Why Husserl is a Moderate Foundationalist

Foundationalism and coherentism are two fundamentally opposed basic epistemological views about the structure of justification. Interestingly enough, there is no consensus on how to interpret Husserl. While interpreting Husserl as a foundationalist was the standard view in early Husserl scholarship, things have changed considerably as prominent commentators like Christian Beyer, John Drummond, Dagfinn Føllesdal, and Dan Zahavi have challenged this foundationalist interpretation. These anti-foundationalist interpretations have again been challenged, for instance, by Walter Hopp and Christian Erhard. One might suspect that inconsistencies in Husserl’s writings are the simple reason for this disagreement. I shall argue, however, that the real question is not so much how to read Husserl, but how to define foundationalism and that there is overwhelming textual evidence that Husserl championed the most tenable version of foundationalism: a moderate foundationalism that allows for incorporating coherentist elements.     

Perceptual Error,Conjunctivism, and Husserl

Claude Romano (2012) and Andrea Staiti (2015) have recently discussed Husserl’s account of perception in relation to debates in current analytic philosophy between so-called “conjunctivists” and “disjunctivists”. Romano and Staiti offer strikingly different accounts of the nature of illusion and hallucination, and opposing readings of Husserl. Romano thinks hallucinations and illusions are fleeting, fragile phenomena, while Staiti claims they are inherently retrospective phenomena. Romano reads Husserl as being committed to a form of conjunctivism that Romano rejects in favour of a version of disjunctivism. Staiti, by contrast, claims that, from a Husserlian viewpoint, conjunctivism and disjunctivism are equally untenable. I suggest that both Romano and Staiti offer implausible accounts of illusions and hallucinations, and deliver premature verdicts on Husserl in relation to the analytic debates on perception.     

Event Semantics: A Husserlian Critique

Event semantics is concerned with the formal structure of sentences which appear to describe an event of some kind, e.g. ‘Brutus kills Caesar,’ or ‘My tooth fell out.’ Phenomenologists should be interested in work in this field, if they hope to rescue Husserl’s phenomenology of judgment from its narrow focus on copular judgments of the form ‘S is p.’ An adequate phenomenology of judgment must ultimately develop an account of judgments whose intentional correlates seem to be events, rather than states of affairs, since such judgments are ubiquitous. For this endeavor, existing work on the formal structure of event sentences provides a crucial foothold. However, phenomenologists cannot simply import semantic theories for their own use, without first evaluating them for phenomenological plausibility. This concern is particularly acute in the case of the widely-adopted “Davidsonian” approach, according to which the logical structure of event sentences diverges radically from natural language syntax. The Davidsonian form introduces a “covert” variable, which stands in for an event. Thus, the sentence ‘Brutus kills Caesar’ becomes, ‘There is an event e that is a killing of Caesar by Brutus.’ Such a theory, if correct, would have decisive consequences for the phenomenology of event sentences, and even of events themselves. Yet the introduction of covert variables in turn introduces—I argue—a covert intentional object, without assessing this idea for phenomenological plausibility. Building on Husserl’s phenomenology of predication, I develop a criterion for evaluating this hypothesis, and argue that the Davidsonian approach, as it stands, is phenomenologically untenable.     

Non-Naturalist Moral Realism,Autonomy and Entanglement

It was something of a dogma for much of the twentieth century that one cannot validly derive an ought from an is. More generally, it was held that non-normative propositions do not entail normative propositions. Call this thesis about the relation between the natural and the normative Natural-Normative Autonomy (or Autonomy for short). The denial of Autonomy involves the entanglement of the natural with the normative. Naturalism entails entanglement—in fact it entails the most extreme form of entanglement—but entanglement does not entail naturalism. In a ground-breaking paper “The autonomy of ethics” Arthur Prior constructed some intriguing counterexamples to Autonomy. While his counterexamples have convinced few, there is little agreement on what is wrong with them. I present a new analysis of Autonomy, one which is grounded in a general and independently plausible account of subject matters. While Prior’s arguments do establish shallow natural-normative entanglement, this is a consequence of simple logical relationships that hold between just about any two subject matters. It has nothing special to do with the logical structure of normativity or its relation to the natural. Prior’s arguments (along with several others) leave the fundamental idea behind natural-normative Autonomy intact. I offer a new argument for deep entanglement. I show that in any framework adequate for dealing with the natural and the normative spheres, a purely natural proposition entails a purely normative proposition, and vice-versa. But this is no threat to non-naturalist moral realism. In fact it helps ameliorate the excesses of an extreme non-naturalism, delivering a more palatable and plausible position.     

