You'll change more than I will: Adults’ predictions about their own and others’ future preferences

It has been argued that adults underestimate the extent to which their preferences will change over time. We sought to determine whether such mispredictions are the result of a difficulty imagining that one's own current and future preferences may differ or whether it also characterizes our predictions about the future preferences of others. We used a perspective-taking task in which we asked young people how much they liked stereotypically young-person items (e.g., Top 40 music, adventure vacations) and stereotypically old-person items (e.g., jazz, playing bridge) now, and how much they would like them in the distant future (i.e., when they are 70 years old). Participants also made these same predictions for a generic same-age, same-sex peer. In a third condition, participants predicted how much a generic older (i.e., age 70) same-sex adult would like items from both categories today. Participants predicted less change between their own current and future preferences than between the current and future preferences of a peer. However, participants estimated that, compared to a current older adult today, their peer would like stereotypically young items more in the future and stereotypically old items less. The fact that peers’ distant-future estimated preferences were different from the ones they made for “current” older adults suggests that even though underestimation of change of preferences over time is attenuated when thinking about others, a bias still exists.     

The effect of word length on lexical decision in dyslexic and normal reading children

In the present study, the effect of word length on lexical decision in dyslexic and normal reading children was investigated. Dyslexics of 10-years old, chronological age controls, and reading age controls read words and pseudowords consisting of 3 to 6 letters in a lexical decision task. Length effects were much stronger in dyslexics and reading age controls than in chronological age controls. These results support the contention that dyslexics continue to rely on a predominantly sub-lexical reading procedure, whereas for normal readers the contribution of a lexical reading procedure increases. The relevance of the findings for current computational models of reading is discussed.     

Culture-fair cognitive ability assessment: information processing and psychophysiological approaches

Valid assessment with diverse populations requires tools that are not influenced by cultural elements. This study investigated the relationships between culture, information processing efficiency, and general cognitive capacities in samples of Caucasian and Mexican American college students. Consistent with the neural efficiency hypothesis, pupillary responses (indexing mental effort) and detection accuracy scores on a visual backward-masking task were both significantly related to the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (WAIS-R) Full Scale scores. These measures of information processing efficiency were similar in the two groups. However, they were related only to Caucasian American, but not to a comparable sample of Mexican American, students' WAIS-R scores. Therefore, the differential validity in prediction suggests that the WAIS-R test may contain cultural influences that reduce the validity of the WAIS-R as a measure of cognitive ability for Mexican American students. Information processing and psychophysiological approaches may be helpful in developing culture-fair cognitive ability measures.     

What we fear most: A developmental advantage for threat-relevant stimuli

Fear is one of our most basic emotions. It is an important social signal and alerts us to when a situation is safe or risky. Interestingly, not all fears are created equal: Several researchers have proposed that humans develop specific fears, such as fear of threatening stimuli, more readily than others. Here we discuss three major theories of fear acquisition, and consider the possibility that some fears are privileged in learning. Second, we review a growing literature that suggests that humans have perceptual biases that quickly draw attention to threatening stimuli in the environment. In particular, we highlight recent developmental work that shows that even infants and young children respond rapidly to the presence of threat well before they acquire any threat-relevant fears. Finally, we argue that such biases may play a causal role in privileging fear learning for certain threats, and we suggest directions for future work that can clarify whether early biases in perception indeed facilitate the development of our most common fears.     

Parental Bonding and Its Effect on Adolescent Substance Use and Sexual Debut

The purpose of this study was to examine associations among parental bonding factors and the early onset of sexual behaviors and substance use. Significant differences were found in the levels of care among the parental status groups and among the ages of onset for alcohol use.     

Monkeys perform as well as apes and humans in a size discrimination task

Whether the cognitive competences of monkeys and apes are rather similar or whether the larger-brained apes outperform monkeys in cognitive experiments is a highly debated topic. Direct comparative analyses are therefore essential to examine similarities and differences among species. We here compared six primate species, including humans, chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas (great apes), olive baboons, and long-tailed macaques (Old World monkeys) in a task on fine-grained size discrimination. Except for gorillas, subjects of all taxa (i.e. humans, apes, and monkeys) were able to discriminate three-dimensional cubes with a volume difference of only 10 % (i.e. cubes of 50 and 48 mm side length) and performed only slightly worse when the cubes were presented successively. The minimal size discriminated declined further with increasing time delay between presentations of the cubes, highlighting the difficulty to memorize exact size differences. The results suggest that differences in brain size, as a proxy for general cognitive abilities, did not account for variation in performance, but that differential socio-ecological pressures may better explain species differences. Our study highlights the fact that differences in cognitive abilities do not always map neatly onto phylogenetic relationships and that in a number of cognitive experiments monkeys do not fare significantly worse than apes, casting doubt on the assumption that larger brains per se confer an advantage in such kinds of tests.     

Fitting an ex-Gaussian function to examine costs in event-based prospective memory: Evidence for a continuous monitoring profile

Event-based prospective memory (PM) tasks require individuals to remember to perform a deferred action when a target event occurs. PM task requirements can slow ongoing task responses on non-target trials (‘costs’) under conditions where the defining features of targets are non-focal to the ongoing task, which is indicative that individuals have allocated some form of cognitive control process to the PM task. Recent fits of the ex-Gaussian mathematical function to non-target trial response distributions by prior studies have indicated that these control processes are transiently allocated. In the current paper, fits of the ex-Gaussian function to data reported by Loft and Humphreys (2012) demonstrate a shift in the entire response time distribution (μ) and an increase in skew (τ) for a non-focal PM condition required to remember to make a PM response if presented with category exemplars, compared to a control condition. This change in μ is indicative of a more continuous PM monitoring profile than that reported by prior studies. In addition, within–subject variability in μ was reliably correlated with PM accuracy, suggesting that these control processes allocated on a regular basis were functional to PM accuracy. In contrast, when the ongoing task directed attention to the defining features of targets (focal PM) there was a trend level increase in μ, but the within–subject variability in μ was not correlated with PM accuracy, consistent with the theoretical premise that focal PM tasks are not as dependent on cognitive control as non-focal PM tasks.