Cognitive inhibition in depression

Cognitive inhibition is a key mechanism in the regulation of emotion. There is emerging evidence that depression is characterized by deficits in the inhibition of mood-congruent material. These deficits could result in prolonged processing of negative, goal-irrelevant aspects of presented information thereby hindering recovery from negative mood and leading to the sustained negative affect that characterizes depressive episodes. Indeed, it has been suggested that deficits in cognitive inhibition lie at the heart of memory and attention biases in depression, and set the stage for ruminative responses to negative events and negative mood states. A ruminative response style results in a heightened vulnerability to experience episodes of major depression. Recent research has demonstrated that deficient inhibition of negative material is associated with heightened rumination. In this article, we review the depression literature with a focus on studies that investigate cognitive inhibition in depressed participants and in participants who report a history of major depressive episodes. In addition, we summarize neurobiological findings that indicate a strong relation between depression and deficits in inhibition and we take a closer look at the relation of inhibition, rumination and mood regulation.     

Transformation and alignment in similarity

This paper contrasts two structural accounts of psychological similarity: structural alignment (SA) and Representational Distortion (RD). SA proposes that similarity is determined by how readily the structures of two objects can be brought into alignment; RD measures similarity by the complexity of the transformation that “distorts” one representation into the other. We assess RD by defining a simple coding scheme of psychological transformations for the experimental materials. In two experiments, this “concrete” version of RD provides compelling fits of the data and compares favourably with SA. Finally, stepping back from particular models, we argue that perceptual theory suggests that transformations and alignment processes should generally be viewed as complementary, in contrast to the current distinction in the literature.     

Die Psychotherapieausbildung aus Sicht der Lehrkräfte

Background

A survey was carried out to ask the trainers and supervisors about their appraisal of the quality of the psychotherapy training and about ways to improve it 10 years after the inception of the “German psychotherapy law”.

Methods

Training institutes provided e-mail addresses and other contact information from over 5,000 trainers. The questioning was carried out mainly by on-line questionnaires and 2,196 data sets were used for analysis.

Results

Trainers showed overall satisfaction with the components of psychotherapy training and the skills of the training candidates. More knowledge transfer in the fields of therapy techniques and case studies and more cooperation with other professional groups were suggested. Trainers acknowledged redundancies between professional training and university studies and observed a heterogeneity of trainees, however, these were mostly considered helpful. Only half of the trainers were subject to evaluation of their work.

Conclusions

The quality of psychotherapy training could be improved by stronger emphasis on practical knowledge. Structural changes should be made to take the problem of redundancies and heterogeneities into account. Regular and continuous evaluation of the training should become an integral part of professional training and the results should have consequences.     

Message Framing,Normative Advocacy and Persuasive Success

In a recent article in Argumentation, O’Keefe (Argumentation 21:151–163, 2007) observed that the well-known ‘framing effects’ in the social psychological literature on persuasion are akin to traditional fallacies of argumentation and reasoning and could be exploited for persuasive success in a way that conflicts with principles of responsible advocacy. Positively framed messages (“if you take aspirin, your heart will be more healthy”) differ in persuasive effect from negative frames (“if you do not take aspirin, your heart will be less healthy”), despite containing ‘equivalent’ content. This poses a potential problem, because people might be unduly (and unsuspectingly) influenced by mere presentational differences. By drawing on recent cognitive psychological work on framing effects in choice and decision making paradigms, however, we show that establishing whether two arguments are substantively equivalent—and hence, whether there is any normative requirement for them to be equally persuasive—is a difficult task. Even arguments that are logically equivalent may not be information equivalent. The normative implications of this for both speakers and listeners are discussed.     

Non-monotonicity and Informal Reasoning: Comment on Ferguson (2003)

In this paper, it is argued that Ferguson’s (2003, Argumentation 17, 335–346) recent proposal to reconcile monotonic logic with defeasibility has three counterintuitive consequences. First, the conclusions that can be derived from his new rule of inference are vacuous, a point that as already made against default logics when there are conflicting defaults. Second, his proposal requires a procedural “hack” to the break the symmetry between the disjuncts of the tautological conclusions to which his proposal leads. Third, Ferguson’s proposal amounts to arguing that all everyday inferences are sound by definition. It is concluded that the informal logic response to defeasibility, that an account of the context in which inferences are sound or unsound is required, still stands. It is also observed that another possible response is given by Bayesian probability theory (Oaksford and Chater, in press, Bayesian Rationality: The Probabilistic Approach to Human Reasoning, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK; Hahn and Oaksford, in press, Synthese).     

The ingroup as pars pro toto: projection from the ingroup onto the inclusive category as a precursor to social discrimination

In an approach to intergroup discrimination and tolerance, it is assumed that the outgroup's difference from the ingroup is evaluated with reference to the prototype of the higher-order category that includes both groups. Two correlational studies yielded evidence that (a) group members tend to perceive their ingroup as relatively prototypical for the inclusive category (projection), (b) members highly identified with both ingroup and inclusive category (dual identity) tend to project most, and (c) relative prototypicality is related to negative attitudes toward the outgroup. The latter relation was further specified in Study 3, manipulating the valence of the inclusive category. Projection was related to more negative attitudes toward the outgroup when the inclusive category was primed positively but to more positive attitudes when it was primed negatively. The meaning of dual identities for intergroup relations is discussed.