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281.
Hannes Leitgeb 《Synthese》2011,179(2):339-350
This is a personal, incomplete, and very informal take on the role of logic in general philosophy of science, which is aimed at a broader audience. We defend and advertise the application of logical methods in philosophy of science, starting with the beginnings in the Vienna Circle and ending with some more recent logical developments. 相似文献
282.
Peter Nilsson 《Philosophia》2011,39(1):125-144
Compassion is often described in terms of suffering. This paper investigates the nature of this suffering. It is argued that
compassion involves suffering of a particular kind. To begin with a case is made for the negative claim that compassion does
not involve an ordinary, or afflictive, suffering over something. Secondly, it is argued that the suffering of compassion
is a suffering for someone else’s sake: If you feel compassion for another person, P, then you suffer over P:s suffering for
P:s sake, and if that is all you do, then you are not affected with an afflictive suffering over something. The final section
identifies and addresses a problem concerning self-pity, and a suggestion is made on how to specify the proposed account so
as to cover both self-directed and other-directed compassion. 相似文献
283.
We show that the contemporary debate surrounding the question “What is the norm of assertion?” presupposes what we call the quantitative view, i.e. the view that this question is best answered by determining how much epistemic support is required to warrant assertion. We consider what Jennifer Lackey (2010) has called cases of isolated second-hand knowledge and show—beyond what Lackey has suggested herself—that these cases are best understood as ones where a certain type of understanding, rather than knowledge, constitutes the required epistemic credential to warrant assertion. If we are right that understanding (and not just knowledge) is the epistemic norm for a restricted class of assertions, then this straightforwardly undercuts not only the widely supposed quantitative view, but also a more general presupposition concerning the universalisability of some norm governing assertion—the presumption (almost entirely unchallenged since Williamson’s 1996 paper) that any epistemic norm that governs some assertions should govern assertions—as a class of speech act—uniformly. 相似文献
284.
Michael T. McFall 《Philosophia》2011,39(4):657-672
The decision to get married, as well as choosing whom to marry, is of the utmost importance to most people. This decision
consists of many amoral considerations, but an ethical relationship arises when a promise is made, especially a vow that binds
for a lifetime and affects oneself, one’s spouse, one’s children, and society. This essay provides an account of ideal romantic
marriage, arguing that John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty provides an excellent foundation for constructing such an account. Neither dead dogma nor living truth is a healthy model
for marriage, so a hybrid model of marriage, living dogma, is developed. The importance of the marital vow becomes apparent
as the living dogma account is revealed, and this examination yields a model for how to decide when and whom to marry. 相似文献
285.
Brandon Warmke 《Philosophia》2011,39(1):179-200
Moral responsibility invariantism is the view that there is a single set of conditions for being morally responsible for an
action (or omission or consequence of an act or omission) that applies in all cases. I defend this view against some recent
arguments by Joshua Knobe and John Doris. 相似文献
286.
Recently, the ‘right to die’ became a major social issue. Few agree suicide is a right tout court. Even those who believe suicide (‘regular’, passive, or physician-assisted) is sometimes morally permissible usually require
that a suicide be ‘rational suicide’: instrumentally rational, autonomous, due to stable goals, not due to mental illness,
etc. We argue that there are some perfectly ‘rational suicides’ that are, nevertheless, bad mistakes. The concentration on
the rationality of the suicide instead of on whether it is a mistake may lead to permitting suicides that should be forbidden. 相似文献
287.
Kevin Meeker 《Philosophia》2011,39(2):369-373
W. V. O. Quine’s assault on the analytic/synthetic distinction is one of the most celebrated events in the history of twentieth
century philosophy. This paper shines a light on Quine’s own understanding of the history of this distinction. More specifically,
this paper argues, contrary to what seems to be the received view, that Quine explicitly recognized a kindred subversive spirit
in David Hume. 相似文献
288.
289.
Andrew C. Khoury 《The Journal of value inquiry》2011,45(2):135-146
290.