Hippocampal associative cellular responses: dissociation with behavioral responses revealed by a transfer-of-control technique

Multiunit activity was recorded in the CA3 field of the dorsal hippocampus in freely moving rats during classical conditioning and subsequent presentation of the CS on operant baselines for food reward as well as shock avoidance. Rats were first trained in a nonsignaled bar-pressing-dependent shock omission task and in a food-motivated lever-pressing task (60-s VI). Five sessions with presentations of a previously habituated tone as a CS paired with footshock as a US were then given. Testing was carried out by presenting the CS alone while behavioral responses were maintained by reinforcement in both instrumental tasks on alternate sessions. As expected, the CS induced a marked suppression of lever pressing for food reward and a marked enhancement of bar-pressing for shock avoidance. The analysis of the frequency of multiunit discharges to the CS revealed that the hippocampal cellular responses established during classical conditioning were maintained while two different behavioral responses were exhibited to the CS. The results showed that the associative response of hippocampal neurons may be dissociated from the Pavlovian conditioned responses the CS elicits. They support the hypothesis that hippocampal cellular responses represent a neural index of the acquired CS-US associative representation.     

Pavlovian analysis of interactions between hunger and thirst

In four experiments we examined the effect of an irrelevant drive on classical conditioning with food and water. In the first experiment the irrelevant drive weakened the conditioned response in extinction. In Experiments 2 and 3, this suppressive effect was found also in acquisition. Furthermore, the presence of an irrelevant drive during nonreinforced presentations of the conditioned stimulus was found to protect the conditioned response from extinction. Experiment 4 showed that the depressive effect of the irrelevant drive is manifested only when the relevant drive is present. Taken together, these results suggest that an irrelevant drive can influence conditioned responding by modulating the representation of the unconditioned stimulus.     

Effects of foveal priming and extrafoveal preview on object identification

The results of three different experiments suggested that the relation between an object in the fovea on fixation n and an object subsequently brought into the fovea on fixation n + 1 affects the time to identify the second object. In Experiment 1 we extended previous work by demonstrating that a previously seen related priming object speeded the time to name a target object even when a saccade intervened between the two objects. In Experiment 2 we replicated this result and further showed that the benefit on naming time was due to facilitation from the related object rather than inhibition from the unrelated object. In addition, naming of the target object was much slower in both experiments when there was not a peripheral preview of the target object on fixation n. However, because the effect of the foveal priming object was greater when the target was not present than when it was present, priming did not appear to make extraction of the extrafoveal information more efficient. In Experiment 3, fixation times were recorded while subjects looked at four objects in order to identify them. Fixation time on an object was shorter when a related object was fixated immediately before it, even though the four objects did not form a scene. The size of the facilitation was roughly comparable to that in several analogous experiments where scenes were used. The results suggest that the effects of a predictive scene context on object identification may be explainable in terms of an object-to-object or "intralevel" priming mechanism.     

Rigidity in cinema seen from the front row, side aisle

Pictures and cinema seen at a slant present the optics of virtual objects that are distorted and inconsistent with their real counterparts. In particular, it should not be possible for moving objects on slanted film and television screens to be seen as rigid, at least according to rules of linear perspective. Previous approaches to this problem have suggested that some process (perhaps cognitive) rectifies the optics of objects in slanted pictures to derive true shape and preserve shape constancy. The means for this rectification is usually thought to be based on recovery of true screen slant. In three experiments I show that this account is unnecessary and insufficient to explain the perception of rotating, rectangular objects in slanted cinema. I present data in favor of an alternate view, one in which the information is sufficient for perceivers to determine rigidity in an object on slanted screens, at least for parallel projections. In the human visual system, local measurements of objects are apparently made according to projective geometry; in those measurements, small amounts of certain distortions in projection are tolerated. Stimuli that appear nonrigid are ones that violate certain local principles, known as Perkins's laws, of projections of rectangular solids.     

Eye movement as a cue to figure motion in anorthoscopic perception

When a figure moves behind a narrow aperture in an opaque surface, if it is perceived as a figure, its shape will often appear distorted. Under such anorthoscopic conditions, the speed or direction of the object's motion is ambiguous. However, when the observer simultaneously tracks a moving target, a figure is always perceived, and its precise shape is a function of the speed or direction of tracking. The figure is seen as moving with the speed or in the direction of the target. Thus, it is argued that eye movement serves as a cue to the figure's motion, which, in turn, determines its perceived length or orientation.     

