The Secret to the Success of the Doctrine of Double Effect (and Related Principles): Biased Framing,Inadequate Methodology,and Clever Distractions

There are different formulations of the doctrine of double effect (DDE), and sometimes philosophers propose “revisions” or alternatives, like the means principle, for instance. To demonstrate that such principles are needed in the first place, one would have to compare cases in which all else is equal and show that the difference in intuitions, if any, can only be explained by the one remaining difference and thus by the principle in question. This is not the methodology defenders of the DDE and of related principles use, however. I will discuss how they actually proceed, focusing on their preferred four pairs of examples. While these examples might have rhetorical force, they are nevertheless philosophically and methodologically useless (since they do not keep all else equal). As a corrective, I shall offer examples that do keep all else equal. These examples undermine the DDE and related principles. I then argue that while the Loop case and the “closeness” problem in the context of Jonathan Bennett’s Sophisticated Bomber example might once have been an embarrassment of sorts for defenders of the DDE, meanwhile their discussion serves as a convenient distraction from the many clear examples disproving the DDE and related principles. I conclude that there is simply no sufficient intuitive support for the DDE or related principles. Instead of looking for their “rationales,” they should be abandoned.     

Biased information search in group decision making

Research has shown that people prefer supporting to conflicting information when making decisions. Whether this biased information search also occurs in group decision making was examined in three experiments. Experiment 1 indicated that groups as well as individuals prefer supporting information and that the strength of this bias depends on the distribution of the group members' initial decision preferences. The more group members had chosen the same alternative prior to the group discussion (group homogeneity), the more strongly the group preferred information supporting that alternative. Experiment 2 replicated these results with managers. Experiment 3 showed that the differences between homogeneous and heterogeneous groups reflect group-level processes. Higher commitment and confidence in homogeneous groups mediated this effect. Functional and dysfunctional aspects of biased information seeking in group decision making are discussed.     

Reinforcement of rat hippocampal LTP by holeboard training

Hippocampal long-term potentiation (LTP) can be dissociated in early-LTP lasting 4-5 h and late-LTP with a duration of more than 8 h, the latter of which requires protein synthesis and heterosynaptic activity during its induction. Previous studies in vivo have shown that early-LTP in the dentate gyrus can protein synthesis-dependently be transformed (reinforced) into late-LTP by the association of arousing novel environmental stimuli. Here we show that consolidation of spatial memory also reinforces early-LTP in the dentate gyrus. Both memory consolidation and LTP-reinforcement depend on protein synthesis. Four groups of animals were trained by five, seven, eight or 10 trials, respectively, to recognize a fixed pattern of baited holes. The last trial was performed 15 min after tetanus. Errors of long-term reference memory during the last trial were significantly decreased only in the eight- and 10-trial experimental groups compared to pseudo-trained animals. In correlation to this learning effect we found a reinforcement of early-LTP only in these experimental groups compared to controls. The data suggest that the synthesis of new proteins required for spatial reference-memory formation also contributes to LTP maintenance in the hippocampal dentate gyrus.     

Combined expectancy effects: an accumulator model

When participants use cues to prepare for a likely stimulus or a likely response, reaction times are facilitated by valid cues but prolonged by invalid cues. In studies on combined expectancy effects, two cues give information regarding two dimensions of the forthcoming task. When the two cues consist of two separable stimuli their effects are approximately additive. When cues are presented as an integrated stimulus, cueing effects interact. A model is presented that simulates effects like these. The model assumes that cues affect different processing stages. When implicit information suggests that expectancies are unrelated, as for instance with separated cues, cueing effects at early and late levels of processing remain independent. When implicit information suggests that expectancies are related, as with integrated cues, however, a mechanism that is sensitive to the validity of the early stage cue, leads to an adjustment of the cueing effect at the late stage. The model is based on neurophysiologically plausible assumptions, it is given explicitly in mathematical terms, and it provides a good fit to a large body of empirical data.     

