Meaning guides attention during scene viewing,even when it is irrelevant

During real-world scene viewing, humans must prioritize scene regions for attention. What are the roles of low-level image salience and high-level semantic meaning in attentional prioritization? A previous study suggested that when salience and meaning are directly contrasted in scene memorization and preference tasks, attentional priority is assigned by meaning (Henderson & Hayes in Nature Human Behavior, 1, 743–747, 2017). Here we examined the role of meaning in attentional guidance using two tasks in which meaning was irrelevant and salience was relevant: a brightness rating task and a brightness search task. Meaning was represented by meaning maps that captured the spatial distribution of semantic features. Meaning was contrasted with image salience, represented by saliency maps. Critically, both maps were represented similarly, allowing us to directly compare how meaning and salience influenced the spatial distribution of attention, as measured by fixation density maps. Our findings suggest that even in tasks for which meaning is irrelevant and salience is relevant, meaningful scene regions are prioritized for attention over salient scene regions. These results support theories in which scene semantics play a dominant role in attentional guidance in scenes.     

Implementation intentions and disengagement from a failing course of action

We explored the consequences of forming implementation intentions that call for action (adjustment of chosen course of action) versus reflection (assessment of the appropriateness of chosen course of action) in situations that activate people's tendency to remain committed to failing courses of action. In Study 1, when negative experiences preceded failure, action and reflection implementation intention participants showed higher rates of disengagement than mere goal intention and no intention participants. However, when positive experiences preceded failure, only action implementation intention participants maintained this high disengagement rate. In Study 2, we observed that time pressure moderated the facilitating effects of action and reflection implementation intentions on disengagement when negative experiences preceded failure. Whereas the effect of action implementation intentions benefited from time pressure, the effect of reflection implementation intentions did not. The present studies construe disengagement as a self-regulation process and highlight the benefits of implementation intentions as a self-regulation tool. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Relies to our critics

We respond to the central concerns raised by our commentators to our book, The Epistemological Spectrum. Casullo believes that our account of what we term “low-grade a priori” justification provides important clarification of a kind of philosophical reflection. However he objects to calling such reflection a priori. We explain what we think is at stake. Along the way, we comment on his idea of that there may be an epistemic payoff to making a distinction between assumptions and presumptions. In the book, we argued that an epistemically important form of nonaccidental reliability can be understood as a matter of processes being “transglobally reliable under modulational control.” Graham recommends another form of nonaccidental reliability, one rooted in evolutionary etiology. We explain why we think that the reliability of perceptual processes is best understood as turning of the kinds of modulational control that we highlight. We clarify how this approach represents a kind of reasonable epistemic patience—modulational control takes time, as it must turn on agents generating information about their own capacities and foibles. Lyons raises interesting questions regarding how (what we term) morphological content possessed by the agent can do the work that we set for it. We argue that it is necessary in order for agents to accommodate the background information that is relevant to many central problems of belief formation. We clarify how it can be expected to work.     

How does self stigma differ across people with psychiatric diagnoses and rheumatoid arthritis,and how does it impact on self-esteem and empowerment?

Self stigmatising attitudes have been found in people who have psychiatric diagnoses, however, research assessing self stigma in physical illnesses is rare. It is known that receiving a diagnosis of rheumatoid arthritis (RA) can affect a person’s identity and self esteem. This study aimed to compare levels of self stigma, self esteem and empowerment between people diagnosed with psychiatric illnesses and people diagnosed with RA to establish whether self stigma, and specifically endorsement of negative stereotypes, is associated with self esteem and empowerment across these two groups. A total of 202 participants (psychiatric group n = 102; RA group n = 100) were interviewed using the Internalised Stigma of Mental Illness scale (ISMI), or the Internalized Stigma of Mental Illness scale- Rheumatoid Arthritis (ISMI-RA), the Index of Self Esteem (ISE) and the Mental Health Confidence Scale (MHCS). Overall, the psychiatric group had higher self stigma scores (2.5 vs. 2.2, p < .01), lower self esteem (48.7 vs. 36.8, p < .001) and lower empowerment scores (3.8 vs. 4.3, p < .001) than the RA group. However, sizable proportions of both groups had high self stigma scores. ISMI/ISMI-RA was associated with the ISE and the MHCS. The stereotype endorsement subscale of the ISMI/ISMI-RA was not related to self esteem or empowerment in either group. Interventions that aim to decrease self stigma and increase self esteem could focus on alienation.     

