The Incremental Validity of Self-Report and Performance-Based Methods for Assessing Hostility to Predict Cardiovascular Disease in Physicians

We evaluated the utility of an integrative, multimethod approach for assessing hostility-related constructs to predict premature cardiovascular disease (CVD) and premature coronary heart disease (CHD) using participants from the Johns Hopkins Precursors Study, which was designed to identify risk factors for heart disease. Participants were assessed at baseline while in medical school from 1946 to 1962 (M age = 24.6) and have been followed annually since then. Baseline assessment included individually administered Rorschach protocols (N = 416) scored for aggressive imagery (i.e., Aggressive Content, Aggressive Past) and self-reports of 3 possible anger responses to stress. Cox regression analyses predicting morbidity or mortality by age 55 revealed a significant interaction effect; high levels of Aggressive Content with high self-reported hostility predicted an increased rate of premature CVD and CHD, and incrementally predicted the rate of these events after controlling for the significant covariates of smoking (CVD and CHD) and cholesterol (CHD) that were also assessed at baseline. The hostility and anger measures, as well as other baseline covariates, were not predictors of CVD risk factors assessed at midlife during follow-up. Overall, this integrative model of hostility illustrates the potential value of multimethod assessment to areas of health psychology and preventive medicine.     

Does practice in category learning increase rule use or exemplar use—or both?

Categorization research has demonstrated the use of both rules and remembered exemplars in classification, although there is disagreement over whether learners shift from one to the other or use both strategies simultaneously. Theoretical arguments can motivate predictions for both rule use and exemplar use increasing with more practice. We describe a single large experiment (n = 190) that manipulated the number of training items (category size), the number of presentations of each training item, and the similarity between the training and the transfer stimuli in order to discover when rules and exemplars are most likely to be used. Results showed that rules and exemplars both influenced classification and that exemplars were used more often with smaller categories, with more training on items, and when test items were similar to training items. There was no consistent evidence of a shift from rule-based to exemplar-based categorization with more learning. Importantly, we found a number of conditions in which rules and exemplars were both used, even within individual participants. We discuss our results in terms of hybrid models of classification.     

Resolving Peer Disagreements Through Imprecise Probabilities

Two compelling principles, the Reasonable Range Principle and the Preservation of Irrelevant Evidence Principle, are necessary conditions that any response to peer disagreements ought to abide by. The Reasonable Range Principle maintains that a resolution to a peer disagreement should not fall outside the range of views expressed by the peers in their dispute, whereas the Preservation of Irrelevant Evidence (PIE) Principle maintains that a resolution strategy should be able to preserve unanimous judgments of evidential irrelevance among the peers. No standard Bayesian resolution strategy satisfies the PIE Principle, however, and we give a loss aversion argument in support of PIE and against Bayes. The theory of imprecise probability allows one to satisfy both principles, and we introduce the notion of a set‐based credal judgment to frame and address a range of subtle issues that arise in peer disagreements.     

Impulsive choice and pre‐exposure to delays: iv. effects of delay‐ and immediacy‐exposure training relative to maturational changes in impulsivity

Impulsive choice describes preference for smaller, sooner rewards over larger, later rewards. Excessive delay discounting (i.e., rapid devaluation of delayed rewards) underlies some impulsive choices, and is observed in many maladaptive behaviors (e.g., substance abuse, gambling). Interventions designed to reduce delay discounting may provide therapeutic gains. One such intervention provides rats with extended training with delayed reinforcers. When compared to a group given extended training with immediate reinforcers, delay‐exposed rats make significantly fewer impulsive choices. To what extent is this difference due to delay‐exposure training shifting preference toward self‐control or immediacy‐exposure training (the putative control group) shifting preference toward impulsivity? The current study compared the effects of delay‐ and immediacy‐exposure training to a no‐training control group and evaluated within‐subject changes in impulsive choice across 51 male Wistar rats. Delay‐exposed rats made significantly fewer impulsive choices than immediacy‐exposed and control rats. Between‐group differences in impulsive choice were not observed in the latter two groups. While delay‐exposed rats showed large, significant pre‐ to posttraining reductions in impulsive choice, immediacy‐exposed and control rats showed small reductions in impulsive choice. These results suggest that extended training with delayed reinforcers reduces impulsive choice, and that extended training with immediate reinforcers does not increase impulsive choice.     

Accuracy of Clinician Predictions of Future Self‐Harm: A Systematic Review and Meta‐Analysis of Predictive Studies

Assessment of a patient after hospital‐treated self‐harm or psychiatric hospitalization often includes a risk assessment, resulting in a classification of high risk versus low risk for a future episode of self‐harm. Through systematic review and a series of meta‐analyses looking at unassisted clinician risk classification (eight studies; N = 22,499), we found pooled estimates for sensitivity 0.31 (95% CI: 0.18–0.50), specificity 0.85 (0.75–0.92), positive predictive value 0.22 (0.21–0.23), and negative predictive value 0.89 (0.86–0.92). Clinician classification was too inaccurate to be clinically useful. After‐care should therefore be allocated on the basis of a needs rather than risk assessment.     

On Fodor's First Law of the Nonexistence of Cognitive Science

In his enormously influential The Modularity of Mind, Jerry Fodor (1983) proposed that the mind was divided into input modules and central processes. Much subsequent research focused on the modules and whether processes like speech perception or spatial vision are truly modular. Much less attention has been given to Fodor's writing on the central processes, what would today be called higher‐level cognition. In “Fodor's First Law of the Nonexistence of Cognitive Science,” he argued that central processes are “bad candidates for scientific study” and would resist attempts at empirical analysis. This essay evaluates his argument for this remarkable claim, concluding that although central processes may well be “messier” than input modules, this does not mean that they cannot be studied and understood. The article briefly reviews the scientific progress made in understanding central processes in the 35 years since the book was published, showing that Fodor's prediction is clearly falsified by massive advances in topics like decision making and analogy. The essay concludes that Fodor's Law was not based on a clear argument for why the complexities of central systems could not be studied but was likely based on intuitions and preferences that were common in psychology at the time.