Extrapolating from Laboratory Behavioral Research on Nonhuman Primates Is Unjustified

Conducting research on animals is supposed to be valuable because it provides information on how human mechanisms work. But for the use of animal models to be ethically justified, it must be epistemically justified. The inference from an observation about an animal model to a conclusion about humans must be warranted for the use of animals to be moral. When researchers infer from animals to humans, it’s an extrapolation. Often nonhuman primates are used as animal models in laboratory behavioural research. The target populations are humans and other nonhuman primates. I argue that the epistemology of extrapolation renders the use of nonhuman primates in laboratory behavioural research unreliable. If the model is relevantly similar to the target, then the experimental conditions introduce confounding variables. If the model is not relevantly similar to the target, then the observations of the model cannot be extrapolated to the target. Since using nonhuman primates as animal models in laboratory behavioural research is not epistemically justified, using them as animal models in laboratory behavioural research is not ethically justified.     

Decision‐making competence: External validation through an individual‐differences approach

This study asks to what extent (a) individuals show consistent performance differences across typical behavioral decision‐making tasks, and (b) how those differences correlate with plausible real‐world correlates of good decision making. Seven tasks, chosen to span the domain of decision‐making skills, were administered to participants in an ongoing longitudinal study providing extensive social, psychological, and behavioral measures. Performance scores on individual tasks generally showed small, positive inter‐task correlations. An aggregate measure of decision‐making competence (DMC) was appropriately correlated with plausible sources, concomitants, and outcomes of good decision making, suggesting the underlying construct's external validity. Higher DMC scores were associated with more intact social environments, more constructive cognitive styles, and fewer ‘maladaptive’ risk behaviors. In each case, DMC adds to the predictive validity of general measures of cognitive ability. These results suggest that poor decision making on common laboratory tasks is related to real‐world antecedents and consequences of poor decision making. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Perfectionism and Suicidal Preoccupation

ABSTRACT One hundred twenty-nine undergraduate students were assessed for suicidal preoccupation, using the Alabama Adolescent Health Survey (AAHS) and selected cards from the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT). They were also administered the Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (MPS) to assess perfectionistic tendencies. Objective scoring of the TAT was found to be highly reliable. Canonical correlational analyses were nonsignificant for a relationship between perfectionism and suicidal themes on the TAT. However, the more direct questions of the AAHS relating to suicide were significantly related to perfectionism. Results suggest that passive perfectionists who procrastinate out of fear of making mistakes are more likely to be preoccupied with suicide, unlike perfectionists whose strivings produce achievement. High personal standards and parental expectations do not appear related to suicidal preoccupations.     

Revs and Psychos: Role,Impact and Interaction of Sport Chaplains and Sport Psychologists within English Premiership Soccer

Despite an increased focus on spirituality and athlete well-being in sport (Watson, 2011), there is limited research regarding those who provide support to the athlete in these areas. The aim of this study was to explore the practice of sport psychologists and sport chaplains within professional soccer, and identify potential for working partnerships. By interviewing three psychologists and four chaplains who are employed currently within English Premiership soccer, it was revealed that significant overlap in their roles existed. The psychologists and chaplains identified barriers that restricted support offered to players, which may be addressed by working cooperatively in the future.     

Hedonic contrast and condensation: Good stimuli make mediocre stimuli less good and less different

Loud sounds make soft sounds softer (contrast) and also make them less discriminable (which we callcondensation). We report on parallel phenomena in hedonics: Good stimuli reduce the pleasantness of less good stimuli, and also reduce people’s preferences among the less good stimuli. In Experiment 1, subjects rated the pleasantness of fruit juices diluted to approximate hedonic neutrality. Subjects who had just previously drunk and rated some good-tasting full-strength juices rated the diluted juices lower than did subjects who had not (hedonic contrast). In Experiment 2, subjects drank pairs of diluted juices and rated their preference for one juice over the other. Subjects who had just previously drunk and rated pairs of full-strength juices gave lower preference ratings between the diluted juices than did subjects who had not (condensation). Thus the same stimulus set produced contrast in Experiment 1 and condensation in Experiment 2, paralleling results in loudness.     

Children's attributions of intentions to an invisible agent

Children ages 3-9 years were informed that an invisible agent (Princess Alice) would help them play a forced-choice game by "telling them, somehow, when they chose the wrong box," whereas a matched control group of children were not given this supernatural prime. On 2 unexpected event trials, an experimenter triggered a simulated unexpected event (i.e., a light turning on/off; a picture falling), and children's behavioral response to these events (i.e., moving their hand to the opposite box) was coded. Results showed a significant Age GroupxExperimental Condition interaction; the only children to reliably alter their behavior in response to the unexpected events were the oldest children (M=7 years 4 months), who were primed with the invisible agent concept. For children's posttest verbal explanations, also, only these children saw the unexpected events as being referential and declarative (e.g., "Princess Alice did it because I chose the wrong box"). Together, these data suggest that children may not regularly begin to see communicative signs as embedded in unexpected events until they are around 7 years of age.