Conceptual priming for realistic auditory scenes and for auditory words

Two experiments were conducted using both behavioral and Event-Related brain Potentials methods to examine conceptual priming effects for realistic auditory scenes and for auditory words. Prime and target sounds were presented in four stimulus combinations: Sound–Sound, Word–Sound, Sound–Word and Word–Word. Within each combination, targets were conceptually related to the prime, unrelated or ambiguous. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to judge whether the primes and targets fit together (explicit task) and in Experiment 2 they had to decide whether the target was typical or ambiguous (implicit task). In both experiments and in the four stimulus combinations, reaction times and/or error rates were longer/higher and the N400 component was larger to ambiguous targets than to conceptually related targets, thereby pointing to a common conceptual system for processing auditory scenes and linguistic stimuli in both explicit and implicit tasks. However, fine-grained analyses also revealed some differences between experiments and conditions in scalp topography and duration of the priming effects possibly reflecting differences in the integration of perceptual and cognitive attributes of linguistic and nonlinguistic sounds. These results have clear implications for the building-up of virtual environments that need to convey meaning without words.     

Consciousness mediated by neural transition states: How invisibly rapid motions can become visible

When observers view a rapidly moving stimulus they may see only a static streak. We report that there can be a transient percept of motion if such a moving stimulus is preceded or followed by a stationary image of that stimulus. A ring of dots was rotated so rapidly observers only saw a continuous outline circle and could not report its rotation direction. When an objectively stationary ring of dots preceded or followed this rotating ring, the stationary ring appeared to visibly launch into motion from a standstill or visibly rotate to a halt, principally in the same direction as the actual rapid rotation. Thus, motions too rapid to be consciously perceived as motion can nonetheless be processed by the visual system, and generate neural transition states that are consciously experienced as motion percepts. We suggest such transition states might serve a unifying function by bridging discontinuous motion states.     

Information seeking of high- and low-anxiety subjects after receiving positive and negative self-relevant feedback

The present paper reports an experiment in which subjects received fictitious intelligence test feedback that was either negatively or positively discrepant with their self-evaluation. They were then given an opportunity to choose among several articles containing information that either derogated intelligence tests (test-disparaging information) or argued for their validity (test-supporting information). The main finding of this study consists of an interaction between the personality factor anxiety and the feedback variable: High-anxiety subjects prefer test-disparaging information significantly more in the negative feedback condition than in the positive feedback condition, whereas low-anxiety subjects show no difference in preference for test-related information as a function of the feedback condition. These results are in line with past theoretical reasoning and experimental findings showing that high-anxiety subjects feel more threatened by negative self-relevant feedback than do low-anxiety subjects.     

Reaching beyond spatial perception: Effects of intended future actions on visually guided prehension

Three experiments examined whether manipulating actors' intentions, regarding forthcoming actions, influences the time course and kinematics of visually guided, reach‐to‐grasp movements. Subjects performed two‐step action sequences where the initial movement always involved reaching for and grasping cubes located at a constant distance. Demands of the second movement were systematically manipulated. Although the spatial parameters (cube size and distance) remained constant across all conditions, the durations of the initial movements differed substantially depending on the actions subjects intended to perform once the objects were in hand. Less time was required to engage a small (1 cm³) cube when the intention was to transport it to a new location on the workspace vs. a large (4 cm³) cube when the goal was to merely lift it above its current resting position (Experiment 1). This difference in duration of the initial movement reflects more time spent in the deceleration phase of the reach when the task does not require transporting the cube to a new location on the workspace. Further, this context effect is not related to accuracy demands (Experiment 2), or complexity (Experiment 3) of the intended second movement. These findings demonstrate that actions are determined both by the perceived spatial demands of the immediate movement as well as the intended goal of the entire action sequence.