Common Sense and the Natural Light in George Berkeley’s Philosophy

Philosophia - It is argued that George Berkeley’s term ‘common sense’ does not indicate shared conviction, but the shared capacity of reasonable judgement, and is therefore to be...     

Parsing as a Cue-Based Retrieval Model

This paper develops a novel psycholinguistic parser and tests it against experimental and corpus reading data. The parser builds on the recent research into memory structures, which argues that memory retrieval is content-addressable and cue-based. It is shown that the theory of cue-based memory systems can be combined with transition-based parsing to produce a parser that, when combined with the cognitive architecture ACT-R, can model reading and predict online behavioral measures (reading times and regressions). The parser's modeling capacities are tested against self-paced reading experimental data (Grodner & Gibson, 2005), eye-tracking experimental data (Staub, 2011), and a self-paced reading corpus (Futrell et al., 2018).     

The Croatian version of the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire: Links with higher- and lower-level personality traits and mood

The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) measures habitual use of two emotion regulation strategies, cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression. The present study tested the psychometric properties and validity of a newly developed Croatian adaptation of the ERQ. In a sample of 347 participants, we first sought to confirm the ERQ's original factor structure. Next, we tested its convergent, divergent and incremental validity. In the first subsample (N = 140), we linked the ERQ with a measure of the Five-Factor Model dimensions and their facets (Revised NEO Personality Inventory). In the second subsample (N = 207), we tested its ability to predict personality dimensions assessed by a different measure (Big Five Inventory) as well as the traits of positive and negative affect, including its incremental validity in predicting the latter. The results corroborated earlier findings, showing that the Croatian ERQ has equivalent psychometrics and predictive validity as ERQs in other languages. Crucially, the observed links between the ERQ and the facets of the Five-Factor Model dimensions enrich our understanding of the personality mechanisms behind the employment of these emotion regulation strategies.     

Boys Just Don’t! Gender Stereotyping and Sanctioning of Counter-Stereotypical Behavior in Preschoolers

Sex Roles - Although children start to adopt gender stereotypes by the age of three, there is less evidence about how early they start to sanction other children’s counter-stereotypical...     

Effect of social organisation on interspecific differences in overmarking behaviour of foals in African equids

Animal Cognition - Overmarking remains an unstudied topic in juvenile mammals. We have previously documented a very high rate of overmarking by foals in four captive African equid species: mountain...     

The Knowledge Argument and Objectivity

In this paper I argue that Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument is better considered not as an argument against physicalism, but as an argument that objective theories must be incomplete. I argue that despite the apparent diversity of responses to the knowledge argument, they all boil down to a response according to which genuine epistemic gains are made when an individual has an experience. I call this the acquaintance response. I then argue that this response violates an intuitive stricture on the objectivity of theories. Therefore, the knowledge argument does show that objective theories cannot provide a complete understanding of the world. The result, however, is that both objective dualism and objective physicalism are refuted by the argument. In the end it is suggested that the notion of “subjective physicalism” is one that should be pursued.     

How Wittgenstein Defeated Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment

In 1913 Wittgenstein raised an objection to Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment that eventually led Russell to abandon his theory. As he put it in the Tractatus, the objection was that “the correct explanation of the form of the proposition, ‘A makes the judgement p’, must show that it is impossible for a judgement to be a piece of nonsense. (Russell’s theory does not satisfy this requirement,” (5.5422). This objection has been widely interpreted to concern type restrictions on the constituents of judgment. I argue that this interpretation is mistaken and that Wittgenstein’s objection is in fact a form of the problem of the unity of the proposition.