Incongruent Feeling States in Psychoanalysis

ABSTRACT

Analysts occasionally find that we have dreamt of a patient or experienced feelings in sessions that appear to have nothing to do with the feelings or content presented by the patient. This can be disturbing or confusing, but is always fascinating. This article defines and illustrates these phenomena, grapples with their meanings, and attempts to understand how they came about.     

‘Active’ating thoughts about affect: elicitation of physical activity judgements in insufficiently active women

Objective: A growing body of evidence suggests that affective judgements are distinct from, and exert greater influence on, physical activity behaviours than instrumental judgements.

Design: As part of a randomised controlled trial, 110 insufficiently active, female, university students were randomised to (a) an affective mental contrasting condition, (b) an instrumental mental contrasting condition, or (c) a ‘standard’ mental contrasting intervention (with no modifications). In the analyses concerning the trial’s primary outcome, the affective mental contrasting condition was found to be more effective for increasing physical activity than the standard or instrumental conditions. The purpose of this study was to qualitatively examine the physical activity outcomes and obstacles elicited from participants as part of the three mental contrasting interventions within this trial.

Results: 32 lower-order physical activity judgement themes, categorised within seven high-order themes, were derived through the use of the mental contrasting intervention. In addition to identifying several affective and instrumental outcomes and obstacles that have previously been recognised, participants in this study also highlighted contextualised responses that describe complicated relationships that exist between affective and instrumental judgements.

Conclusions: This study provides fine-grained insight into cognitive processes derived from a novel intervention involving insufficiently active women.     

Dual processes in decision making and developmental neuroscience: A fuzzy-trace model

From Piaget to the present, traditional and dual-process theories have predicted improvement in reasoning from childhood to adulthood, and improvement has been observed. However, developmental reversals—that reasoning biases emerge with development—have also been observed in a growing list of paradigms. We explain how fuzzy-trace theory predicts both improvement and developmental reversals in reasoning and decision making. Drawing on research on logical and quantitative reasoning, as well as on risky decision making in the laboratory and in life, we illustrate how the same small set of theoretical principles apply to typical neurodevelopment, encompassing childhood, adolescence, and adulthood, and to neurological conditions such as autism and Alzheimer’s disease. For example, framing effects—that risk preferences shift when the same decisions are phrased in terms of gains vs. losses—emerge in early adolescence as gist-based intuition develops. In autistic individuals, who rely less on gist-based intuition and more on verbatim-based analysis, framing biases are attenuated (i.e., they outperform typically developing control subjects). In adults, simple manipulations based on fuzzy-trace theory can make framing effects appear and disappear depending on whether gist-based intuition or verbatim-based analysis is induced. These theoretical principles are summarized and integrated in a new mathematical model that specifies how dual modes of reasoning combine to produce predictable variability in performance. In particular, we show how the most popular and extensively studied model of decision making—prospect theory—can be derived from fuzzy-trace theory by combining analytical (verbatim-based) and intuitive (gist-based) processes.