Speech anxiety and rapid emotional reactions to angry and happy facial expressions

The aim was to explore whether people high as opposed to low in speech anxiety react with a more pronounced differential facial response when exposed to angry and happy facial stimuli. High and low fear participants were selected based on their scores on a fear of public speaking questionnaire. All participants were exposed to pictures of angry and happy faces while facial electromyographic (EMG) activity from the Corrugator supercilii and the Zygomaticus major muscle regions was recorded. Skin conductance responses (SCR), heart rate (HR) and ratings were also collected. Participants high as opposed to low in speech anxiety displayed a larger differential corrugator responding, indicating a larger negative emotional reaction, between angry and happy faces. They also reacted with a larger differential zygomatic responding, indicating a larger positive emotional reaction, between happy and angry faces. Consistent with the facial reaction patterns, the high fear group rated angry faces as more unpleasant and as expressing more disgust, and further rated happy faces as more pleasant. There were no differences in SCR or HR responding between high and low speech anxiety groups. The present results support the hypothesis that people high in speech anxiety are disposed to show an exaggerated sensitivity and facial responsiveness to social stimuli.     

Turning the history of medical ethics from its head onto its feet: a critical commentary on Baker and McCullough

The paper provides a critical commentary on the article by Baker and McCullough on Medical Ethic's Appropriation of Moral Philosophy. The author argues that Baker and McCullough offer a more "pragmatic" approach to the history of medical ethics that has the potential to enrich the bioethics field with a greater historical grounding and sound methodology. Their approach can help us to come to a more nuanced understanding about the way in which medical ethics has connected, disconnected, and reconnected with philosophical ideas throughout the centuries. The author points out that Baker and McCullough's model can run the danger of overemphasizing the role of medical ethicists whilst marginalizing the influence of philosophers and of other historical actors and forces. He critically reviews the two case studies on which Baker and McCullough focus and concludes that scholars need to bear in mind the levels of uncertainty and ambivalence that accompany the process of transformation and dissemination of moral values in medicine and medical practice.     

Pointing out new news, old news, and absent referents at 12 months of age

There is currently controversy over the nature of 1-year-olds' social-cognitive understanding and motives. In this study we investigated whether 12-month-old infants point for others with an understanding of their knowledge states and with a prosocial motive for sharing experiences with them. Declarative pointing was elicited in four conditions created by crossing two factors: an adult partner (1) was already attending to the target event or not, and (2) emoted positively or neutrally. Pointing was also coded after the event had ceased. The findings suggest that 12-month-olds point to inform others of events they do not know about, that they point to share an attitude about mutually attended events others already know about, and that they can point (already prelinguistically) to absent referents. These findings provide strong support for a mentalistic and prosocial interpretation of infants' prelinguistic communication.     

Contrasting two models of academic self‐efficacy – domain‐specific versus cross‐domain – in children receiving and not receiving special instruction in mathematics

In social cognitive theory, self‐efficacy is domain‐specific. An alternative model, the cross‐domain influence model, would predict that self‐efficacy beliefs in one domain might influence performance in other domains. Research has also found that children who receive special instruction are not good at estimating their performance. The aim was to test two models of how self‐efficacy beliefs influence achievement, and to contrast children receiving special instruction in mathematics with normally‐achieving children. The participants were 73 fifth‐grade children who receive special instruction and 70 children who do not receive any special instruction. In year four and five, the children's skills in mathematics and reading were assessed by national curriculum tests, and in their fifth year, self‐efficacy in mathematics and reading were measured. Structural equation modeling showed that in domains where children do not receive special instruction in mathematics, self‐efficacy is a mediating variable between earlier and later achievement in the same domain. Achievement in mathematics was not mediated by self‐efficacy in mathematics for children who receive special instruction. For normal achieving children, earlier achievement in the language domain had an influence on later self‐efficacy in the mathematics domain, and self‐efficacy beliefs in different domains were correlated. Self‐efficacy is mostly domain specific, but may play a different role in academic performance depending on whether children receive special instruction. The results of the present study provided some support of the Cross‐Domain Influence Model for normal achieving children.     

Anti-Normativism Evaluated

Abstract

I argue that recent attempts to show that meaning and content are not normative fail. The two most important arguments anti-normativists have presented are what I call the ‘argument from constitution’ and the ‘argument from guidance’. Both of these arguments suffer from the same basic problem: they overlook the possibility of focusing on assessability by norms, rather than compliance with norms or guidance by norms. Moreover, I argue that the anti-normativists arguments fail even if we ignore this basic problem. Thus, we have not been given good reasons to think that normativism is false.     

Infants Anticipate Others' Social Preferences

In the current eye‐tracking study, we explored whether 12‐month‐old infants can predict others' social preferences. We showed infants scenes in which two characters alternately helped or hindered an agent in his goal of climbing a hill. In a control condition, the two characters moved up and down the hill in identical ways to the helper and hinderer but did not make contact with the agent; thus, they did not cause him to reach or not reach his goal. Following six alternating familiarization trials of helping and hindering interactions (help–hinder condition) or up and down interactions (up–down condition), infants were shown one test trial in which they could visually anticipate the agent approaching one of the two characters. As predicted, infants in the help–hinder condition made significantly more visual anticipations toward the helping than hindering character, suggesting that they predicted the agent to approach the helping character. In contrast, infants revealed no difference in visual anticipations between the up and down characters. The up–down condition served to control for low‐level perceptual explanations of the results for the help–hinder condition. Thus, together the results reveal that 12‐month‐old infants make predictions about others' behaviour and social preferences from a third‐party perspective. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Language is not necessary for color categories

The origin of color categories is under debate. Some researchers argue that color categories are linguistically constructed, while others claim they have a pre‐linguistic, and possibly even innate, basis. Although there is some evidence that 4–6‐month‐old infants respond categorically to color, these empirical results have been challenged in recent years. First, it has been claimed that previous demonstrations of color categories in infants may reflect color preferences instead. Second, and more seriously, other labs have reported failing to replicate the basic findings at all. In the current study we used eye‐tracking to test 8‐month‐old infants’ categorical perception of a previously attested color boundary (green–blue) and an additional color boundary (blue–purple). Our results show that infants are faster and more accurate at fixating targets when they come from a different color category than when from the same category (even though the chromatic separation sizes were equated). This is the case for both blue–green and blue–purple. Our findings provide independent evidence for the existence of color categories in pre‐linguistic infants, and suggest that categorical perception of color can occur without color language.