performance, even when using the same experimental conditions. Here, we investigate if the subjects’ relative dominance rank with other dogs had an effect on their social learning performance. On the basis of the owners’ answers to a questionnaire, subjects from multi-dog homes were sorted into groups of dominant and subordinate dogs. In Experiment 1, dominant and subordinate dogs were tested without demonstration and we did not find any difference between the groups—they had similarly low detour performances on their own. In Experiment 2 and 3, dogs from single dog and multi-dog households were tested in the detour task with demonstration by an unfamiliar dog, or human, respectively. The results showed that social learning performance of the single dogs fell between the dominant and subordinate multi-dogs with both dog and human demonstration. Subordinate dogs displayed significantly better performance after having observed a dog demonstrator in comparison to dominant dogs. In contrast, the performance of dominant and subordinate dogs was almost similar, when they observed a human demonstrator. These results suggest that perceived dominance rank in its own group has a strong effect on social learning in dogs, but this effect seems to depend also on the demonstrator species. This finding reveals an intricate organization of the social structure in multi-dog households, which can contribute to individual differences existing among dogs.     

On the Arts

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis -     

Class and compassion: socioeconomic factors predict responses to suffering

Previous research indicates that lower-class individuals experience elevated negative emotions as compared with their upper-class counterparts. We examine how the environments of lower-class individuals can also promote greater compassionate responding-that is, concern for the suffering or well-being of others. In the present research, we investigate class-based differences in dispositional compassion and its activation in situations wherein others are suffering. Across studies, relative to their upper-class counterparts, lower-class individuals reported elevated dispositional compassion (Study 1), as well as greater self-reported compassion during a compassion-inducing video (Study 2) and for another person during a social interaction (Study 3). Lower-class individuals also exhibited heart rate deceleration-a physiological response associated with orienting to the social environment and engaging with others-during the compassion-inducing video (Study 2). We discuss a potential mechanism of class-based influences on compassion, whereby lower-class individuals' are more attuned to others' distress, relative to their upper-class counterparts.     

I see what you’re saying: Voice signals influence children’s judgments of direct and averted gaze

Adults use gaze and voice signals as cues to the mental and emotional states of others. We examined the influence of voice cues on children’s judgments of gaze. In Experiment 1, 6-year-olds, 8-year-olds, and adults viewed photographs of faces fixating the center of the camera lens and a series of positions to the left and right and judged whether gaze was direct or averted. On each trial, participants heard the participant-directed voice cue (e.g., “I see you”), an object-directed voice cue (e.g., “I see that”), or no voice. In 6-year-olds, the range of directions of gaze leading to the perception of eye contact (the cone of gaze) was narrower for trials with object-directed voice cues than for trials with participant-directed voice cues or no voice. This effect was absent in 8-year-olds and adults, both of whom had a narrower cone of gaze than 6-year-olds. In Experiment 2, we investigated whether voice cues would influence adults’ judgments of gaze when the task was made more difficult by limiting the duration of exposure to the face. Adults’ cone of gaze was wider than in Experiment 1, and the effect of voice cues was similar to that observed in 6-year-olds in Experiment 1. Together, the results indicate that object-directed voice cues can decrease the width of the cone of gaze, allowing more adult-like judgments of gaze in young children, and that voice cues may be especially effective when the cone of gaze is wider because of immaturity (Experiment 1) or limited exposure (Experiment 2).