Innocent but proven guilty: Eliciting internalized false confessions using doctored‐video evidence

More powerful computers and affordable digital‐video equipment means that desktop‐video editing is now accessible and popular. In two experiments, we investigated whether seeing fake‐video evidence, or simply being told that video evidence exists, could lead people to believe they committed an act they never did. Subjects completed a computerized gambling task, and when they returned later the same day, we falsely accused them of cheating on the task. All of the subjects were told that incriminating video evidence existed, and half were also exposed to a fake video. See‐video subjects were more likely to confess without resistance, and to internalize the act than told‐video subjects, and see‐video subjects tended to confabulate details more often than told‐video subjects. We offer a metacognitive‐based account of our results. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

People consider reliability and cost when verifying their autobiographical memories

Because memories are not always accurate, people rely on a variety of strategies to verify whether the events that they remember really did occur. Several studies have examined which strategies people tend to use, but none to date has asked why people opt for certain strategies over others. Here we examined the extent to which people's beliefs about the reliability and the cost of different strategies would determine their strategy selection. Subjects described a childhood memory and then suggested strategies they might use to verify the accuracy of that memory. Next, they rated the reliability and cost of each strategy, and the likelihood that they might use it. Reliability and cost each predicted strategy selection, but a combination of the two ratings provided even greater predictive value. Cost was significantly more influential than reliability, which suggests that a tendency to seek and to value “cheap” information more than reliable information could underlie many real-world memory errors.     

Expect the unexpected: ability, attitude, and responsiveness to hypnosis

Participants' expectancies and hypnotic performance throughout the course of a standardized, individually administered hypnotic protocol were analyzed with a structural equation model that integrated underlying ability, expectancy, and hypnotic response. The model examined expectancies and ability as simultaneous predictors of hypnotic responses as well as hypnotic responses as an influence on subsequent expectancies. Results of the proposed model, which fit very well, supported each of the 4 major hypothesized effects: Expectancies showed significant stability across the course of the hypnosis protocol; expectancies influenced subsequent hypnotic responses, controlling for latent ability; hypnotic responses, in turn, affected subsequent expectancies; and a latent trait underlay hypnotic responses, controlling for expectancies. Although expectancies had a significant effect on hypnotic responsiveness, there was an abundance of variance in hypnotic performance unexplained by the direct or indirect influence of expectation and compatible with the presence of an underlying cognitive ability.     

Individual differences in working memory capacity and learning: Evidence from the serial reaction time task

High and low working memory (WM) capacity individuals performed the serial reaction time task under both incidental and intentional learning conditions to determine the role of WM capacity in the learning of sequential information. WM capacity differences emerged in conditions of intentional but not incidental learning, indicating that individual differences in WM capacity occur in tasks requiring some form of control, with little difference appearing on tasks that required relatively automatic processing. Furthermore, an index of learning was significantly related to a measure of general fluid intelligence under intentional conditions only. Thus, the degree of learning was significantly related to higher order cognition, but only when intentional processing was emphasized.