Semantic priming by irrelevant speech

To-be-ignored, task-irrelevant speech disrupts serial recall performance relative to a quiet control condition. In most studies, the content of the auditory distractors had no effect on their disruptive potential, one’s own name being one of the few exceptions. There are two possible explanations of this pattern: (1) Semantic features of the irrelevant speech are usually not processed, except for highly relevant auditory distractors, or (2) semantic processing of the irrelevant speech always occurs, but usually does not affect serial recall performance. To test these explanations, we presented to-be-ignored auditory distractor words drawn from different categories while participants memorized visual targets for serial recall. Afterwards, participants were invited to what they believed to be an unrelated norming study, in which they were required to spontaneously produce words from the categories from which the auditory distractor words were drawn. Previously ignored words were produced with a higher probability than words from a parallel, nonpresented set, demonstrating that features of to-be-ignored, task-irrelevant speech that do not interfere with immediate serial recall performance are nevertheless processed semantically and may have substantial effects on subsequent behavior.     

The Burden of Proof and Its Role in Argumentation

The notion of “the burden of proof” plays an important role in real-world argumentation contexts, in particular in law. It has also been given a central role in normative accounts of argumentation, and has been used to explain a range of classic argumentation fallacies. We argue that in law the goal is to make practical decisions whereas in critical discussion the goal is frequently simply to increase or decrease degree of belief in a proposition. In the latter case, it is not necessarily important whether that degree of belief exceeds a particular threshold (e.g., ‘reasonable doubt’). We explore the consequences of this distinction for the role that the “burden of proof” has played in argumentation and in theories of fallacy.     

Now I see it but you don't: 14-month-olds can represent another person's visual perspective

Twelve- and 14-month-old infants' ability to represent another person's visual perspective (Level-1 visual perspective taking) was studied in a looking-time paradigm. Fourteen-month-olds looked longer at a person reaching for and grasping a new object when the old goal-object was visible than when it was invisible to the person (but visible to the infant). These findings are consistent with the interpretation that infants 'rationalized' the person's reach for a new object when the old goal-object was out of sight. Twelve-month-olds did not distinguish between test conditions. The present findings are consistent with recent research on infants' developing understanding of seeing.     

Lateralized cognition: asymmetrical and complementary strategies of pigeons during discrimination of the "human concept"

This study was aimed at revealing which cognitive processes are lateralized in visual categorizations of "humans" by pigeons. To this end, pigeons were trained to categorize pictures of humans and then tested binocularly or monocularly (left or right eye) on the learned categorization and for transfer to novel exemplars (Experiment 1). Subsequent tests examined whether they relied on memorized features or on a conceptual strategy, using stimuli composed of new combinations of familiar and novel humans and backgrounds (Experiment 2), whether the hemispheres processed global or local information, using pictures with different levels of scrambling (Experiment 3), and whether they attended to configuration, using distorted human figures (Experiment 4). The results suggest that the left hemisphere employs a category strategy and concentrates on local features, while the right hemisphere uses an exemplar strategy and relies on configuration. These cognitive dichotomies of the cerebral hemispheres are largely shared by humans, suggesting that lateralized cognitive systems already defined the neural architecture of the common ancestor of birds and mammals.     

Personality disorder and future-directed thinking in parasuicide

Parasuicide patients have been found to lack positive expectations for the future. The aim of the present study was to look at variations in this lack of positive future-thinking as a function of personality status. A sample (N = 442) of repeat parasuicide patients was assessed on positive and negative future-thinking and the presence of personality disorder or personality difficulty. Those with a Cluster B personality disorder (borderline or dissocial) were significantly lower in positive future-thinking than those with no Cluster B symptoms or those with Cluster B personality difficulty. Neither Cluster A nor Cluster C symptomatology was related to positive future-thinking. Negative future-thinking was not significantly related to any type of personality disorder or difficulty. The results are interpreted as evidence of the importance of personality status in influencing positive future-thinking and gives some indications of why those with Cluster B personality disorder have such high rates of recurrent self-harm.     

Does the use of natural stimuli facilitate amodal completion in pigeons?

Three experiments were carried out to investigate whether amodal completion in pigeons can be facilitated by the use of colour photographs instead of highly artificial stimuli such as geometrical shapes. Ten pigeons were trained in a go/no-go procedure to discriminate between photographs of complete and of incomplete pigeon figures. In the subsequent test, the birds classified pictures of partly occluded pigeons as though they were complete (experiment 1). However, we found evidence that classification was based on spurious stimulus features that paralleled the intended class rule of figural completeness versus incompleteness. In particular, classification was shown to be guided by white background gaps that separated the parts of the fragmented pigeon figures (experiment 2), as well as by cues related to overall Gestalt (experiment 3). In summary, the present results indicate that the use of more natural stimuli such as photographs instead of geometrical shapes is insufficient for providing amodal completion in pigeons. It is suggested that a combination of various cues, including, eg, 3-D information and common motion in addition to surface and contour properties, may be required to induce a perceptual bias favouring visual completion of occluded portions.