Overconfidence in Probability and Frequency Judgments: A Critical Examination

The overconfidence observed in calibration studies has recently been questioned on both psychological and methodological grounds. In the first part of the article we discuss these issues and argue that overconfidence cannot be explained as a selection bias, and that it is not eliminated by random sampling of questions. In the second part of the article, we compare probability judgments for single events with judgments of relative frequency. Subjects received a target individual's personality profile and then predicted the target's responses to a series of binary questions. One group predicted the responses of an individual target, while a second group estimated the relative frequency of responses among all target subjects who shared a given personality profile. Judgments of confidence and estimates of relative frequency were practically indistinguishable; both exhibited substantial overconfidence and were highly correlated with independent judgments of representativeness.     

Changing Perspective: Building Creative Mindsets

The search for new ideas often frustratingly cycles back to old ones, a phenomenon known as fixation. Recent research has shown ways to kick-start finding new uses for familiar objects, a prototypical creativity task: wandering in the mind or the world or working on a messy desk. Those techniques seem to succeed by helping break fixation, but do not guide the search for new ideas. The perspective-taking or human-centric or empathic mindset championed by many in HCI and in design firms does provide a search strategy. We compared the mind-wandering mindset to a perspective-taking mindset, the latter priming thinking of ways that people in different roles (gardener, artist, etc.) might use the objects. In two studies, the Perspective-Taking mindset yielded more ideas and more original ideas than Mind-Wandering, which did not differ from a No-Mindset control. Original ideas came late, rewarding persistence. The perspective-taking mindset is productive for problem-solving, forecasting, and social interactions as well as innovation.     

Memory for faces: Are caricatures better than photographs?

Because photographs capture an individual at a moment in time, they contain fleeting features as well as more stable ones. Caricature line drawings, however, include stable features and emphasize distinctive ones. As such, caricatures are closer to schematic memory representations than are photographs. Three experiments using faces of public figures test the hypothesis that caricatures yield better performance than do photographs. Contrary to hypothesis, photographs lead to better performance than do line-drawing caricatures in three different tasks: name recall, face recognition, and name-face verification reaction time. Photographs are also rated as more characteristic or representative of their targets than are line-drawing caricatures.     

Differential weighting of common and distinctive components

We investigated possible explanations of the finding that the relative weight (W) of common components in similarity judgments is higher for verbal than for pictorial stimuli. A serial presentation of stimulus components had no effect on verbal stimuli; it increased the impact of both common and distinctive components of pictorial stimuli but did not affect their relative weight. On the other hand, W was increased by manipulations that reduced the cohesiveness of composite pictures, such as separating, scrambling, and mixing their components. Furthermore, W was decreased by manipulations that enhanced the cohesiveness of composite verbal stimuli by imposing structure on their components. Verbal and pictorial representations of the same stimuli yielded no systematic differences in W.     

Cognitive constraints on ordering operations: the case of geometric analogies

Many tasks (e.g., solving algebraic equations and running errands) require the execution of several component processes in an unconstrained order. The research reported here uses the geometric analogy task as a paradigm case for studying the ordering of component processes in this type of task. In solving geometric analogies by applying mental transformations such as rotate, change size, and add a part, the order of performing the transformations is unconstrained and does not in principle affect solution accuracy. Nevertheless, solvers may bring cognitive constraints with them to the analogy task that influence the ordering of the transformations. First, we demonstrate that solvers have a preferred order for performing mental transformations during analogy solution. We then investigate three classes of explanations for the preferred order, one based on general information processing considerations, another based on task-specific considerations, and a third based on individual differences in analogy ability. In the first and third experiments, college students solved geometric analogies requiring two or three transformations and indicated the order in which they performed the transformations. There was close agreement on nearly the same order for both types of analogies. In the second experiment, subjects were directed to perform pairs of transformations in the preferred or unpreferred order. Both speed and accuracy were greater for the preferred orders, thus validating subjects' reported orders. Ability differences were observed for only the more difficult three-transformation problems: High- and middle-ability subjects agreed on an overall performance order, but the highs were more consistent in their use of this order. Low-ability subjects did not consistently order the transformations for these difficult problems. The general information processing factor examined was working-memory load. A number of task factors have been shown to affect working-memory load during the solution of inductive reasoning problems. Of these, we chose to examine process difficulty. Because analogies are solved in working memory, performing more difficult transformations earlier may reduce working-memory load and facilitate problem solution. However, the observed performance order was not correlated with transformation difficulty. The first task-specific factor considered was that some transformations may be identified earlier, possibly because of perceptual salience, and that the performance order follows the identification order.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

Developmental trends in the use of perceptual and conceptual attributes in grouping,clustering, and retrieval

In Experiment I, two tasks were administered to children aged 4, 5, and 9 in order to investigate preference for perceptual versus conceptual attributes in grouping of common objects, and in various aspects of memory. The grouping task revealed a clear chronological progression: color and form determined the youngest children's grouping about equally; form dominated in the 5-year-olds; and most of the oldest children grouped primarily by conceptual attributes. In the memory task, three lists—one organized by color, one by form, one by superordinate category—were presented for free, followed by cued recall. Clustering showed the developmental shift from color to form to concept, while cued recall showed conceptual superiority at all ages. Experiment II replicated the memory task, yielding the same results. The results were discussed in terms of the relative abstractness and predictability of conceptual versus perceptual attributes and the difficulty of abstraction in encoding and the function of predictability in retrieval.     

Structure and strategy in encoding simplified graphs

Tversky and Schiano (1989) found a systematic bias toward the 45 degrees line in memory for the slopes of identical lines when embedded in graphs, but not in maps, suggesting the use of a cognitive reference frame specifically for encoding meaningful graphs. The present experiments explore this issue further using the linear configurations alone as stimuli. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate that perception and immediate memory for the slope of a test line within orthogonal "axes" are predictable from purely structural considerations. In Experiments 3 and 4, subjects were instructed to use a diagonal-reference strategy in viewing the stimuli, which were described as "graphs" only in Experiment 3. Results for both studies showed the diagonal bias previously found only for graphs. This pattern provides converging evidence for the diagonal as a cognitive reference frame in encoding linear graphs, and demonstrates that even in highly simplified displays, strategic factors can produce encoding biases not predictable solely from stimulus structure alone.     

Parts and the basic level in natural categories and artificial stimuli: Comments on Murphy (1991)

Natural taxonomies consist of categories that vary in level of abstraction. Categories at the basic level, such as chair and apple, are preferred in a broad range of situations (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976). Several studies have revealed qualitative differences between the basic level and other levels. For example, Tversky and Hemenway (1984) presented evidence that parts proliferative at the basic level; they proposed that parts link the appearance of category members with their functions. Although not taking issue with these findings, Murphy (1991) investigated whether parts are necessary or sufficient for a basic level. In an attempt to demonstrate that parts are not necessary, Murphy used artificial stimuli that did not capture the essential features of natural taxonomies. These discrepancies preclude any conclusions based on his studies. Murphy's data also do not support his claim that parts are not sufficient for a basic level. Finally, it is unlikely that pursuing questions of necessity or sufficiency will produce insights into human categorization.