Observed behaviors during clinical interviews predict improvement in depression

A considerable percentage of depressed patients do not respond to antidepressive treatment. Early indicators of prognosis are needed. The aims of this study are to examine (a) whether the interpersonal behavior of patients and psychiatrist, as assessed by means of direct observation of behavior during a baseline clinical interview, might have predictive value with respect to therapeutic outcome and (b) which predictive potency measures of psychomotor activation, as assessed by less refined methods, such as global clinical judgment, might have. In the analysis used, speech-pause behavior was taken as the basic structure of the interaction. The relations of other behaviors such as looking and hand and head movement with this structure were determined. Evidence is presented that in a group of 31 depressives, improvement after a period of 10 weeks was related to observed behaviors during a baseline interview. The behaviors of the patients are interpreted as relational or nonrelational. The relational behaviors (i.e., looking yesnodding, gesturing) occur less in patients who will improve, whereas the nonrelational behaviors (i.e., intensive body touching, head movements) occur more in these patients. The nonrelational behaviors are presumed to be indicative of the state of arousal. The predictive potency of these variables could not be explained by their relationship with the baseline severity of depression, which in itself also predicted improvement. Moreover, global clinical assessment of psychomotor activation (i.e., retardation and agitation) could not be related to outcome.     

Do you really want to maintain that a flat tire can upset your stomach? Using the findings of the psychophysiology of stress to bolster the argument that people are not directly disturbed by events

The purpose of this paper is to help clients and others more fully appreciate the complex chain of events intervening between an external happening and an emotional response to that happening. It deals first with the sensory processing of physical stimulation and then presents the current state of knowledge regarding stress psychophysiology. A decision by the cortex which defines something as dangerous or threatening activates two major stress reaction pathways, the endocrine system and the autonomic nervous system, with a large number of physical consequences such as: acceleration of heart rate, increased blood pressure, reduced effectiveness of the immunological system, slowing of gastro-intestinal processes, pupil dilation, bronchial dilation and inhibition of salivation. The complexity and variety of such consequences is illustrated with a series of flow-chart diagrams, and it is suggested that these can be an additional and persuasive argument for the RET position which follows the claim of Epictetus: People are disturbed not by things, but by the views they take of them. Finally it is argued that while rapid emotional responses oftenseem to occur automatically it is because the intervening cortical processes are at times not verbalized. This is shown in the context of a diagrammatic outline of the Rational-Emotive Therapy process.Paul J. Woods, Ph.D., co-editor of this journal, is an associate fellow and an RET training supervisor of the Institute for Rational-Emotive Therapy.     

Fallacies in pragma-dialectical perspective

In the pragma-dialectical approach, fallacies are considered incorrect moves in a discussion for which the goal is successful resolution of a dispute. Ten rules are given for effective conduct at the various stages of such a critical discussion (confrontation, opening, argumentation, concluding). Fallacies are discussed as violations of these rules, taking into account all speech acts which are traditionally recognized as fallacies. Special attention is paid to the role played by implicitness in fallacies in everyday language use. It is stressed that identifying and acknowledging fallacies in ordinary discussions always has a conditional character. Differences between the pragma-dialectical perspective, the Standard Treatment, and the formal logic approach to fallacy analysis are discussed.     

Fallacies

Fallacies are things people commit, and when they commit them they do something wrong. What kind of activities are people engaged in when they commit fallacies, and in what way are they doing something wrong? Many different things are called fallacies. The diversity of the use of the concept of a fallacy suggests that we are dealing with a family of cases not related by a common essence. However, we suggest a simple account of the nature of fallacies which encompasses them all, viz., the term “fallacy” is our most general term for criticizing any general procedure used for the fixation of beliefs that has an unacceptably high tendency to generate false or unfounded beliefs, relative to that method of fixing beliefs. Very different sorts of things called fallacies are examined in the light of this account, e.g., denying the antecedent, circular arguments, so-called informal fallacies, and propositions said to be fallacies. We do not provide a theory of fallacies. Still, on our account pretty much all of those things that have been called fallacies are fallacies, and they have been called fallacies for pretty much the same reasons.