Cognitive inhibition in depression

Cognitive inhibition is a key mechanism in the regulation of emotion. There is emerging evidence that depression is characterized by deficits in the inhibition of mood-congruent material. These deficits could result in prolonged processing of negative, goal-irrelevant aspects of presented information thereby hindering recovery from negative mood and leading to the sustained negative affect that characterizes depressive episodes. Indeed, it has been suggested that deficits in cognitive inhibition lie at the heart of memory and attention biases in depression, and set the stage for ruminative responses to negative events and negative mood states. A ruminative response style results in a heightened vulnerability to experience episodes of major depression. Recent research has demonstrated that deficient inhibition of negative material is associated with heightened rumination. In this article, we review the depression literature with a focus on studies that investigate cognitive inhibition in depressed participants and in participants who report a history of major depressive episodes. In addition, we summarize neurobiological findings that indicate a strong relation between depression and deficits in inhibition and we take a closer look at the relation of inhibition, rumination and mood regulation.     

Transformation and alignment in similarity

This paper contrasts two structural accounts of psychological similarity: structural alignment (SA) and Representational Distortion (RD). SA proposes that similarity is determined by how readily the structures of two objects can be brought into alignment; RD measures similarity by the complexity of the transformation that “distorts” one representation into the other. We assess RD by defining a simple coding scheme of psychological transformations for the experimental materials. In two experiments, this “concrete” version of RD provides compelling fits of the data and compares favourably with SA. Finally, stepping back from particular models, we argue that perceptual theory suggests that transformations and alignment processes should generally be viewed as complementary, in contrast to the current distinction in the literature.     

Die Psychotherapieausbildung aus Sicht der Lehrkräfte

Background

A survey was carried out to ask the trainers and supervisors about their appraisal of the quality of the psychotherapy training and about ways to improve it 10 years after the inception of the “German psychotherapy law”.

Methods

Training institutes provided e-mail addresses and other contact information from over 5,000 trainers. The questioning was carried out mainly by on-line questionnaires and 2,196 data sets were used for analysis.

Results

Trainers showed overall satisfaction with the components of psychotherapy training and the skills of the training candidates. More knowledge transfer in the fields of therapy techniques and case studies and more cooperation with other professional groups were suggested. Trainers acknowledged redundancies between professional training and university studies and observed a heterogeneity of trainees, however, these were mostly considered helpful. Only half of the trainers were subject to evaluation of their work.

Conclusions

The quality of psychotherapy training could be improved by stronger emphasis on practical knowledge. Structural changes should be made to take the problem of redundancies and heterogeneities into account. Regular and continuous evaluation of the training should become an integral part of professional training and the results should have consequences.     

Motivated to be socially mindful: Explaining age differences in the effect of employees’ contact quality with coworkers on their coworker support

In this research, we examine how high-quality contact can facilitate employees’ coworker support and explain why the benefits of high-quality contact are contingent upon age. First, we employ a social mindfulness lens to decipher the motivational mechanisms of high-quality contact with coworkers on providing coworker support via coworker-oriented perspective taking and empathic concern. Second, we utilize socioemotional selectivity theory to overcome the current age-blind view on workplace interactions and examine the indirect moderating effect of age via future time perspective on the link between contact quality, social mindfulness, and coworker support. We tested our hypotheses based on data from a sample of 575 employees collected in three waves. Results showed that both coworker-oriented perspective taking and empathic concern mediated the positive effects of contact quality on coworker support. The effect of contact quality on coworker-oriented empathic concern was stronger for older employees with a more constrained future time perspective as compared to younger employees with a more extensive future time perspective. Overall, we extend research on aging, workplace interactions, and support behavior by linking the literature on these topics using a social mindfulness lens and by adding employee age and age-related mechanisms as important boundary conditions that qualify the outcomes of positive workplace contact.     

Reasons and impossibility

In this paper, I argue that a person can have a reason to do what she cannot do. In a nutshell, the argument is that a person can have derivate reasons relating to an action that she has a non-derivative reason to perform. There are clear examples of derivative reasons that a person has in cases where she cannot do what she (non-derivatively) has reason to do. She couldn’t have those derivative reasons, unless she also had the non-derivative reason to do what she cannot do. I discuss a number of objections to this view, in particular two: (1) The objection that if there were reasons to do what one cannot do, many of those would be ‘crazy reasons’, and (2) the worry that if there were such reasons, then agents would have reasons to engage in futile deliberations and tryings. I develop an explanation of ‘crazy reasons’ that shows that not all reasons to do the impossible are crazy and only those that are need to be filtered out, and, regarding the second objecting, I show that the reasons for trying as well as for taking the means to doing something—instrumental reasons in a broad sense—are different from the reasons for performing the action in the first place. They are affected by impossibility, and we can explain why that is so. The view I argue for is that a person may have a reason to do what she cannot do, but she does not have a reason to try to do so or to take means to realizing the impossible.     

Message Framing,Normative Advocacy and Persuasive Success

In a recent article in Argumentation, O’Keefe (Argumentation 21:151–163, 2007) observed that the well-known ‘framing effects’ in the social psychological literature on persuasion are akin to traditional fallacies of argumentation and reasoning and could be exploited for persuasive success in a way that conflicts with principles of responsible advocacy. Positively framed messages (“if you take aspirin, your heart will be more healthy”) differ in persuasive effect from negative frames (“if you do not take aspirin, your heart will be less healthy”), despite containing ‘equivalent’ content. This poses a potential problem, because people might be unduly (and unsuspectingly) influenced by mere presentational differences. By drawing on recent cognitive psychological work on framing effects in choice and decision making paradigms, however, we show that establishing whether two arguments are substantively equivalent—and hence, whether there is any normative requirement for them to be equally persuasive—is a difficult task. Even arguments that are logically equivalent may not be information equivalent. The normative implications of this for both speakers and listeners are discussed.     

Non-monotonicity and Informal Reasoning: Comment on Ferguson (2003)

In this paper, it is argued that Ferguson’s (2003, Argumentation 17, 335–346) recent proposal to reconcile monotonic logic with defeasibility has three counterintuitive consequences. First, the conclusions that can be derived from his new rule of inference are vacuous, a point that as already made against default logics when there are conflicting defaults. Second, his proposal requires a procedural “hack” to the break the symmetry between the disjuncts of the tautological conclusions to which his proposal leads. Third, Ferguson’s proposal amounts to arguing that all everyday inferences are sound by definition. It is concluded that the informal logic response to defeasibility, that an account of the context in which inferences are sound or unsound is required, still stands. It is also observed that another possible response is given by Bayesian probability theory (Oaksford and Chater, in press, Bayesian Rationality: The Probabilistic Approach to Human Reasoning, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK; Hahn and Oaksford, in press, Synthese).