Trait anxiety and the neural efficiency of manipulation in working memory

The present study investigates the effects of trait anxiety on the neural efficiency of working memory component functions (manipulation vs. maintenance) in the absence of threat-related stimuli. For the manipulation of affectively neutral verbal information held in working memory, high- and low-anxious individuals (N = 46) did not differ in their behavioral performance, yet trait anxiety was positively related to the neural effort expended on task processing, as measured by BOLD signal changes in fMRI. Higher levels of anxiety were associated with stronger activation in two regions implicated in the goal-directed control of attention--that is, right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and left inferior frontal sulcus--and with stronger deactivation in a region assigned to the brain's default-mode network--that is, rostral-ventral anterior cingulate cortex. Furthermore, anxiety was associated with a stronger functional coupling of right DLPFC with ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. We interpret our findings as reflecting reduced processing efficiency in high-anxious individuals and point out the need to consider measures of functional integration in addition to measures of regional activation strength when investigating individual differences in neural efficiency. With respect to the functions of working memory, we conclude that anxiety specifically impairs the processing efficiency of (control-demanding) manipulation processes (as opposed to mere maintenance). Notably, this study contributes to an accumulating body of evidence showing that anxiety also affects cognitive processing in the absence of threat-related stimuli.     

Slim Futures and the Fat Pill: Civic Imaginations of Innovation and Governance in an Engagement Setting

Innovation politics is seen as an ever more central area of public policy, and as a key means for shaping societal futures. Particularly in Europe, with its history of controversial public debates about innovations, the idea that scientific progress is automatically equated with societal progress seems hard to sustain. Broader public participation within techno-scientific governance seems necessary; though who is to participate in which form often remains unclear. Increasingly, when the innovation process is discussed in both policy and academia, the question of when public engagement should take place in the innovation process is addressed using common models such as ‘upstream engagement’. However, these discussions about public engagement often assume a top-down approach, and pay little attention to citizens' perspectives. To address this gap in the literature, this article will ask the following questions: what tacit understandings of techno-scientific innovation and governance do citizens have; and how do they relate their understandings of the form, structure and dynamics of these innovation processes to their visions of governance and participation? How do specific cultural forms of conceptualising innovation open up or close down particular possibilities of governance and public participation, hence privileging the involvement of certain actors and not others? To address these questions, we analyse the discussions in a long-term public engagement setting involving both genome scientists and citizens in Austria.     

Intelligence is differentially related to neural effort in the task-positive and the task-negative brain network

Previous studies on individual differences in intelligence and brain activation during cognitive processing focused on brain regions where activation increases with task demands (task-positive network, TPN). Our study additionally considers brain regions where activation decreases with task demands (task-negative network, TNN) and compares effects of intelligence on neural effort in the TPN and the TNN. In a sample of 52 healthy subjects, functional magnetic resonance imaging was used to determine changes in neural effort associated with the processing of a working memory task. The task comprised three conditions of increasing difficulty: (a) maintenance, (b) manipulation, and (c) updating of a four-letter memory set. Neural effort was defined as signal increase in the TPN and signal decrease in the TNN, respectively. In both functional networks, TPN and TNN, neural effort increased with task difficulty. However, intelligence, as assessed with Raven's Matrices, was differentially associated with neural effort in the TPN and TNN. In the TPN, we observed a positive association, while we observed a negative association in the TNN. In terms of neural efficiency (i.e., task performance in relation to neural effort expended on task processing), more intelligent subjects (as compared to less intelligent subjects) displayed lower neural efficiency in the TPN, while they displayed higher neural efficiency in the TNN. The results illustrate the importance of differentiating between TPN and TNN when interpreting correlations between intelligence and fMRI measures of brain activation. Importantly, this implies the risk of misinterpreting whole brain correlations when ignoring the functional differences between TPN and TNN.     

Explaining the Decision to Plagiarize: An Empirical Test of the Interplay Between Rationality,Norms, and Opportunity

Plagiarism is a fraudulent behavior that infringes on the rules of universities and intellectual property rights. Rational choice theory provides a theoretical framework for explaining this deviant behavior. Our study increases knowledge of the little analyzed interrelation among the individual determinants of deviant behavior. We use panel data from a large-scale random sample of university students (N = 2,806). The expected utility of plagiarism, internalized social norms, and opportunities to plagiarize can explain the frequency of plagiarism. The significant interaction between utility and opportunity could be interpreted as a form of temptation. Promising strategies to reduce plagiarism are also discussed.     