Enoch’s “Taking-Morality-Seriously Thought” Unpacked and at Work in the Argument from Impartiality

After a brief outline of Enoch’s defense of robust realism in his Taking Morality Seriously (§ 1), I focus on Enoch’s taking-morality-seriously thought by making explicit the assumptions I see involved in it (§ 2). Enoch’s argument from impartiality is then reconstructed (§ 3) to show how these assumptions are at work (§ 4). Next (§§ 5 and 6), I explain the reasons why Enoch does not succeed in converting these assumptions into a positive argument for the thesis implied by robust realism that there is a moral objectivity. Finally (§ 7), I conclude that the critical analysis provided casts a shadow on the reliability of the taking-morality-seriously thought as a basis of a theoretical inquiry into the nature of morality.     

Work,Nonwork, and Sleep (WNS): a Review and Conceptual Framework

The current paper expands on traditional views of the work-nonwork interface to incorporate the critical component of sleep. We integrate past theoretical and empirical work from the sleep and organizational science literatures to inform a novel framework that will facilitate research evaluating associations among work, nonwork, and sleep, the three major areas of life. We propose that attitudes, behaviors, and states emerging in work and nonwork domains cannot be fully understood without taking into account upstream and downstream sleep quantity and quality effects. Rather, periods of sleep bookend engagement in work and nonwork roles. Thus, we propose the work, nonwork, and sleep (WNS) conceptual framework and, in doing so, identify specific, underlying resource mechanisms (i.e., human energy and time) operating both intra-individually and inter-individually. We also discuss contextual factors that act as predictors and moderators of these relationships. We suggest that a unifying framework explaining connections and underlying processes among work, nonwork, and sleep is necessary for applied psychology and management disciplines to significantly contribute to future research, intervention development and dissemination, and ultimately policy change. We provide a number of avenues for future investigation, including relevant special populations and methodological approaches. Although a plethora of work-nonwork theoretical frameworks exist, none have incorporated the third major area of life: sleep. We call for the expansion and acknowledgement of sleep, an important source of variance in everyday attitudes, behaviors, and states, and ultimately in long-term organizational, family, and individual health and well-being.     

Incivility in Meetings: Predictors and Outcomes

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to provide a deeper understanding of uncivil meeting behaviors (UMBs) by exploring their frequency, potential predictors, and perceived impact on meeting outcomes. Five forms of UMBs were identified and examined. Key situational variables (meeting characteristics) and individual differences (Big Five factors and the Dark Triad of personality) were explored as potential predictors of UMBs.

Methodology

We collected data from two independent samples of meeting participants (N _s  = 345, 170) via two online surveys. We used confirmatory factor analysis, correlations, hierarchical multiple regressions, and relative weight analyses to analyze the data.

Findings

The findings demonstrated that attendees’ perceptions of UMBs were linked to lower ratings of meeting satisfaction and effectiveness. In particular, the ratings were most affected by the observation of attendees who did not participate actively and who showed inappropriate interpersonal behavior. Results further suggest situational variables (meeting purpose and meeting norms) and individual differences (narcissism, psychopathy, and agreeableness) as potential predictors of UMBs.

Implications

By showing the consequences of UMBs on meeting outcomes and by providing insights into potential causes of engagement in UMBs, this study offers valuable input for running and leading work meetings.

