Interkulturelle Trainings für die psychosoziale Versorgung

The psychosocial care of patients with a migration background is often related to higher access barriers. Also for professionals in mental health care service the treatment of patients with a migration background often represents a challenge. One way to overcome such barriers is to train care givers in order to enhance cross-cultural competence. In addition to knowledge transfer such training focuses on the process of self-reflection and examination of ones own, as well as the unknown cultural orientation system. Sufficient effectiveness of cross-cultural training has been proven on an international level. However, evaluation studies are lacking in the German speaking region. Additionally, guidelines or quality criteria for providers of training for psychosocial care professionals are lacking. Validated psychometric instruments which assess cross-cultural competence in individuals hardly exist. The present article gives an overview of concepts of cross-cultural competence and the effectiveness of such training. Also an outlook is given on the future prospects of development in the field.     

The effect of applicant–employee fit and temporal construal on employer attraction and pursuit intentions

Although applicant–employee fit has emerged as an important topic in recruitment research, little is known about how job seekers’ perceived similarity with the employees working for an organization affects employer attraction. In this research, we introduce temporal construal as a crucial moderating variable and study how the temporal decision context affects the weighting of applicant–employee fit. In particular, we argue that applicant–employee fit is construed in abstract, high‐level terms, and exerts a stronger influence when prospective applicants hold a distant time perspective. In contrast, instrumental attributes such as pay level represent low‐level construals and gain greater relevance when prospective applicants hold a near time perspective. Two experiments involving a student sample and a sample of unemployed job seekers supported these predictions.     

Associative memory or algorithmic search: a comparative study on learning strategies of bats and shrews

Two common strategies for successful foraging are learning to associate specific sensory cues with patches of prey ("associative learning") and using set decision-making rules to systematically scan for prey ("algorithmic search"). We investigated whether an animal's life history affects which of these two foraging strategies it is likely to use. Natterer's bats (Myotis nattereri) have slow life-history traits and we predicted they would be more likely to use associative learning. Common shrews (Sorex araneus) have fast life-history traits and we predicted that they would rely more heavily on routine-based search. Apart from their marked differences in life-history traits, these two mammals are similar in body size, brain weight, habitat, and diet. We assessed foraging strategy, associative learning ability, and retention time with a four-arm maze; one arm contained a food reward and was marked with four sensory stimuli. Bats and shrews differed significantly in their foraging strategies. Most bats learned to associate the sensory stimuli with the reward and remembered this association over time. Most shrews searched the maze using consistent decision-making rules, but did not learn or remember the association. We discuss these results in terms of life-history traits and other key differences between these species. Our results suggest a link between an animal's life-history strategy and its use of associative learning.     

Straightening priority out

In recent work, Louis deRosset (Philosophical Studies 149:73?C97, 2010) has argued that priority theorists, who hold that truths about macroscopic objects can be metaphysically explained without reference to such things, cannot meet an independently motivated constraint upon good explanation. By clarifying the nature of the priority theorist??s project, I argue that deRosset??s argument fails to establish its conclusion.     

Changing minds in a changing world

I defend a general rule for updating beliefs that takes into account both the impact of new evidence and changes in the subject??s location. The rule combines standard conditioning with a ??shifting?? operation that moves the center of each doxastic possibility forward to the next point where information arrives. I show that well-known arguments for conditioning lead to this combination when centered information is taken into account. I also discuss how my proposal relates to other recent proposals, what results it delivers for puzzles like the Sleeping Beauty problem, and whether there are diachronic constraints on rational belief at all.