Actual Existence, Identity and Ontological Priority

The paper first distinguishes ontological priority from epistemological priority and unilateral ontic dependence. Then explications of ontological priority are offered in terms of the reducibility of the actual existence or identity of entities in one ontological category to the actual existence or identity of entities in another. These explications lead to incompatible orders of ontological priority for individuals, properties of individuals and states of affairs. Common to those orders is, however, that the primacy of the category of individuals is abandoned. This primacy is challenged in the paper also by epistemological arguments, and an onto-anthropological explanation is offered for the very common but false idea that individuals are ontological prior to all other kinds of entities. Finally ontological priority is discussed with respect to a fully specified system of ontological categories. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The Air Pollution Experience and Physical Aggression1

Sixty undergraduate males delivered electric shocks to a confederate as punishment for making errors on a learning task. Half did so after being exposed to an aggressive model, whereas the other half did so without being exposed. Shocks were delivered from a room whose atmosphere was either unpolluted or contaminated by a moderately unpleasant odor (ethyl mercoptan) or an extremely obnoxious stench (ammonium sulfide). As hypothesized, the moderately unpleasant pollutant facilitated higher levels of aggression than either the extremely obnoxious one or the absence of pollution. However, contrary to a second hypothesis, pollution facilitated aggression only in the model's absence. The confirmation of the first hypothesis was interpreted as supporting and extending the affect-aggression model from heat research. It was speculated that disconfirmation of the second hypothesis resulted either from a ceiling effect or from malodor distracting attention away from the aggressive cues of the model. The methodological, theoretical, and applied implications of research on air pollution were discussed.     

Performance of an unpleasant task: Effects of over- vs under-payment on perception of adequacy of rewards and task attractiveness

Subjects who came to an experiment expecting to receive a moderate amount of money for performing a task were then told, either before or after performing it, that their pay would be higher than, equal to, or less than they had expected. When the actual payment was announced after the task was performed, subjects' evaluations of the task increased with the amount they were paid; however, they estimated a higher rate of pay to be appropriate if they received either more or less than they expected than if they received what they expected. When the actual payment was announced before the task was performed (and before subjects made their decision to perform it), a different pattern emerged. Subjects rated the task more attractive when they were offered either more or less than the expected amount, while their judgments of the appropriateness of the pay offered increased with the amount of the offer. Implications of the results for incentive and dissonance theories as well as self-perception and equity theories are discussed.     

A Taxonomy of Counseling Goals and Methods

Content analysis and multivariate taxonomic procedures were used to generate taxonomies of counseling methods and goals. Items within each taxonomy were taken from the works of 14 American theorists in counseling and psychotherapy. Seven goal clusters were generated: Transfer of Therapy Learning to Outside Situations, Awareness and Acceptance of Self in Conflict, Specific Symptom Removal, Strengthened Ego Functioning, Awareness of Positive Inner Resources, Learning to Respond to and Control the Environment, and Awareness of Negative Thoughts and Feelings. Six process clusters emerged: Client Acceptance, Active Critical Questioning, Recognition and Interpretation of Unconscious Material, Manipulation of Client Anxiety, Reeducation About Emotional Conflicts, and Support of Client Autonomy. The article discusses the implications of the taxonomies for practice.     

The effect of negative feedback about oneself and cost of information on preferences for information about the source of this feedback

The present paper reports an experiment in which different amounts of negative self-discrepant information were induced and its effects on information seeking were tested. In addition, the monetary cost of the information available was manipulated. Subjects received fictitious intelligence test results that were negatively discrepant from their self-evaluation. They were then given the opportunity to choose among several articles containing information that either derogated intelligence tests (test-disparaging information) or argued for their validity (test-supporting information). The relative preference for test-disparaging over test-supporting information increased with feedback discrepancy up to a point, but then decreased as this discrepancy became more extreme. The relative preference in reading desirability for test-disparaging over test-supporting articles was also higher when the information cost money than when it did not. In addition, the difference between the desire for the two types of information was greater under cost than under no cost conditions, particularly at the extreme levels of feedback discrepancy.