The Spirit in Public Theology: Appropriating the Legacy of Abraham Kuyper – Vincent E. Bacote

Book reviewed:
The Spirit in Public Theology: Appropriating the Legacy of Abraham Kuyper , Vincent E. Bacote, Baker Academic 2005 (0-8010-2740-3), 172 pp., pb $18.99     

Recognition of facial emotions in neuropsychiatric disorders

Recognition of facial emotions represents an important aspect of interpersonal communication and is governed by select neural substrates. We present data on emotion recognition in healthy young adults utilizing a novel set of color photographs of evoked universal emotions. In addition, we review the recent literature on emotion recognition in psychiatric and neurologic disorders, and studies that compare different disorders.     

ALDH2 status and conduct disorder mediate the relationship between ethnicity and alcohol dependence in Chinese, Korean, and White American college students

This study examined aldehyde dehydrogense (ALDH2) gene status, alcohol dehydrogense (ADH2) gene status, conduct disorder, and alcohol dependence in Chinese, Korean, and White American college students. Chinese had a lower rate of alcohol dependence (5%) than Koreans (13%) and Whites (17%). Koreans had a higher rate of conduct disorder (15%) than Whites (9%) and Chinese (6%). The relationship of ethnicity to alcohol dependence was mediated by ALDH2 status and conduct disorder, although Chinese ethnicity remained significant. ADH2 status was not related to alcohol dependence with ALDH2 included, and no interactions were significant. Results suggest that different rates of risk (e.g., conduct disorder) and protective (e.g., ALDH2 status) factors partially account for ethnic differences in rates of alcohol dependence.     

On Not Confusing the Tree of Trustworthy Statistics with the Greater Forest of Good Science: A Comment on Simmons et al.’s Perspective on Pre‐registration

In this commentary on Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn (this issue), we examine their rationale for pre‐registration within the broader perspective of what good science is. We agree that there is potential benefit in a system of pre‐registration if implemented selectively. However, we believe that other tools of open science such as the full sharing of study materials and open access to underlying data, provide most of the same benefits—and more (i.e., the prevention of outright fraud)—without risking the potential adverse consequences of a system of pre‐registration. This is why we favor these other means of controlling type I error and fostering transparency. Direct replication, as opposed to conceptual replication, should be encouraged as well.     

Behavioral Functions of Aesthetics: Science and Art,Reason, and Emotion

The Psychological Record - In his landmark article for this journal, Francis Mechner (2017) presents a novel analysis of the confluence of unique combinations of variables accounting for aesthetic...     

Avoiding the Asymmetry Problem

If earlier‐than‐necessary death is bad because it deprives individuals of additional good life, then why isn't later‐than‐necessary conception bad for the same reason? Deprivationists have argued that prenatal non‐existence is not bad because it is impossible to be conceived earlier, but postmortem non‐existence is bad because it is possible to live longer. Call this the Impossibility Solution . In this paper, I demonstrate that the Impossibility Solution does not work by showing how it is possible to be conceived earlier in the same senses it is possible to live longer. I then offer a solution to the Asymmetry Problem by suggesting a novel way to separate the badness of each type of non‐existence from the type, and frequency, of attitudes we should have towards each type of non‐existence. Even if both types of non‐existence are equally bad, certain contingent facts about our postmortem non‐existence provide reason for the badness of early deaths to be more frequently salient than the badness of late conceptions. 1 1 For helpful discussion and feedback on earlier drafts of this paper, I am grateful to Kurt Blankschaen, Ben Bradley, Yishai Cohen, Jenni Ernst, John Martin Fischer, Frederik Kaufman, Gerald Marsh, Jeff McMahan, Hille Paakkunainen, Derek Parfit, Doug Portmore, Nate Sharadin, David Sobel, and my audience at the University of Miami. I am also greatly indebted to the anonymous referees who read this paper and whose detailed and insightful comments significantly improved the final product. Work on this paper was supported by the Immortality Project at the University of California Riverside, funded by the John Templeton Foundation.
     

Moral Obligations: Actualist,Possibilist, or Hybridist?

Do facts about what an agent would freely do in certain circumstances at least partly determine any of her moral obligations? Actualists answer ‘yes’, while possibilists answer ‘no’. We defend two novel hybrid accounts that are alternatives to actualism and possibilism: Dual Obligations Hybridism and Single Obligation Hybridism. By positing two moral ‘oughts’, each account retains the benefits of actualism and possibilism, yet is immune from the prima facie problems that face actualism and possibilism. We conclude by highlighting one substantive difference between our two hybrid accounts.     

Non-mereological pluralistic supersubstantivalism: an alternative perspective on the matter/spacetime relationship

In both the historical and contemporary literature on the metaphysics of space (and, more recently, spacetime), a core dispute is that between relationism and substantivalism. One version of the latter is supersubstantivalism, according to which space (or, again, spacetime) is the only kind of substance, such that what we think of as individual material objects (electrons, quarks, etc.) are actually just parts of spacetime which instantiate certain properties. If those parts are ontologically dependent on spacetime as a whole, then we arrive at an ontology with only a single genuinely independent substance, namely the entire spacetime manifold. This is monist supersubstantivalism. A view on which the parts of spacetime are ontologically prior to the whole has been called pluralistic supersubstantivalism. As currently formulated, supersubstantivalism (in either its monist or pluralistic forms) carries significant advantages and encounters major difficulties. I argue that some of the latter motivate an alternative formulation, non-mereological pluralistic supersubstantivalism, according to which spacetime is a real substance, but what we think of as material objects are also real substances, irreducible to and numerically distinct from that larger spacetime manifold and any of its parts. Yet, the underlying nature of those material objects is ultimately the same type as that of spacetime: at bottom, a particle is just a smaller quantity of spacetime embedded in or contained by or co-located with the larger whole that we would normally think of as ‘spacetime,’ capable both of genuine movement within/across the larger spacetime manifold and (at least in principle) independent existence from it.