The unconscious pursuit of emotion regulation: implications for psychological health

Because of the central involvement of emotion regulation in psychological health and the role that implicit (largely unconscious) processes appear to play in emotion regulation, implicit emotion-regulatory processes should play a vital role in psychological health. We hypothesised that implicitly valuing emotion regulation translates into better psychological health in individuals who use adaptive emotion-regulation strategies. A community sample of 222 individuals (56% women) who had recently experienced a stressful life event completed an implicit measure of emotion regulation valuing (ER-IAT) and reported on their habitual use of an important adaptive emotion-regulation strategy: cognitive reappraisal. We measured three domains of psychological health: well-being, depressive symptoms, and social adjustment. As hypothesised, individuals who implicitly valued emotion regulation exhibited greater levels of psychological health, but only when they were high in cognitive reappraisal use. These findings suggest that salutary effects of unconscious emotion-regulation processes depend on its interplay with conscious emotion-regulation processes.     

Inhibitory interaction: the effects of multiple non-predictive visual cues

When the interval between a non-predictive cue and a target appearing at the same spatial location is longer than about 200 ms, target performance is typically poorer than when the cue and target appear at different locations. Recent studies have shown that this effect, known as inhibition of return (IOR), can occur at multiple cued locations, and is enhanced when multiple cues are presented at the same spatial location. However, little is known about how the magnitude of IOR at one spatial location is influenced by a subsequent or preceding cue presented at a different spatial location. We investigated this issue by presenting single or multiple cues at varying inter-cue intervals prior to target onset. Results suggest that the magnitude of IOR at a given location is influenced by the presentation of a preceding cue, but that once IOR occurs, it is unaffected by the presentation of a subsequent cue.     

Priming in the attentional blink: Perception without awareness?

The attentional blink refers to a reduction in accuracy that occurs when observers are required to identify the second of two rapidly sequential targets. Even when the second target cannot be reported, however, it is still capable of priming the response to a subsequent related item. At issue in the present work was whether this priming is attributable mainly to conscious or unconscious processes. To answer this question, we used an exclusion procedure that permitted an assessment of the relative dominance of conscious and unconscious processes. The results showed that second targets that are identified incorrectly are nonetheless processed extensively outside of awareness. Moreover, this processing is sufficient to prime a subsequent response for at least 1 s after the onset of the prime.     

The Decision-Theoretic Lockean Thesis

Abstract

Certain philosophers maintain that there is a ‘constitutive threshold for belief’: to believe that p just is to have a degree of confidence that p above a certain threshold. On the basis of this view, these philosophers defend what is known as ‘the Lockean Thesis’, according to which it is rational to believe that p just in case it is rational to have a degree of confidence that p above the constitutive threshold for belief. While not directly speaking to the controversy over the Lockean Thesis, this paper defends the general idea behind it—namely, the thesis that there is some threshold such that it is rational to believe that p if and only if it is rational to have a degree of confidence greater than that threshold. This paper identifies the threshold in question—not with the alleged constitutive threshold for belief—but with what I call ‘the practical threshold for rational belief’. Roughly, the thesis defended here is that it is rational to believe that p if and only if it is rational to have a degree of confidence that p that rationalizes engaging in certain types of practical reasoning.     

Does delaying judgments of learning really improve the efficacy of study decisions? Not so much

A widely held assumption in metamemory is that better, more accurate metamemory monitoring leads to better, more efficacious restudy decisions, reflected in better memory performance--we refer to this causal chain as the restudy selectivity hypothesis. In 3 sets of experiments, we tested this hypothesis by factorially manipulating metamemory monitoring accuracy and self-regulation of study. To manipulate monitoring accuracy, we compared judgments of learning (JOLs) made contemporaneously with a delayed retrieval attempt to JOLs either made at a delay without attempting retrieval or made immediately after study; in previous studies, delayed retrieval-based JOLs have robustly predicted recall with greater relative accuracy than have the other JOL types. To manipulate self-regulation of study, in Experiments 1A-1C and 2A-2C, we compared conditions in which participants' restudy selections were honored with conditions in which they were completely or randomly dishonored; in Experiments 3A-3C, we randomly honored or dishonored half of the restudy selections and half of the nonselections. Results revealed that the benefit of delayed, retrieval-based JOLs for final memory performance was due largely to the selection of more items for restudy rather than to better discriminations between items that would benefit more versus less from restudy. In most cases, gains in recall due to greater self-regulation of study did not increase with better monitoring accuracy; when they did, the effect was extremely small. The surprising conclusion was that restudy decisions were not very much more efficacious under conditions that yield greater monitoring accuracy than under those that do not.     

Underestimating numerosity of items in visual search tasks

Previous research on numerosity judgments addressed attended items, while the present research addresses underestimation for unattended items in visual search tasks. One potential cause of underestimation for unattended items is that estimates of quantity may depend on viewing a large portion of the display within foveal vision. Another theory follows from the occupancy model: estimating quantity of items in greater proximity to one another increases the likelihood of an underestimation error. Three experimental manipulations addressed aspects of underestimation for unattended items: the size of the distracters, the distance of the target from fixation, and whether items were clustered together. Results suggested that the underestimation effect for unattended items was best explained within a Gestalt grouping framework.     

Revisiting the rise and fall of false recall: Presentation rate effects depend on retention interval

Leading theories of false memory predict that veridical and false recall of lists of semantically associated words can be dissociated by varying the presentation speed during study. Specifically, as presentation rate increases from milliseconds to seconds, veridical recall is predicted to increase monotonically while false recall is predicted to show a rapid rise and then a slow decrease—a pattern shown by McDermott and Watson (2001) in a study using immediate recall tests. In three experiments we tested the generality of the effects of rapid presentation rates on veridical and false memory. In Experiments 1 and 2 participants exhibited high levels of false recall on a delayed recall test, even for very fast stimulus onset asynchronies (SOA)—contrary to predictions from leading theories of false memory. When we switched to an immediate recall test in Experiment 3 we replicated the pattern predicted by the theories and observed by McDermott and Watson. Follow-up analyses further showed that the relative output position of false recalls is not affected by presentation rate, contrary to predictions from fuzzy trace theory. Implications for theories of false memory, including activation monitoring theory and fuzzy trace theory, are discussed.     

Poorer sleep quality is associated with lower emotion-regulation ability in a laboratory paradigm

Theoretical models suggest a positive relationship between sleep quality and individuals' ability to regulate emotion. However, few studies have empirically tested this hypothesised link using standardised laboratory measures of emotion-regulation ability. The present research examined the relationship between sleep quality and the ability to implement a type of emotion regulation that has particularly important implications for psychological health: cognitive reappraisal (cognitively reframing an emotional event so as to dampen its impact). To do so, 156 participants (86 male) reported on their past week's sleep quality. Their ability to implement cognitive reappraisal (CRA) was then measured with a standardised laboratory challenge. Participants with poorer self-reported sleep quality exhibited lower CRA, even after controlling for fourteen potential key confounds (e.g., age, negative affect, mood disorder symptoms, stress). This finding is consistent with the idea that poorer sleep quality impairs individuals' ability to engage in the crucial task of regulating negative emotions.