‘Mutual Obligation’ and ‘New Deal’: Illegitimate and Unjustified?

It is now commonplace for governments in Western countries to require the unemployed to work in exchange for their unemployment benefits. In this article I raise some serious doubts about the most promising and philosophically interesting defence of this argument, which relies on the ‘principle of reciprocity’. I argue that it is seriously unclear whether the obligations imposed on welfare claimants by ‘workfare’ schemes are legitimate and justified according to the principle of reciprocity. I do this by reconstructing the arguments for the obligations of the unemployed put forward in both the United Kingdom and Australia.     

Logics for Epistemic Programs

We construct logical languages which allow one to represent a variety of possible types of changes affecting the information states of agents in a multi-agent setting. We formalize these changes by defining a notion of epistemic program. The languages are two-sorted sets that contain not only sentences but also actions or programs. This is as in dynamic logic, and indeed our languages are not significantly more complicated than dynamic logics. But the semantics is more complicated. In general, the semantics of an epistemic program is what we call aprogram model. This is a Kripke model of ‘actions’,representing the agents' uncertainty about the current action in a similar way that Kripke models of ‘states’ are commonly used in epistemic logic to represent the agents' uncertainty about the current state of the system. Program models induce changes affecting agents' information, which we represent as changes of the state model, called epistemic updates. Formally, an update consists of two operations: the first is called the update map, and it takes every state model to another state model, called the updated model; the second gives, for each input state model, a transition relation between the states of that model and the states of the updated model. Each variety of epistemic actions, such as public announcements or completely private announcements to groups, gives what we call an action signature, and then each family of action signatures gives a logical language. The construction of these languages is the main topic of this paper. We also mention the systems that capture the valid sentences of our logics. But we defer to a separate paper the completeness proof. The basic operation used in the semantics is called the update product. A version of this was introduced in Baltag et al. (1998), and the presentation here improves on the earlier one. The update product is used to obtain from any program model the corresponding epistemic update, thus allowing us to compute changes of information or belief. This point is of interest independently of our logical languages. We illustrate the update product and our logical languages with many examples throughout the paper.     

Motivation in later life: personal projects and well-being

"Personal projects," as defined by B. R. Little (1983), were elicited from 600 community residents aged 70+, representing a broad range of health and illness. Factor analysis revealed 6 types of personal projects: activities of daily living, active recreation, other-oriented activities, intellectual activities, home planning, and spiritual moral activities. Background factors and health were shown to affect the number and type of projects reported. Most indices of personal projects were associated with positive affect and valuation of life. Only 1 was associated with depression. This confirms the differential association of personal projects to positive but not negative affect. Personal projects are seen as part of an open motivational system in which social position, cognitive ability, health, and positive mental health are mutually interacting members.     

Semantic processing of living and nonliving concepts across the cerebral hemispheres

Studies of patients with category-specific semantic deficits suggest that the right and left cerebral hemispheres may be differently involved in the processing of living and nonliving domains concepts. In this study, we investigate whether there are hemisphere differences in the semantic processing of these domains in healthy volunteers. Based on the neuropsychological findings, we predicted a disadvantage for nonliving compared to living concepts in the right hemisphere. Our prediction was supported, in that semantic decisions to nonliving concepts were significantly slower and more error-prone when presented to the right hemisphere. In contrast there were no hemisphere differences for living concepts. These findings are consistent with either differential representation or processing of concepts across right and left hemispheres. However, we also found a disadvantage for nonliving things compared to living things in the left hemisphere, which is not consistent with a simple representation account. We discuss these findings in terms of qualitatively different semantic processing in right and left hemispheres within the framework of a distributed model of conceptual representation.     

Does selective attention influence the octave illusion?

The octave illusion occurs when each ear receives a sequence of tones alternating by one octave, but with different frequencies in each ear. Most listeners report a high pitch in one ear alternating with a low pitch in the opposite ear. Deutsch and Roll proposed an influential suppression model of the illusion in which the pitch is determined by ear dominance, while the location of this pitch is determined by high-frequency dominance. Deutsch later suggested that this unusual division between 'what' and 'where' mechanisms is facilitated by sequential interactions within the eliciting sequence. A recent study has raised doubts about the suppression model and the role of sequential interactions in the illusion (Chambers et al, 2002 Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 28 1288-1302). Here, we examined whether this previous null effect of sequential interactions may have arisen because of uncontrolled influences of selective attention. The results reveal no evidence of a link between selective attention and sequential interactions, thus consolidating doubts about the validity of the suppression model.