Originality/Value

No previous study has empirically examined how different forms of UMBs affect meeting outcomes. Additionally, the paper introduces situational and personality variables that may act as potential predictors of UMBs.

     

Friends and Family: The Role of Relationships in Community and Workplace Attachment

Purpose

Most work–life research focuses on the spillover of the nuclear family to the workplace, offering little insight into how other family relationships and friendships can spill over to affect employees’ organizational attachment. Past research has also overlooked the role of relationship quality and the mechanisms underlying these life-to-work spillover effects. Addressing these shortcomings, we integrate the systemic model of community attachment with job embeddedness theory to develop a model of community relational embeddedness and then use this model to examine how nonwork relationships connect people to their workplaces.

Design/Methodology/Approach

We used survey data from a national sample of 2025 accounting professionals and tested mediation hypotheses using structural equation modeling.

Findings

Employees’ relationships with friends and family predicted their attachment to their communities, which in turn predicted their workplace turnover intentions. Supporting our theoretical model, bonds with friends and family predicted moving intentions, and community fit and sacrifice mediated these effects. Community fit and sacrifice also predicted work turnover intentions indirectly through moving intentions. Tests also revealed that, surprisingly, friendships had a stronger impact on community attachment than family.

Implications

Employees are connected to their organizations through an array of close community relationships that extend beyond the nuclear family (i.e., spouse, children). Organizations can enhance employees’ workplace attachment by recognizing the role of friends and offering work–life programs that use a broad conceptualization of family (e.g., adult siblings, parents).

Originality/Value

Our study illustrates the importance of community relationships to workplace attachment, and the need to incorporate relational quality, nonnuclear family, and friendships in future research.

     

A Conservation of Resources Perspective on Negative Affect and Innovative Work Behaviour: the Role of Affect Activation and Mindfulness

The present study aimed to clarify the inconsistent relationship between negative affect and innovative work behaviour by taking into account the role of affect activation and mindfulness. Building on the conservation of resources theory, we hypothesized that low-activated negative affect can be associated with increased innovativeness, but only for employees with high levels of mindfulness. Conversely, high-activated negative affect is expected to have a positive, direct relationship with innovative work behaviour. Data were collected from two independent samples, namely 163 French Canadian and 101 Italian employees. Consistent with our predictions, multiple regression analysis results showed that low-activated negative affect was positively related to innovative behaviour only when mindfulness was high (vs. low), whereas high-activated negative affect was directly associated with higher innovativeness. Our findings challenge the assumption that low-activated negative affects are associated with undermined innovative behaviour, suggesting that these affective states can be related to increased innovativeness if employees are mindful. On the other hand, they support the view that high-activated negative affects provide the energizing potential for instigating innovative actions. This study is unique in examining mindfulness as a moderator that is capable of shaping the link between deactivating negative affect and employee innovativeness. As such, it answers recent calls for research on how mindfulness can contribute to workplace functioning. Moreover, this is the first study to take into account the role of activation level in the negative affect-innovative work behaviour relationship.     

Moral Emotions Toward Others at Work and Implications for Employee Behavior: a Qualitative Analysis Using Critical Incidents

We propose a theoretical framework for and, via critical incidents, inductively investigate (a) the situations that trigger moral emotions toward others at work and (b) worker responses to these situations. Critical incidents were collected from a heterogeneous sample of 423 workers. Participants described an incident that caused each of four moral emotions (gratitude, anger, admiration, and contempt) and their response. Incidents and responses were coded, and frequencies, differences across the moral emotions, and associations between incidents and responses were analyzed. Several morally relevant situations at work were found to trigger the moral emotions. Participants responded in ways that had implications for their performance and their own well-being. The incidents largely align with moral foundations theory (Haidt and Graham in Social Justice Research, 20, 98–116, 2007). Responses also show evidence for social exchange, social learning, and rational expectancy-based processes and behavior. The incidents specify several practices for managers and organizations to encourage and avoid. This was the first qualitative study of moral emotions at work and one of the few workplace studies to examine these emotions empirically. Several understudied factors and behavioral responses emerged.