Emotion recognition in body dysmorphic disorder: Application of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task

Body dysmorphic disorder (BDD) is characterized by perceived appearance-related defects, often tied to aspects of the face or head (e.g., acne). Deficits in decoding emotional expressions have been examined in several psychological disorders including BDD. Previous research indicates that BDD is associated with impaired facial emotion recognition, particularly in situations that involve the BDD sufferer him/herself. The purpose of this study was to further evaluate the ability to read other people's emotions among 31 individuals with BDD, and 31 mentally healthy controls. We applied the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task, in which participants are presented with a series of pairs of eyes, one at a time, and are asked to identify the emotion that describes the stimulus best. The groups did not differ with respect to decoding other people's emotions by looking into their eyes. Findings are discussed in light of previous research examining emotion recognition in BDD.     

Cognitive and emotional demands of black humour processing: the role of intelligence,aggressiveness and mood

Humour processing is a complex information-processing task that is dependent on cognitive and emotional aspects which presumably influence frame-shifting and conceptual blending, mental operations that underlie humour processing. The aim of the current study was to find distinctive groups of subjects with respect to black humour processing, intellectual capacities, mood disturbance and aggressiveness. A total of 156 adults rated black humour cartoons and conducted measurements of verbal and nonverbal intelligence, mood disturbance and aggressiveness. Cluster analysis yields three groups comprising following properties: (1) moderate black humour preference and moderate comprehension; average nonverbal and verbal intelligence; low mood disturbance and moderate aggressiveness; (2) low black humour preference and moderate comprehension; average nonverbal and verbal intelligence, high mood disturbance and high aggressiveness; and (3) high black humour preference and high comprehension; high nonverbal and verbal intelligence; no mood disturbance and low aggressiveness. Age and gender do not differ significantly, differences in education level can be found. Black humour preference and comprehension are positively associated with higher verbal and nonverbal intelligence as well as higher levels of education. Emotional instability and higher aggressiveness apparently lead to decreased levels of pleasure when dealing with black humour. These results support the hypothesis that humour processing involves cognitive as well as affective components and suggest that these variables influence the execution of frame-shifting and conceptual blending in the course of humour processing.     

Cultural Interpretations of Global Information? Hindsight Bias after Reading Wikipedia Articles across Cultures

Summary: Hindsight bias is the mistaken belief that an outcome could have been foreseen once it is known. But what happens after learning about an event? Can reading biased media amplify hindsight distortions? And do people from different cultural backgrounds — with different cognitive thinking styles — draw equal conclusions from equal media reports? We report two studies with Wikipedia articles and samples from different cultures (Study 1: Germany, Singapore, USA, Vietnam, Japan, Sweden, N = 446; Study 2: USA, Vietnam, N = 144). Participants read one of two article versions (foresight and hindsight) about the Fukushima Nuclear Plant and estimated the likelihood, inevitability, and foreseeability of the nuclear disaster. Reading the hindsight article increased individuals' hindsight bias independently of analytic or holistic thinking style. Having excluded survey language as potential impact factor (Study 2), this result remains. Our findings extend prior research on hindsight bias by demonstrating the amplifying effect of additional (biased) information on hindsight bias. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Observational Context of Mother-Child Interaction: Impact of a stress Context on Emotional Availability

Previous studies have found that a stressful observational context challenges the mother-child relationship, thus highlighting negative interactive behavior. However, the impact of observational context has only been investigated in infants and preschoolers without specifically using the Emotional Availability Scales. Nor have they explored whether the association of mother-child interaction with children’s emotional or behavioral problems depends on the observational context. We observed 140 mothers and their five to 12-year-old children in non-stressful free play and in a stressful task context. In general, dyads showed higher emotional availability in the task context compared to the free play. Specifically, mothers showed higher levels of Sensitivity, Structuring and Nonhostility, but lower levels of Nonintrusiveness during the task compared to the free play context; children showed higher levels of Responsiveness during the task than during free play. After controlling for dyadic stress, contextual effects decreased for all dimensions of emotional availability. The association of mother-child interaction with child problem behavior depended on the observational context. Specifically, we found maternal emotional availability during free play to be more strongly associated with child problem behavior than during the stressful task; however, emotional availability of the child was more strongly associated with problem behavior when obtained during the task. We conclude that context impacts on mother-child interactive behavior and also on the association of mother-child-interaction and child behavior. Stress is a relevant contextual factor influencing mother-child interactive behavior.     

Unrealistic optimism about future life events: a cautionary note

A robust finding in social psychology is that people judge negative events as less likely to happen to themselves than to the average person, a behavior interpreted as showing that people are "unrealistically optimistic" in their judgments of risk concerning future life events. However, we demonstrate how unbiased responses can result in data patterns commonly interpreted as indicative of optimism for purely statistical reasons. Specifically, we show how extant data from unrealistic optimism studies investigating people's comparative risk judgments are plagued by the statistical consequences of sampling constraints and the response scales used, in combination with the comparative rarity of truly negative events. We conclude that the presence of such statistical artifacts raises questions over the very existence of an optimistic bias about risk and implies that to the extent that such a bias exists, we know considerably less about its magnitude, mechanisms, and moderators than previously assumed.