Human gaze control during real-world scene perception

In human vision, acuity and color sensitivity are best at the point of fixation, and the visual-cognitive system exploits this fact by actively controlling gaze to direct fixation towards important and informative scene regions in real time as needed. How gaze control operates over complex real-world scenes has recently become of central concern in several core cognitive science disciplines including cognitive psychology, visual neuroscience, and machine vision. This article reviews current approaches and empirical findings in human gaze control during real-world scene perception.     

Targeting regressions: Do readers pay attention to the left?

The perceptual span during normal reading extends approximately 14 to 15 characters to the right and three to four characters to the left of a current fixation. In the present study, we investigated whether the perceptual span extends farther than three to four characters to the left immediately before readers execute a regression. We used a display-change paradigm in which we masked words beyond the three-to-four-character range to the left of a fixation. We hypothesized that if reading behavior was affected by this manipulation before regressions but not before progressions, we would have evidence that the perceptual span extends farther left before leftward eye movements. We observed significantly shorter regressive saccades and longer fixation and gaze durations in the masked condition when a regression was executed. Forward saccades were entirely unaffected by the manipulations. We concluded that the perceptual span during reading changes, depending on the direction of a following saccade.     

Semantic Informativeness Mediates the Detection of Changes in Natural Scenes

Three experiments investigated whether the semantic informativeness of a scene region (object) influences its representation between successive views. In Experiment 1, a scene and a modified version of that scene were presented in alternation, separated by a brief retention interval. A changed object was either semantically consistent with the scene (non-informative) or inconsistent (informative). Change detection latency was shorter in the semantically inconsistent versus consistent condition. In Experiment 2, eye movements were eliminated by presenting a single cycle of the change sequence. Detection accuracy was higher for inconsistent versus consistent objects. This inconsistent object advantage was obtained when the potential strategy of selectively encoding inconsistent objects was no longer advantageous (Experiment 3). These results indicate that the semantic properties of an object influence whether the representation of that object is maintained between views of a scene, and this influence is not caused solely by the differential allocation of eye fixations to the changing region. The potential cognitive mechanisms supporting this effect are discussed.     

Using real-world scenes as contextual cues for search

Research on contextual cueing has demonstrated that with simple arrays of letters and shapes, search for a target increases in efficiency as associations between a search target and its surrounding visual context are learned. We investigated whether the visual context afforded by repeated exposure to real-world scenes can also guide attention when the relationship between the scene and a target position is arbitrary. Observers searched for and identified a target letter embedded in photographs of real-world scenes. Although search time within novel scenes was consistent across trials, search time within repeated scenes decreased across repetitions. Unlike previous demonstrations of contextual cueing, however, memory for scene-target covariation was explicit. In subsequent memory tests, observers recognized repeated contexts more often than those that were presented once and displayed superior recall of target position within the repeated scenes. In addition, repetition of inverted scenes, which made the scene more difficult to identify, produced a markedly reduced rate of learning, suggesting semantic information concerning object and scene identity are used to guide attention.     

Dispersion in Cognitive Ability as a Function of Age: A Longitudinal Study of an Elderly Community Sample

This longitudinal study investigated whether age is associated with increased dispersion among major domains of cognitive ability. Three samples were examined: the full sample of 760 elderly community dwellers aged 70 years and older who were tested in 1990; a subset of the original sample who died between testing occasions; and the sample of 426 who survived with full data sets in 1994 (followed up for a mean 3.5 years). Dispersion, as measured by the within-individual standard deviation of ability scores and by the within-individual deviations from crystallized intelligence for speed, memory and spatial functioning, was significantly correlated with age in all three samples at Wave 1 and at Wave 2 (for the longitudinal sample). The rate at which dispersion increased was not significantly correlated with age. In a more detailed analysis of the 426 survivors, dispersion as a function of age was similar for demented persons within this sample, those without dementia, those with poor and excellent educational levels, and those with a physical disability. Activities of daily living was a predictor of larger-than-average changes in dispersion – but not age, education, or activity. Greater dispersion was associated with faster deterioration in memory and speed performance. Contrary to some recent reports, there was evidence for greater within-individual variability among cognitive domains in older individuals.