A Defense of a Particularist Research Program

What makes some acts morally right and others morally wrong? Traditionally, philosophers have thought that in order to answer this question we must find and formulate exceptionless moral principles—principles that capture all and only morally right actions. Utilitarianism and Kantianism are paradigmatic examples of such attempts. In recent years, however, there has been a growing interest in a novel approach—Particularism—although its precise content is still a matter of controversy. In this paper I develop and motivate a new formulation of particularism as a research program and I show that my formulation is not vulnerable to the most common objections to particularism. Moreover, I argue that the particularist research program shows enough promise to warrant further exploration.     

Direct Risk Aversion: Evidence From Risky Prospects Valued Below Their Worst Outcome

ABSTRACT— Why would people pay more for a $50 gift certificate than for the opportunity to receive a gift certificate worth either $50 or $100, with equal probability? This article examines three possible mechanisms for this recently documented uncertainty effect (UE): First, awareness of the better outcome may devalue the worse one. Second, the UE may have arisen in the original demonstration of this effect because participants misunderstood the instructions. Third, the UE may be due to direct risk aversion, that is, actual distaste for uncertainty. In Experiment 1 , the UE was observed even though participants in the certainty condition were also aware of the better outcome; this result eliminates the first explanation. Experiment 2 shows that most participants understand the instructions used in the original study and that the UE is not caused by the few who do not. Overall, the experiments demonstrate that the UE is robust, large (prospects are valued at 65% of the value of the worse outcome), and widespread (at least 62% of participants exhibit it).     

Moral advice and moral theory

Monists, pluralists, and particularists disagree about the structure of the best explanation of the rightness (wrongness) of actions. In this paper I argue that the availability of good moral advice gives us reason to prefer particularist theories and pluralist theories to monist theories. First, I identify two distinct roles of moral theorizing—explaining the rightness (wrongness) of actions, and providing moral advice—and I explain how these two roles are related. Next, I explain what monists, pluralists, and particularists disagree about. Finally, I argue that particularists and pluralists are better situated than monists to explain why it is a good idea to think before we act, and that this gives us reason to favor particularism and pluralism over monism.     

Brief consultation with headache sufferers

Abstract

This paper describes the author's efforts at involving chronic headache sufferers in brief consultations with individual, family, and group therapy programs in an inpatient medical treatment facility. A variety of difficult issues facing chronic headache sufferers are presented, including the rationale for utilizing each therapeutic modality and the role and strategies that the therapist undertakes in each program. The author provides some case vignettes and discusses the importance of communication between the therapist, the primary physician, and the medical staff members.     

Spurious? Name similarity effects (implicit egotism) in marriage, job, and moving decisions

Three articles published in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology have shown that a disproportionate share of people choose spouses, places to live, and occupations with names similar to their own. These findings, interpreted as evidence of implicit egotism, are included in most modern social psychology textbooks and many university courses. The current article successfully replicates the original findings but shows that they are most likely caused by a combination of cohort, geographic, and ethnic confounds as well as reverse causality.     

Viewing objects and planning actions: on the potentiation of grasping behaviours by visual objects

How do humans interact with tools? Gibson (1979) suggested that humans perceive directly what tools afford in terms of meaningful actions. This “affordances” hypothesis implies that visual objects can potentiate motor responses even in the absence of an intention to act. Here we explore the temporal evolution of motor plans afforded by common objects. We presented objects that have a strong significance for action (pinching and grasping) and objects with no such significance. Two experimental tasks involved participants viewing objects presented on a computer screen. For the first task, they were instructed to respond rapidly to changes in background colour by using an apparatus mimicking precision and power grip responses. For the second task, they received stimulation of their primary motor cortex using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) while passively viewing the objects. Muscular responses (motor evoked potentials: MEPs) were recorded from two intrinsic hand muscles (associated with either a precision or power grip). The data showed an interaction between type of response (or muscle) and type of object, with both reaction time and MEP measures implying the generation of a congruent motor plan in the period immediately after object presentation. The results provide further support for the notion that the physical properties of objects automatically activate specific motor codes, but also demonstrate that this influence is rapid and relatively short lived.     

False-positive psychology: undisclosed flexibility in data collection and analysis allows presenting anything as significant

In this article, we accomplish two things. First, we show that despite empirical psychologists' nominal endorsement of a low rate of false-positive findings (≤ .05), flexibility in data collection, analysis, and reporting dramatically increases actual false-positive rates. In many cases, a researcher is more likely to falsely find evidence that an effect exists than to correctly find evidence that it does not. We present computer simulations and a pair of actual experiments that demonstrate how unacceptably easy it is to accumulate (and report) statistically significant evidence for a false hypothesis. Second, we suggest a simple, low-cost, and straightforwardly effective disclosure-based solution to this problem. The solution involves six concrete requirements for authors and four guidelines for reviewers, all of which impose a minimal burden on the publication process.     

Empowering chronic headache sufferers

Chronic headache pain affects sufferers and their families. Many headache sufferers lack self-discipline in controlling their headache pains. Although preventive medication is a must, medical treatment which excludes psychotherapeutic intervention reduces its effectiveness. Sufferers report increased tensions and stress with members of their families. This article reports on a program which includes headache sufferers' involvement in both family and individual therapy activities in a clinical setting. The role of the family therapist is primarily to encourage and empower sufferers to become involved in activities which can promote and increase communication, trust and self-confidence, leading toward a development of skills which can enable sufferers to utilize positive coping strategies in their effort to control headaches.