How Wittgenstein Defeated Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment

In 1913 Wittgenstein raised an objection to Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment that eventually led Russell to abandon his theory. As he put it in the Tractatus, the objection was that “the correct explanation of the form of the proposition, ‘A makes the judgement p’, must show that it is impossible for a judgement to be a piece of nonsense. (Russell’s theory does not satisfy this requirement,” (5.5422). This objection has been widely interpreted to concern type restrictions on the constituents of judgment. I argue that this interpretation is mistaken and that Wittgenstein’s objection is in fact a form of the problem of the unity of the proposition.     

On Fork Arrow Logic and its Expressive Power

We compare fork arrow logic, an extension of arrow logic, and its natural first-order counterpart (the correspondence language) and show that both have the same expressive power. Arrow logic is a modal logic for reasoning about arrow structures, its expressive power is limited to a bounded fragment of first-order logic. Fork arrow logic is obtained by adding to arrow logic the fork modality (related to parallelism and synchronization). As a result, fork arrow logic attains the expressive power of its first-order correspondence language, so both can express the same input–output behavior of processes.     

The neighbor and the infinite: Marion and Levinas on the encounter between self,human other,and God

In this article I examine Jean-Luc Marion's two-fold criticism of Emmanuel Levinas’ philosophy of other and self, namely that Levinas remains unable to overcome ontological difference in Totality and Infinity and does so successfully only with the notion of the appeal in Otherwise than Being and that his account of alterity is ambiguous in failing to distinguish clearly between human and divine other. I outline Levinas’ response to this criticism and then critically examine Marion's own account of subjectivity that attempts to go beyond Levinas in its emphasis on a pure or anonymous appeal. I criticize this move as rather problematic and turn instead back to Levinas for a more convincing account of the relations between self, human other, and God. In this context, I also show that Levinas in fact draws quite careful distinctions between human and divine others.     

Academic optimistic bias: Implications for college student performance and well-being

Although optimism has several benefits, there are potential drawbacks associated with “too much of a good thing”. Within an academic context, a possible determinant of the adaptiveness of optimistic bias is whether students have a sense of control over academic outcomes: optimistically-biased (OB) achievement expectations paired with perceptions of academic control may enhance performance and well-being; optimistic bias in the absence of perceived control may result in disappointment, poor performance, and diminished well-being. The current longitudinal study examined academic control cognitions (ACC) among OB college students (n = 319) versus non-optimistically biased (non-OB) students (n = 321). We also examined the effects of academic optimistic bias on composite measures of college performance (perceived success, final psychology course grades, cumulative GPA, course attrition) and well-being (positive and negative emotions, health behaviors, future optimism) 6 months later; and determined whether ACC accounted for those associations. Significant MANCOVAs showed OB students had greater ACC, better subsequent well-being, and outperformed their non-OB counterparts. These well-being and performance differences remained significant after statistically accounting for initial aptitude and ACC. Overall, academic optimistic bias was accompanied by perceived controllability over scholastic outcomes, yet beyond the effects of ACC, optimistic bias was associated with better year-end performance and well-being. Findings have implications for maximizing the successful transition of first-year college students.     

Individual differences in current events knowledge: Contributions of ability,personality, and interests

What accounts for individual differences in the sort of knowledge that people may draw on in everyday cognitive tasks, such as deciding whom to vote for in a presidential election, how to invest money in the stock market, or what team to bet on in a friendly wager? In a large sample of undergraduate students, we investigated correlates of individual differences in recently acquired knowledge of current events in domains such as politics, business, and sports. Structural equation modeling revealed two predictive pathways: one involving cognitive ability factors and the other involving two major nonability factors (personality and interests). The results of this study add to what is known about the sources of individual differences in knowledge and are interpreted in the context of theoretical conceptions of adult intelligence that emphasize the centrality and importance of knowledge (e.g., Ackerman, 1996; Cattell, 1971).     

On the flexibility and the fallibility of associative memory

We report the results of four experiments in which we explored the flexibility and fallibility of associative recognition memory. In each experiment, pairs were studied one or more times, and the task was to discriminate intact from rearranged pairs. The critical findings are that the pattern of false alarm rates was dependent on the nature of the recognition procedure (e.g., ratings vs. yes-no) and the situation in which the task was performed. The specific pattern of findings suggest that subjects adopt different recognition strategies in order to achieve a desired level of performance in the most efficient manner possible by varying the degree to which they base their decisions on familiarity versus recollected information. Implications for theories of recognition memory are discussed.     

Mentoring Nurses in Familial Cancer Risk Assessment and Counseling: Lessons Learned From a Formative Evaluation

Background. As familial cancer genetic services moves into community practice increased numbers of trained health professionals are needed to counsel individuals seeking cancer risk information. Nurses have been targeted to provide cancer risk assessment and counseling. To help prepare nurses for this role, a 5-day training in familial cancer risk assessment and counseling followed by a long-distance mentorship to support continued skill development in the work environment was conducted by Fox Chase Cancer Center, Philadelphia, PA. Methods. Four cohorts (N = 41) have completed the training and were randomized to either an immediate or delayed mentorship. A formative evaluation assessed the nurse’s ability to consult with other genetic health professionals and build self-efficacy in counseling skills via responses to questionnaire. A post-mentorship interview evaluated the usefulness, timing and length of the mentorship. Results. For both groups, there was a statistically significant improvement in self-efficacy for all skills from baseline to 6 months and an increased number of nurses consulting with genetic health professionals. All the nurses reported the value of the mentorship and those with less cancer risk counseling experience prior to the training needed support and resources for further skill and program development. Lessons learned from this formative evaluation are provided.     

Absence of hardly pursued updating in a running memory task

In a running memory span task, the participants are presented with a list of items (e.g. numbers or words) of an unknown length, because this length varies from trial to trial. In one variation of the procedure the participants must report a certain fixed number of items (e.g. four) from the end of the list. According to Morris and Jones (British Journal of Psychology, 81, 111-121, 1990), the recalled items must be updated in memory as the presentation of the list progresses. Ruiz, Elosúa and Lechuga (The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 5, 887-905, 2005) noted that an active strategy implies an inhibition in memory of the final discarded items, and did not find results which supported this hypothesis. The aim of this study is to check whether or not participants adopt an active processing strategy in extreme conditions. Experiment 1 uses catch trials, which induce the participants not to discard the first items of the lists, and also short lists (of 4, 7, 8, 9 and 10 items); these could be considered optimal conditions for updating. However, it should also be pointed out that with an upper limit of 10 items per list, participants could try to memorise the whole list in most of the trials. One way to discourage this strategy is including lists well over span (e.g. 14-26 items). The purpose of Experiment 2 was to analyse the 10-item lists in two conditions: within a context of much longer lists (well over span) in most of the trials and within a context of shorter lists (data of Experiment 1). Results in both experiments, from the analysis of location errors, indicate that even in these conditions the participants do not seem to carry out the supposed active updating of the memory set.