Syntactic context and lexical access

Recent studies demonstrating that multiple meanings of an ambiguous word are initially accessed even when only one reading is syntactically appropriate with the preceding context can be criticized on at least two grounds. First, many of the syntactic contexts used were not truly restrictive, and, secondly, subjects may not have had time to integrate the context before processing the ambiguous word. In the present study, subjects listened to a sentence ending in an ambiguous word and then made a lexical decision to a target related to either the appropriate or inappropriate reading. Contexts were completely restrictive, and a pause was introduced between the context and the ambiguous word. Multiple access still obtained, providing further support for the claim that lexical access is not guided by syntactic context.     

Hegel,modal logic,and the social nature of mind

ABSTRACT

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit provides a fascinating picture of individual minds caught up in “recognitive” relations so as to constitute a realm—“spirit”—which, while necessarily embedded in nature, is not reducible to it. In this essay I suggest a contemporary path for developing Hegel's suggestive ideas in a way that broadly conforms to the demands of his own system, such that one moves from logic to a philosophy of mind. Hence I draw on Hegel's “subjective logic”, understood in the light of modern modal logic, in an attempt to model the way minds might be thought as connected by way of shared intentional contents. Here, we should not be surprised at some of the parallels that emerge between the approaches of Hegel and the modal logician Arthur Prior, as Prior had testified to the influence of his teacher, John N. Findlay, who himself had strong Hegelian leanings. In the final section, Robert Stalnaker's version of possible-world semantics is suggested as a framework within which Hegel's recognitive account of the mind might be understood.