Brain activation patterns in major depressive disorder and work stress-related long-term sick leave among Swedish females

Deficits in executive functioning and working memory associated with frontal lobe dysfunction are prominent in depression and work-related long-term sick leave (LTSL). This study used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate potential differences in brain activation patterns in these conditions. In addition, the function of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis was examined and compared between groups. Since there is a clear overrepresentation of women in these diagnostic groups, and to ensure a more homogenous sample population, only women were included. To examine the neural correlates of relevant cognitive processes in patients on sick leave >90 days due to work-related LTSL, recently diagnosed patients with major depression Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV criteria, untreated), and healthy controls (n?=?10, each group), a 2-back working memory task and a visual long-term memory task were administered during fMRI scanning. HPA axis functioning was investigated using a diurnal curve of saliva cortisol and a dexamethasone suppression test. Task performance was comparable among the three groups. Multivariate image analysis revealed that both memory tasks engaged a similar brain network in all three groups, including the prefrontal and parietal cortex. During the 2-back task, LTSL patients had significant frontal hypoactivation compared to controls and patients with depression. Saliva cortisol measurements showed a flattening of the diurnal rythmicity in LTSL patients compared to patients with depression and healthy contols. Taken together, these findings indicate that work stress-related LTSL and major depression are dissociable in terms of frontal activation and diurnal cortisol rhythmicity.     

Timing is everything: Anticipatory stress dynamics among cortisol and blood pressure reactivity and recovery in healthy adults

Psychological states of anticipation modulate biological stress responsivity. While researchers generally investigate how subjective distress corresponds to the magnitude of stress reactivity, physiological recovery after acute stressors must also be considered when investigating disease vulnerabilities. This study assessed whether anticipatory stress would correspond to stress reactivity and recovery of salivary cortisol and blood pressure levels in response to a well-validated psychosocial stressor. Thirty participants (63% female; mean?±?SEM age 45.4?±?2.12 years) were exposed to the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST) consisting of a public speech and mental arithmetic. Ten salivary cortisol samples and systolic and diastolic blood pressure recordings were collected at time points spanning 50?min before and up to 50?min after stress exposure. These data were transformed into parameters representing stress reactivity (area under the curve) and stress recovery (percent change). The Primary Appraisal Secondary Appraisal scale assessed anticipatory stress before exposure to the TSST. Our results revealed that increased anticipatory stress predicted increased stress reactivity for cortisol (p?=?0.009) but not blood pressure. For stress recovery, increased anticipatory stress predicted greater decrements of cortisol concentration (p?=?0.015) and blood pressure (p?=?0.039), even when controlling for total systemic "output" by incorporating baseline activity. This efficient shutdown of stress responses would have otherwise been ignored by solely investigating reactive increases. These findings underscore the importance of measuring multiple dynamic parameters such as recovery when investigating physiological stress response patterns as a function of psychosocial factors.     

Relative blindsight arises from a criterion confound in metacontrast masking: implications for theories of consciousness

Relative blindsight is said to occur when different levels of subjective awareness are obtained at equality of objective performance. Using metacontrast masking, Lau and Passingham (2006) reported relative blindsight in normal observers at the shorter of two stimulus-onset asynchronies (SOAs) between target and mask. Experiment 1 replicated the critical asymmetry in subjective awareness at equality of objective performance. We argue that this asymmetry cannot be regarded as evidence for relative blindsight because the observers' responses were based on different attributes of the stimuli (criterion contents) at the two SOAs. With an invariant criterion content (Experiment 2), there was no asymmetry in subjective awareness across the two SOAs even though objective performance was the same. Experiment 3 examined the effect of criterion level on estimates of relative blindsight. Collectively, the present results question whether metacontrast masking is a suitable paradigm for establishing relative blindsight. Implications for theories of consciousness are discussed.     

Altered and asymmetric default mode network activity in a "hypnotic virtuoso": an fMRI and EEG study

Very highly hypnotizable subjects are rare, easily induced, and able to manifest the whole spectrum of hypnotic phenomena, including post-hypnotic amnesia. The aim of this study was to detect and localize by means of quantitative functional MRI and EEG changes in cortical activity during hypnosis induction and deep "pure hypnosis" in a hypnotic "virtuoso" subject. We focused on areas forming the default mode network (DMN), since previous studies found that very highly suggestible subjects in hypnosis showed decreased activity in anterior DMN. During undisturbed hypnosis, our "virtuoso" subject showed not only detectable changes in DMN, but also peculiar activations of non-DMN areas and hemispheric asymmetries of frontal lobe connectivity. Our findings confirm that hypnosis is associated with significant modulation of connectivity and activity which involve the DMN but are not limited to it, depending on the depth of the hypnotic state, the type of mental content and emotional involvement.     

Veridical and false memory for scenic material in posttraumatic stress disorder

The question whether memory aberrations in posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) also manifest as an increased production of false memories is important for both theoretical and practical reasons, but is yet unsolved. Therefore, for the present study we investigated veridical and false recognition in PTSD with a new scenic variant of the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, which was administered to traumatized individuals with PTSD (n=32), traumatized individuals without PTSD (n=30), and non-traumatized controls (n=30). The PTSD group neither produced higher rates of false memories nor expressed more confidence in errors, but did show inferior memory sensitivity. Whereas depressive symptoms did not correlate with veridical nor false recognition, state dissociation was positively associated with false memories.     

Priming honesty reduces subjective bias in self-report measures of mind wandering

Using self-report as a measure of conscious experience has been a point of contention in mind wandering research. Whereas prior work has focused on the introspective component of self-report validity, the current research introduces an honesty prime task to the current paradigm in order to assess the role of goal states and social factors on self-report accuracy. Findings provide evidence for an inflated report of mind wandering frequency arising from demand characteristics, intensified by the divergent properties of the subjective and behavioural measures and the general deficit in meta-awareness of off task episodes.     

Emotion and perception of one's own actions--a comment on Wilke, Synofzik and Lindner

Wilke et al. (2012) make significant headway in gaining a better understanding of the influence affect cues may have on action perception and judgement. In our view their account also brings up a row of important questions demanding further research. This concerns (a) the role of conceptual and non-conceptual content and (b) the different effects emotions of the same valence may play in the perception and judgement of action.     

Reading aloud and the question of intent

Must readers intend to process a word to activate various levels of representation, or is such processing simply triggered by the presentation of a word (i.e., is it “automatic”)? This issue was addressed via the use of Besner and Care’s Task Set paradigm. On each trial a cue, which indicated which of two tasks to perform appeared either before the target, or at the same time as the target. If subjects can process the target while preparing a task set, then the effect of a manipulated psycholinguistic factor should be absorbed into the time taken to process the cue. Despite robust main effects of SOA and word frequency there was no interaction between these factors when the task was to read aloud. This result implies that target processing is delayed until the subject knows what task to perform, and therefore that intention plays an important role when reading words aloud.     

Assessing intentional binding with the method of constant stimuli

Intentional binding describes the phenomenon that actions and their effects are perceived to be temporally approximated. We introduced a new method of duration estimation to the research field, the method of constant stimuli. Participants freely chose to press one of two keys or experienced passive key presses. After an interval of 250ms or 600ms a visual effect occurred. In Experiment 1, each key produced an effect after a specific interval. In Experiment 2, both keys produced an effect after the same interval that varied between sessions. Participants compared the duration of the action-effect interval with a tone of varying duration. To assess intentional binding, we compared the perceived duration of the action-effect interval between the active and passive condition. We showed intentional binding for 600ms, but not for 250ms action-effect intervals in both experiments. Thus, the method of constant stimuli is suitable to assess intentional binding.     

Reducing self-control by weakening belief in free will

Believing in free will may arise from a biological need for control. People induced to disbelieve in free will show impulsive and antisocial tendencies, suggesting a reduction of the willingness to exert self-control. We investigated whether undermining free will affects two aspects of self-control: intentional inhibition and perceived self-control. We exposed participants either to anti-free will or to neutral messages. The two groups (no-free will and control) then performed a task that required self-control to inhibit a prepotent response. No-free will participants showed less intentional inhibitions than controls, suggesting a reduction of self-control. We assessed perceived self-control by asking participants whether the response resulted from a deliberate intention or from an impulsive reaction. Perceived self-control was lower in the no-free will group than in control group. Our findings show that undermining free will can degrade self-control and provide insights into how disbelieving in free will leads to antisocial tendencies.